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Chapter 1 
 
1 Setting the Scene 
 
1.1 Background 
Why do Iran’s natural resources matter? The other important question is to whom Iran’s 
natural resources matter? The former question can be addressed through some stylized 
facts. Iran is one of the founders of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC).1 Iran ranks among the world’s top three holders of both oil and 
natural gas reserves.  
At the end of 2007, Iran’s estimated  proved oil reserves were 138.4  billion barrels or 
11.2 % of the world's total proven petroleum.  At the same time, Iran has the second 
highest reserves to production (R/P) ratio (86.2) after UAE (91.9) in the world.2 Within 
OPEC, Iran is the second largest producer and exporter after Saudi Arabia. In 2008, Iran 
produced 3.8 million barrels per day, while Saudi Arabia’s production totalled 9.3 
million barrels per day. The record level of oil production by Iran was recorded in 1974 
which accounted for 6 million barrels per day. Since 1979, Iran has been unable to 
repeat that record mainly due to lack of sufficient foreign investment and as a result of 
war with Iraq among other factors. Globally, Iran is the fourth largest exporter of crude 
oil after Saudi Arabia, Russia and Norway.3  These aforementioned facts show the 
strategic position of Iran in the global oil markets.  
Natural resources and primarily oil also play a key role in the Iranian economy. Oil has 
become a strategic element of annual government budgets in Iran since 1974. Global oil 
prices have increased from $3.29 per barrel in 1973 to $11.58 in 1974. However, one of 
the main characteristics of oil markets is their very high volatility. Predicting oil prices 
                                                     
1 Founder members of the Organization are those countries which were represented at OPEC's first 
Conference, held in Baghdad, Iraq, in September 1960, and which signed the original agreement 
establishing OPEC. These members are Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela.  
2 Reserves-to-production (R/P) ratio - If the reserves remaining at the end of any year are divided by the 
production in that year, the result is the length of time that those remaining reserves would last if 
production were to continue at that level. 
3 For more details on Iran oil information see: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Iran/Oil.html  
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and developments of oil markets is very difficult if not impossible. Thus, linking the 
economy to the development of oil markets is a risky decision. Such a dangerous policy 
has been maintained over the past three decades. Still more than 90% of Iran’s foreign 
exchange reserves come from oil exports. This is an indicator of less attention to 
expanding non-oil export sections. Around 60% of annual government budgets are 
dependent on oil revenues. The government welfare system is financed through oil 
revenues. This includes the heavy subsidy system, especially for fuel products. Keeping 
the price of oil products such as gasoline below global prices carries a huge cost which 
is financed through oil revenues. Maintenance of a fixed exchange rate system requires 
rich foreign reserves, enabling the Central Bank to clear the market. Again, policies in 
Iran’s foreign exchange market are linked to the oil market situation. Finally, oil 
resources not only affect Iranians’ daily life but also affect Iran’s foreign policies.  
Oil is an important instrument for the matter of foreign diplomacy for Iran for a number 
of reasons. This is the point which makes natural resources in Iran a key matter for 
global powers including the United States. Howard (2007, p. 17) illustrates this issue:  
“Yet Iran’s challenge to the United States is not born of any military threat… This 
contemporary challenge to the United States is instead a consequence of a political 
leverage that essentially hinges on the world’s increasing need for the very resources 
that Iran possesses in such abundance. Their ownership inevitably bestows a degree of 
power and influence that exists in equal proportion to the need that others have for 
them, and this means that one country’s possession of oil inevitably has powerful 
political repercussions in the same way that the possession of any highly valued 
commodity, like brains or beauty, also confers power and influence on its beholder.”  
 
Hass (2009), as the  president of the US council on Foreign Relations, refers to Iran as 
“one of the most serious and most difficult national security challenges facing the 
United States… and one of the most influential local states in the greater Middle East”. 
He later connects the foreign politics of Iran and energy prices: “And Iran was also (at 
least until fairly recently) the beneficiary of high energy prices. The net result is that 
Iran is now something of an imperial power, one that defines its interests broadly and 
seeks to influence a large number and wide range of regional matters”.  
Natural resource management in Iran is in close nexus with illegal trade. This nexus is 
through large price disparity between fuel products in Iran and its neighbors. This price 
disparity is created through heavy subsidies on different petroleum products and some 
other goods such as medicine. Subsidies on gasoline besides over-consumption of 
inefficient cars and the limited capacity of Iranian refineries have forced the government 
to import a significant share of domestic gasoline consumption. For example, in 2006, 
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Iran used about 422000 bbl/d of gasoline and imports 170000 bbl/d of it. For this 
volume of import, Iran paid $4 billion (Nanay, 2006). Financing such a heavy subsidy 
and imports of gasoline is mostly through the withdrawals of Oil Stabilization Fund. 
The cheap domestic gasoline has provided enough incentive for its export smuggling in 
the past years. From 2000-2005, oil and oil products accounted for about 90% of export 
smuggling in Iran. Destinations of smuggled fuel have been Turkey, Iraq, Afghanistan 
and Pakistan. In 2005, the former Director General of Iran's Customs Administration 
mentioned that “The price difference for gasoline is to the benefit of smugglers... We 
must become an economically developed state and protect domestic production in order 
to eradicate smuggling”. Ramezanzade, the Iranian cabinet secretary of state in the 
government of Khatami, quantified the amount of fuel smuggling: “Each year, more 
than five billion litres of fuels...mainly including gasoline, are smuggled out of the 
country. It costs the state $1.13 billion per annum”.4 Increasing oil revenues also 
provide necessary financial sources for the government to continue its inefficient 
protectionist policies through high tariffs on imports. After the revolution, the Iranian 
government emphasized self-sufficiency policies. To this due, it has implemented 
various tariff burdens against the import of consumption goods to make domestic 
products more economical. The examples are supporting inefficient national car 
factories, textiles, mobile telephones and so on. Indeed, relying on oil revenues has 
reduced the costs of faulty policies in different aspects of economy and trade. These 
inefficient policies in foreign trade and in the foreign exchange market have provided 
necessary incentives for illicit trade.  
The Islamic Revolution in 1979 put an end to the autocracy system in Iran. While 
Iranians had experienced a strong ruler and the dominance of one group before the 
revolution, they had to deal with a new factionalized system afterwards. The main 
characteristic of the Islamic Republic is its factionalized nature. Many disorganized 
political groups and factions play the role of rent-seekers in the political economy of 
Iran. Though before the Revolution, one political family extracted the economic rent, 
during the post-revolutionary age many political families had to compete for rents. The 
question which arises in an oil economy is which political system may be more 
determinental for growth - a strong autocracy like the Shah or a factionalized system 
under the Islamic Republic? 
                                                     
4 http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb6478/is_15_64/ai_n29171375  (Access:10.03.2009) 
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Populism in Iran has its root in oil rents. The Islamic Revolution in Iran was a highlight 
of populist promises to the people. Provision of free electricity and water were among 
these populist slogans and promises which were given to the people on the advent of 
revolution.  However, the economic logic and scarcity of resources gradually dominated 
the political approach of the governors of the Islamic Republic. In 2005, the rather more 
logical way of thinking in the Iranian state was reversed and a populist person was 
elected as a president of Iran. Among his key election campaign promises was “bringing 
oil revenues to the dinner table of Iranians”. The populist agenda of president 
Ahmadinejad was revealed in a ceremony for confirmation of his presidency by the 
Supreme Leader Khamenei:  
“The new government will stress four principles including the  promotion of justice, 
attention to the needs of the people, serving all the masse, and the material and moral 
progress of the country. By following the pure Islamic culture and paying due attention 
to the people’s needs, the new government will put promotion of justice in all areas, 
fairness in the distribution of opportunities and facilities, the eradication of poverty and 
struggle against administrative discrimination and corruption at the top of its agenda” 
(Ehteshami and Zweiri, 2007, p. 64).  
In short, this dissertation is concerned with the effects of natural resources and the 
quality of governance on the macroeconomy of Iran.  
 
1.2 Outline of the dissertation and main findings 
This dissertation is comprised of four main chapters. Chapter 2 deals with 
macroeconomic effects of oil price shocks in Iran and tries to understand how oil shocks 
transfer into the Iranian economy. It also gives a comprehensive picture of the Iranian 
economy in the Middle East region. This study is one of only a handful of investigations 
into a developing, net oil exporting economy. The effects of oil price shocks are 
analyzed in three different channels: the supply side, the demand side, and the terms of 
trade. Our main results for the period 1989 to 2006 on the supply side of economy 
reveal that positive oil price shocks stimulate Iranian industrial production and real 
imports. On the other hand, negative shocks on oil prices undermine the process of real 
industrial production and play a significant role in lowering the real level of imports. On 
the demand side, both positive and negative oil price shocks have inflationary effects 
and drive up the general level of prices, which translate into lower real disposable 
incomes and a reduction in the real effective demand of Iranian consumers. Another 
unexpected finding is the response of government expenditures to oil price changes. We 
can identify only a marginal impact of oil price fluctuations on real government 
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expenditures. The third main result of our paper is on terms of trade. Increasing oil 
prices improves the terms of trade and appreciates the real effective exchange rate. The 
response of the exchange rate to positive shocks is significantly positive, and increasing 
in the short and midterm. At the same time, negative shocks cause significantly negative 
responses in the real effective exchange rate, increasing competitiveness of the tradable 
Iranian goods in international markets. In addition to the evaluation of impulse response 
analyses, I have carried out variance decomposition analyses to illustrate the 
contribution of oil price shocks to fluctuations of major macroeconomic variables in 
Iran. Studying the effects of asymmetric changes in real oil prices can be a step forward 
in understanding the Achilles' heel of the Iranian economy and in filling the existing gap 
in the empirical literature regarding the macroeconomics of oil in developing and net oil 
exporting countries. 
Chapter 3 sheds light on economic growth through the interaction of oil rents with the 
political power structure in Iran. This study examines the phenomenon of “the natural 
resource curse” in the rentier economy of Iran. Contrary to existing beliefs that higher 
oil rents are harmful for economic growth, I instead show that increasing political 
factionalism in an oil economy is a curse for economic growth. I find a dampening 
effect of higher symmetry of political power structure on growth for the case of Iran. 
For the maximum level of factionalism, one standard deviation increase in the share of 
oil rents in the government budget reduces real economic growth by 9% due to rent-
seeking efforts.  
Chapter 4 traces the fingerprints of illegal trades in the Iranian economy and explains 
how mismanagement of oil revenues can be harmful for the Iranian economy. More 
specifically, this study investigates the causes and consequences of import and export 
smuggling and estimates its relative size in Iran from 1970 to 2002. Multiple Indicators 
- Multiple Causes (MIMIC) modeling and calculation of trade misinvoicing are used to 
compute the latent variable of smuggling. The results indicate that the penalty rate for 
smuggling and the quality of economic and political institutions reduce smuggling, 
while tariffs and black market premium increase the incentives for illegal trade. More 
trade openness is associated with greater illegal trade in the case of Iran. On average, 
smuggling in Iran has been approximately 13% of the total trade. 
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Chapter 5 uses the Dornbusch and Edwards (1990) analytical framework to investigate 
the macroeconomic populism in Iran under the Ahmadinejad government. 
Macroeconomic populism is in close tandem with oil rents. My thesis endeavours to 
place the government of Ahmadinejad in a populist context and forecasts its fall mainly 
due to macroeconomic instabilities. The purpose of this thesis is to illustrate how 
closely Ahmadinejad's government follows the model of Dornbusch and Edwards 
(1990).  
Finally the conclusion of this dissertation in chapter 6 highlights the important issues in 
each chapter and illustrates a way forward for future research.  
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Chapter 2 
 
2 Oil and the Iranian Economy: A Macroeconometric 
Analysis5 
 
 
“Oil is so significant in the international economy that forecasts of economic growth are 
routinely qualified with the caveat: provided there is no oil shock” 
Adelman (1993, p. 537) 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The Iranian economy has experienced a volatile development since the first oil boom in 
1974. The first oil price hike in the mid of 1970s was the beginning point of “oil 
dependency” in Iran. Comparing the real GDP per capita of Iran with other non-oil 
regional economies such as Turkey and Malaysia as well as oil resource rich economy 
such as Norway is insightful. Figure 2.1 shows that the Iranian GDP per capita 
increased faster than the GDP of Turkey and Malaysia until 1976. In the late 1970s, the 
decreasing trend of economic growth began and the other regional non oil economies 
increased their gap with Iran. The destructive war with Iraq during 1980-1988 was one 
of the main causes of economic stagnation but that cannot justify this disappointing 
outcome. The natural resource curse literature explains such negative developments in 
oil economies, attributing it to high dependency of these economies to oil rents, to the 
Dutch disease phenomenon and to a weakening accountability of the government. It 
seems, however, that Iran is not the only oil economy which has had such a 
disappointing fate. Table 2.1 illustrates the overall economic performance of key oil rich 
countries of Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and non-MENA region in 
comparison with control groups. 
 
 
                                                     
5 This chapter is based on Farzanegan and Markwardt (2009). 
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Fig.2.1. Comparative GDP per capita (1968-2006) 
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Source: World Bank (2008) 
Table 2.1. Comparative economic performance of selected oil exporters  
Per capita GDP in* 
Growth 
rate** 
Per capita GDP 
 
1975 2004 1975-2004 
Highest 
value 
Year of 
highest 
MENA oil exporters 
Iran 6984 6916 -0.03% 7976 1976 
Kuwait 27760 17815 -1.52% 27760 1975
Saudi Arabia 21591 12706 -1.81% 23263 1977 
Non - MENA oil exporters 
Nigeria 922 1061 0.48% 1061 2004 
Mexico 6298 9010 1.75% 9046 2000 
Venezuela 7103 5544 -0,84% 7587 1977 
Comparators 
East Asia 806 4920 6.44% 4920 2004 
South Asia 1101 2635 3.06% 2635 2004 
World 4835 8187 1.83% 8187 2004 
Source: World Bank (2008) and own calculations. Note: * in US dollar (PPP, 2000), ** 
compounding geometric growth rate, MENA is the abbreviation for the Middle East and North 
Africa. 
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Oil and gas revenues play strategic roles in the structure of the Iranian economy. 
However, there is a difference between the Iranian economy and other key oil exporters 
of the MENA region. Although more than 90% of foreign exchange revenues of Iran 
come from oil exports and about 60% of government revenues in annual budgets 
depends on oil revenues, oil value added accounted for just about 20% of total GDP in 
the past years (Central Bank of Iran, 2008). This is in contrast with the higher share of 
oil GDP in the other oil exporter of MENA region. This is partly because of the more 
diversified economy of Iran, especially in agriculture, compared to the Arab oil rich 
economies. Table 2.2 compares the share of oil value added in GDP of key oil 
exporters.  
Table 2.2. Share of oil GDP in total GDP 
 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Iran … 9.5 13.4 10.4 16.1 17.5 
Kuwait 70.5 67.9 50.2 38 … 53.2 
Qatar 80.6 67.3 44.2 33.6 32.5 60.4 
Saudi Arabia 71.1 61.6 33.5 37.6 36.4 41 
UAE 67.5 63.3 45.3 46.7 35 39.8 
Source: Askari (2006)  
The low share of oil value added in the Iranian GDP can also be attributed to heavy 
price distortions of energy products in Iran. The massive subsidies on domestic sale of 
crude oil and oil products underestimate the real share of oil GDP in the economy. 
Nevertheless, the major share of state foreign revenues still comes from oil exports and 
a significant share of current and capital expenditures of state finance through the 
petrodollars. In a rentier economy6 like Iran the state has not to bear the risk of 
increasing taxes to finance provision of public goods.  
The share of total tax revenues in GDP in Iran is lower than any other developed and 
non-oil developing country. This causes the financial independency of the state from 
                                                     
6 Rentier economies are those in which resource wealth provides a high proportion of government 
revenue; e.g. a high resource-to-revenue ratio (see Herb 2005, p 8). Not any kind of resource wealth 
makes such a rentier state. Usually, oil resource which are geographically concentrates and their 
extraction is highly capital-intensive and  require complex and expensive technology, imposing sever 
barriers for entrance of private companies in this industry provides flow of rents to coffer of state.  
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contributions through taxes. It also creates a lack of accountability of state to people.7 
Figure 2.2 compares the share of tax revenues in GDP of Iran with control groups.  
Another characteristic of the Iranian economy is a massive subsidy of energy and non-
energy products. The government uses the oil rents to “buy-off” the population by 
offering costly subsidies. These subsides, especially on petroleum products, have 
created a large distortion in the price system. Large price disparities between Iran and 
its neighbors has fostered export smuggling of fuel in Iran, putting a heavy burden on 
the government budgets. In 1997, total energy subsidies accounted for about 18% of 
Iranian GDP and in 2002 it reached to 16.9 billion dollars or 14.5% of GDP (Iran 
Energy Report, 2005). 
Table 2.3 presents the relative prices of different kinds of oil products in Iran to import 
prices (Free on Board (FOB) prices of the Persian Gulf). This table shows, for example, 
that the local price of gasoline in Iran on average has been about 0.27 of the import 
prices.  
Fig.2.2. Share of tax revenues in GDP (%) 
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Source: World Bank (2008) 
                                                     
7 One of the main theorists of renteirism (Beblawi, 1987, p. 53) explains the political by side effects of oil 
rents as following: “Public goods and private favors have thus gone together in defining the role of the 
[rentier] state. With virtually no taxes, citizens are far less demanding in terms of political participation. 
The history of democracy owes its beginnings… to some fiscal association (no taxation without 
representation)” 
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Table 2.3. Ratio of Iranian oil products prices and FOB prices of Persian Gulf 
Products 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
LPG 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 
Gasoline-
normal 
0.27 0.26 0.24 0.27 0.21 0.34 0.34 0.38 0.31 0.23 0.21 
Kerosene 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.1 0.09 0.1 0.06 0.04 0.04 
Gasoil  0.06 0.07 0.09 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 
Source: Institute for International Energy Studies (IIES) (www.iies.org) 
The weak performance of the Iranian economy is a side-effect of oil dependency 
revenues and of the political economy based on such rents. The flow of oil rents into the 
economy increases demand for both non-tradable and tradable goods. Assuming that the 
price of tradable goods is exogenously given by international markets, the increased 
demand pushes the prices of non-tradables upward. These increased prices provide 
attractive profit making opportunities for economic agents, absorbing labor and capital 
from the tradable sector (mainly industry) to the non-tradable section. At the end, we 
should observe downsizing of the manufacturing sector and “de-industrialization” of 
the economy (see, e.g., Corden and Neary, 1982, Corden, 1984 and van Wijenbergen, 
1984). Furthermore, the major share of oil exports in total exports of Iran since mid 
1970s has linked the fate of Iranian growth to highly volatile energy market. This is 
clearly the Achilles' heel of political economy of Iran. 
Figure 2.3 illustrates the co-movement of the Iranian GDP per capita with fluctuations 
of real oil prices since 1970. We can observe that the former variable is linked to trend 
of the latter. Thus, any external and significant shock in the international oil markets 
affects the economic growth and development of Iran.  
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Fig.2.3. The co-movement between GDP per capita and oil price 
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Source: World Bank (2008) and IFS-Database (2008) 
Following the successful experience of other oil exports such as Norway in the 
management of oil revenues, the Iranian government established the Oil Stabilization 
Fund (OSF) in 2000. The main goal was to protect the economy against external oil 
price shocks. Investing the OSF resources in infrasturuce and construction projects, 
assisting the private sector, and covering the budget deficits were among the announced 
aims of this decision. However, the lack of transparency and accountability within the 
government administration has been the main challenges.  
Instead of channeling the OSF reserves in productive and profitable investments, the 
government has used it as the major source of financing budget deficits in recent years. 
The shares of various sources of financing the budget deficits in Iran over 2005 to 2007 
are presented in Table 2.4. As is evident from this table, more than 90% of annual 
budget deficits in Iran is financed through withdrawals from OSF. Furthremore, the 
extraction from OSFalways exceeded the planned amount in the annual budgets. This is 
a significant divergence from the initial aims of OSF.  
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Table 2.4. Financing budget deficit 
2005 2006 2007 
 
Budget Actual Budget Actual Budget Actual 
State bond 3.2% 3.3% 5.4% 0% 6.2% 0% 
Foreign 
borrowing 
2.1% 0% 3.2% 0% 2.8% 0.4% 
Privatization 30.9% 0.4% 4.8% 0.2% 26.4% 1.7% 
Oil 
Stabilization 
Fund 
57.5% 87.2% 82.7% 96.3% 62% 94% 
Others 6.2% 9.1% 3.9% 3.5% 2.6% 3.9% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Note: Budget and Actual refer to the planned and realized figures for financing government 
budget deficits, respectively. State bond are called participation bonds in Iran. Participation 
bonds are issued under certain conditions to avoid violation of religious law in transactions 
involving usury (For more details see: http://www.iran-daily.com/1385/2779/pdf/i6.pdf ). 
Source: Survey of the Iranian Economy, Karafarin Bank, Online E-library. 
One of the main channels of transfer of oil price shocks to the economy is foreign 
exchange fluctuations. The Dutch disease literature emphasizes this channel. 
Appreciation of foreign exchange during oil price booms results in a contraction of the 
tradable sector. Increasing the real effective exchange rate (appreciation of domestic 
currency) is associated with increasing oil prices, making domestic non-oil goods more 
expensive for foreign consumers. The major losers are industrial and manufacturing 
exporters who lost the international markets to their competitors. 
Figure 2.4 shows that there is a close co-movement between real oil prices and real 
effective exchange rates of Iran.8 During the booming oil markets, an over-valued 
domestic currency offset some of the increased oil wealth by reducing the non-oil 
exports.  
 
 
 
                                                     
8 Correlation between real effective exchange rate and oil prices from 1995-2006 is 0.61. 
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Fig.2.4. Co-movement of oil price and real effective exchange rate 
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Source: World Bank (2008) 
Given the high degree of dependence of the Iranian economy on oil revenues and the 
tremendous volatility in global oil markets (for example in the late 20089), a 
comprehensive analysis that considers the main transmission channels of oil price 
shocks on the Iranian economy is vital. This paper is one of the rare studies on a 
developing, net oil exporting economy which traces the asymmetric effects of oil 
shocks. The effects of oil price shocks are analyzed in three different channels: the 
supply side, the demand side, and the terms of trade. 
The main results for the period 1989–2006 on the supply side of economy reveal that 
positive oil price shocks stimulate Iranian industrial production10 and real imports. On 
the other hand, negative shocks on oil prices undermine the process of real industrial 
production and play a significant role in lowering the real level of imports. On the 
demand side, both positive and negative oil price shocks have inflationary effects and 
drive up the general level of prices, which translate into lower real disposable incomes 
and a reduction in the real effective demand of Iranian consumers. Another unexpected 
finding is the response of government expenditures to oil price changes. We can 
identify only a marginal impact of oil price fluctuation on real government 
                                                     
9 For example, from July 2008-January 2009, the price of Iranian heavy oil is reduced by 300%.  
10 The same results were obtained in the case of using real GDP per capita instead of real industry value 
added GDP per capita. 
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expenditures. The behaviour of government expenditure may also due to the 
government intertemporal consumption smoothing.  
The third main result of this study is on the terms of trade. Increasing oil prices improve 
the terms of trade and appreciate the real effective exchange rate. The response of the 
exchange rate to positive shocks is significantly positive, and increasing in the short and 
midterm. At the same time, negative shocks cause significantly negative responses in 
the real effective exchange rate, increasing competitiveness of the tradable Iranian 
goods in international markets. In addition to the evaluation of impulse response 
analyses, I have carried out variance decomposition analyses to illustrate the 
contribution of oil price shocks to fluctuations of major macroeconomic variables in 
Iran. Studying the effects of asymmetric changes in real oil prices can be a step forward 
in understanding the Achilles' heel of the Iranian economy and in filling the existing gap 
in the empirical literature regarding the macroeconomics of oil in developing and net oil 
exporting countries. 
The chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, I briefly review the existing 
literature covering the oil price macroeconomic relationship. In section 2.3, the data and 
the VAR methodology will be discussed. The empirical findings, the discussion of 
results and robustness tests are presented in section 2.4. Finally, section 2.5 summarizes 
the main findings. 
2.2. Previous literature 
Volatility of oil markets and the important role of this strategic natural resource for 
global economic growth have attracted a great deal of attention to macroeconomic and 
political consequences of oil shocks. Researchers have focused on studying the impacts 
of crude oil price shocks mainly within developed, net oil-importing economies. 
However, explicit studies on net oil exporters have been rare so far. In an international 
context, oil price shocks may have a different impact depending on countries' sectoral 
compositions, their institutional structures and their economic development.11 
Researchers have focused on analyzing the relationship between oil price changes and 
macroeconomic variables such as output growth, employment, wages and inflation. As 
we will see, the literature is still far from reaching a consensus. In the following section, 
I will review some selected studies on industrial and developing economies. 
                                                     
11 See Cunado and de Garcia (2005) for a similar view. 
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2.2.1. Industrial economies 
There are several studies addressing the question of whether there is a relationship 
between oil price shocks and macroeconomic key variables.  
Pioneering work on oil price effects carried out by Darby (1982) and Hamilton (1983) 
focused on the US economy. While Darby was not able to identify a significant 
relationship between oil prices and macroeconomic variables, Hamilton found that oil 
price shocks were an important factor in almost all US recessions from 1949 to 1973. 
He concludes that changes in oil prices Granger-caused changes in unemployment and 
GNP in the US economy. 
Following Hamilton (1983), the literature for net oil importing countries raises two 
fundamental questions. First, is the relationship between oil prices and economic output 
stable over time? Second, does an asymmetric relationship exist between oil price 
changes and economic activity? 
In considering the first question, studies, e.g. by Burbridge and Harrison (1984), Gisser 
and Goodwin (1986), Hooker (1996), Rotemberg and Woodford (1996) and Schmidt 
and Zimmermann (2007), have shown that for several industrial countries oil price 
shocks have a significant negative impact on industrial production. However, they all 
concluded that the impact of oil price changes varies over time. It seems evident that the 
effects of oil price movements have weakened during the eighties.  
Blanchard and Gali (2007) examined and compared the current response of inflation and 
output in a group of industrialized economies to those of the 1970s. They concluded that 
the main reasons behind the weak response of economies in recent years are smaller 
energy intensity, a more flexible labor market, and improvements in monetary policies.  
In considering the second question, Mork (1989) proposes an asymmetric definition of 
oil prices and distinguishes between positive and negative oil price changes. He defines 
oil price changes as follows:12 
    ))roilproilp( ,0( maxroilp 1ttt −−=+                                                                       (2.1) 
    ))roilproilp( ,0( minroilp 1ttt −−=−                                                                       (2.2) 
                                                     
12 Mork does not use real oil prices in absolute terms. Instead he uses several producer price indices for 
crude oil. For a more detail description see Mork (1989), p. 741. 
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where roilpt is the log of real oil price in time t. Mork showed that there is an 
asymmetry in the responses of macroeconomic variables to oil price increases and 
decreases. He concluded that positive oil price changes have a strongly negative and 
significant relationship with changes in real GNP while negative oil price changes 
exhibit no significant effects. For more comprehensive details on asymmetric effects of 
oil prices see Mork (1994). 
Hamilton (1996) suggested another form of asymmetric transformation of real oil 
prices. Hamilton stated that most of the oil price increases are simply corrections of 
earlier declines. He argued that, if researchers want to measure how unsettling an 
increase in the prices of oil is likely to be for the spending decision of consumers and 
firms, it seems more appropriate to compare the current price of oil with that during the 
previous year rather than during the previous quarter alone (see Hamilton, 1996, p. 
216). Hamilton thus proposed using the percentage change over the previous year's 
maximum if the oil price of the current quarter exceeds the value of the preceding four 
quarters' maximum. If the price of oil in t is lower than in the previous year, the noilp+ 
is defined to be zero in quarter t. In this case no positive oil price shocks have occurred. 
[ ]))roilp(),...,roilp(( max)roilp((,0 maxnoilp 4t1ttt −−−=+                                        (2.3) 
 
[ ]))roilp(),...,roilp(( min)roilp((,0 minnoilp 4t1ttt −−−=−                                          (2.4) 
In his study, net nominal oil price increases are significant in explaining growth in the 
real GDP of the US. Hamilton (2003) asserted that “Oil price increases are much more 
important than oil price decreases, and increases have significantly less predictive 
content if they simply correct earlier decreases” (Hamilton, 2003, p. 363). 
Lee, Ni and Raati (1995) pointed to the volatile nature of oil prices since the big decline 
in 1986 and concluded that Mork's (1989) method of separating positive and negative 
effects does not reveal a strong effect of oil price shocks on real GNP growth for the 
sample up to 1992. If oil prices are volatile in nature, economic agents will expect an 
increase in prices to be reversed in a short time. They used a GARCH-model in order to 
extract conditional variance from real oil price changes.  
They concluded that positive oil price shocks are significantly negatively correlated 
with real GNP growth, but negative oil price shocks are not. In the same vein, Elder and 
Serletis (2006) showed that uncertainty about oil prices has a negative and significant 
effect on industrial production. 
 18
Effects of oil price shocks on inflation within industrial economies have also attracted 
the attention of economists. Using quarterly data for a group of European countries, 
Cunado and de Gracia (2003) shows that oil price shocks have a permanent effects on 
inflation and short run effects on production growth rates. Chen (2009) examined the oil 
price pass-through into inflation among 19 industrialized economies. He finds that 
“appreciation of the domestic currency, a more active monetary policy in response to 
inflation, and a higher degree of trade openness” among other factors are contributing 
to declining effects of oil prices on inflation. Cologni and Manera (2008) examined the 
relationship between oil price shocks, inflation and output of G-7 countries using a 
cointegrated VAR model. Their analysis shows that for all G7 countries except for 
Japan and the UK, oil price shocks have a detrimental role for increasing inflation. 
Inflation rates shocks, on the other hand, transfer into the real economy through interest 
rates.  
The other popular aspect of oil price shocks’ studies is the response of monetary 
policies and stock markets. Bachmeier (2008) emphasized the role of monetary policies 
in the transmission of oil shocks for the case of US economy. He finds that since 1986, 
the oil shocks have had negative effects on stock returns. He shows that oil shocks have 
effects on US economy beyond their effects on the monetary policies. He concludes that 
a systematic monetary policy is not as effective as suggested in some other studies. Park 
and Ratti (2008) examined the effects of oil price shocks on stock markets of the US 
and 13 European countries. They show that increased volatility of oil prices has 
dampening effect on the European stock markets. They concludes that contribution of 
oil price shocks to the volatility of real stock returns in the US and many other 
industrialized economies is more than that of interest rates.  
The asymmetric effects of oil price shocks on the economic growth are at the center of 
attention of economist. Jimenez-Rodriguez and Sanchez (2005) assessed empirically the 
effects of oil price shocks on real economic activities in a sample of seven OECD 
countries, Norway and the Euro area as a whole. They carried out a multivariate VAR 
analysis using both symmetric and asymmetric models. Jimenez-Rodrigez and Sanchez 
concluded that oil price increases have a larger impact on GDP growth than oil price 
declines.  
They emphasized the difference between oil importing and oil exporting countries. 
Among oil importers, oil price increases have a significant negative impact on economic 
activity, but for oil exporting countries, the effect is ambiguous. For a comprehensive 
 19
survey of recent developments on the relationship between oil price shocks and the 
macroeconomy in industrial countries, see Jones et al. (2004). 
2.2.2. Developing economies 
Despite the main focus of research directed towards net oil importers and developed 
economies, some recent studies have examined the effects of oil price changes on the 
macroeconomy of developing economies. In this literature, net oil exporting countries 
are the center of interest. 
Eltony and Al-Awadi (2001) found evidence that symmetric oil price shocks are 
important in explaining fluctuations in macroeconomic variables in Kuwait. Their 
results showed the importance of oil price shocks on government expenditures, which 
are the major determinant for the level of economic activity in Kuwait. 
Cunado and de Garcia (2005) examined the effects of oil price shocks on the six Asian 
oil importing countries. They found that the oil shocks have significant effect on both 
economic activity and price index. The impact is more pronounced when oil price 
shocks are defined in local currencies.  
Raguindin and Reyes (2005) examined the effects of oil price shocks on the Philippine 
economy over the period of 1981 to 2003. Their impulse response functions for the 
symmetric transformation of oil prices showed that an oil price shock leads to a 
prolonged reduction in the real GDP of the Philippines. Conversely, in their asymmetric 
VAR model, oil price decreases play a greater role in each variable's fluctuations than 
oil price increases. 
El-Anashasy (2006) examined the effects of oil price shocks on Venezuela's economic 
performance over 1950 to 2001. They investigated the relationship between oil prices, 
governmental revenues, government consumption spending, GDP and investment by 
employing a general to specific modeling (VAR and VECM). They found two long run 
relations consistent with economic growth and fiscal balance. Furthermore, they found 
that this relationship is important not only for the long run performance but also for 
short-term fluctuations. 
Berument and Ceylan (2005) studied the effects of symmetric oil price shocks on output 
(proxied by industrial production) for a group of Middle East and North African 
countries, including Iran. They estimate several VAR models for each of these countries 
by using annual data over the period of 1960 to 2003. Their impulse response analyses 
suggest that the effects of world oil price on GDP of Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, 
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Oman, Qatar, Syria, Tunisia and UAE are positive and statistically significant. For 
Bahrain, Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco and Yemen they found in majority positive but not 
significant results. For Iran, the estimated impulse response of output to a shock in oil 
prices is contemporaneously significant and positive. I extend this analysis by using 
higher frequency data, using a higher dimension VAR models and considering possible 
asymmetric effects of oil price changes. 
Olomola and Adejumo (2006) examined the effects of oil price shocks on output, 
inflation, real exchange rate and money supply in Nigeria using quarterly data from 
1970 to 2003. Using VAR methodology they found that oil price shocks do not have 
any substantial effect on output and inflation. Oil price shocks significantly determine 
the real exchange rate and significantly affect the money supply in the long run. 
Olomola and Adejumo conclude that this may squeeze the tradable sector, giving rise to 
the Dutch disease. 
There is lack of robust analysis of oil price shocks’ effects on the macroeconomy of the 
Middle East oil exporters. This study fills this empirical gap for the Iranian economy as 
a major player within oil exporter countries. This analysis aims not only to examine the 
symmetric and asymmetric effects of oil price shocks on the Iranian economy, but also 
to trace their effects over different time periods. 
2.3. Data and methodology 
2.3.1. Data 
In this analysis, I make use of six macroeconomic variables: real industrial GDP per 
capita (rgdpi), real public consumption expenditures (rgex), real imports (rimp), real 
effective exchange rate (reex), inflation (inf) and real oil prices changes (roilp).13  
The full sample comprises quarterly observations for the 1975: II–2006: IV period. Our 
main results examine the post-war period (1989: I–2006: IV) and for the robustness 
check, I compare these results with the pre-1989 period (1975: II–1988: IV). 
Furthermore, to take into account the effects of the Iranian revolution (1979), the Iraq–
Iran war (1980–1988), the Iraq–Kuwait war (1990), the financial crisis of South East 
Asia (1998), the terrorist attacks on the USA (2001) and the Iraq war (2003), I have 
employed five dummy variables.  
                                                     
13 The definitions of the variables and the data sources are presented in the Appendix 2.A. 
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For more details on the dummy variables, refer to Appendix 2.B. Seasonal dummies are 
used in all specifications of VARs to control for probable seasonalities in our variables. 
All variables except for inflation are in logarithmic form. 
The proper definition of applicable oil prices is a challenging task. I use oil prices in 
real terms, taking the ratio of the average world nominal oil price in US dollars to the 
US Consumer Price Index extracted from IFS online database. In this analysis, I make 
use of symmetric oil price growth rates as well as of Mork's asymmetric definition of oil 
price changes. In the second specification, I distinguish between the positive rate of 
quarterly changes (roilp+) and the negative rate of quarterly changes (roilp−).14 
2.3.2. Empirical methodology 
To investigate the response of macroeconomic variables to symmetric and asymmetric 
innovations in oil prices, I use an unrestricted vector autoregressive model (VAR). The 
VAR model provides a multivariate framework where changes in a particular variable 
(oil price) are related to changes in its own lags and to changes in other variables and 
the lags of those variables. The VAR treats all variables as jointly endogenous and does 
not impose a priori restrictions on structural relationships. Because the VAR expresses 
the dependent variables in terms of predetermined lagged variables, it is a reduced-form 
model. Once the VAR has been estimated, the relative importance of a variable in 
generating variations in its own value and in the value of other variables can be assessed 
(Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (VDC)). VDC assesses the relative importance 
of oil price shocks in the volatility of other variables in the system. The dynamic 
response of macroeconomic variables to innovations in a particular variable (e.g., here 
oil prices and oil market) can also be traced out using the simulated responses of the 
estimated VAR system (Impulse Response Functions (IRF)).  
Thus, the IRF allows us to examine the dynamic effects of oil price shocks on the 
Iranian macroeconomy. Our unrestricted vector autoregressive model of order p is 
presented in Eq. (2.5): 
tεtz.Bpty.pA...1-ty.1Aty ++-++=                                                                       (2.5) 
where yt is a vector of endogenous variables, zt is a vector of exogenous variables, Ai 
and B are coefficient matrices and p is the lag length. In this study, I have selected lag 4 
                                                     
14 Cf. Eqs. (2.1) and (2.2) for a technical description. Hamilton's asymmetric specification cf. Eqs. (2.3) 
and (2.4) is used for robustness tests in section 2.3. 
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for the pre-1989 and for the post-1989 sample and lag 8 for the full sample (see 
Appendix 2.C.3 for optimal lag selection tests). The innovation process εt is an 
unobservable zero-mean white noise process with a time invariant positive-definite 
variance-covariance matrix. In the unrestricted VAR models, the vector of endogenous 
variables, according to the first Cholesky ordering, consists of real oil price (roilp, 
roilp+, roilp−), real government expenditures (rgex), real industrial GDP per capita 
(rgdpi), inflation (inf), real effective exchange rate (reex), and real import (rimp): 
]rimp,reexinf,,rgdpi,rgex,roilp[yt =                                                                        (2.6) 
The innovations of current and past one-step ahead forecast errors are orthogonalised 
using Cholesky decomposition so that the resulting covariance matrix is diagonal. This 
assumes that the first variable in a pre-specified ordering has an immediate impact on all 
variables in the system, excluding the first variable and so on. In fact, pre-specified 
ordering of variables is important and can change the dynamics of a VAR system. The 
vector of exogenous variables is given by: 
]5D,4D,3D,2D,1D,3Q,2Q,1Q,ttancons[zt =                                                        (2.7) 
where Q1–Q3 refers to seasonal dummies and D1–D5 refers to all other important 
exogenous events during 1975–2006. The details behind the coding of dummies are 
given in Appendix 2.B. 
In our prefered ordering (for the other sets of ordering see footnote 16 and Appendix 
2.4.3 (a)), the real oil price changes are ranked as a largely exogenous variable, 
especially for the case of Iranian economy. Although Iran is one of the key suppliers of 
crude oil to global markets, its production and export quota are predetermined by the 
OPEC criteria, domestic consumption and investment in oil fields. Furthermore, 
demand for crude oil is largely determined by global economic growth, energy intensity 
within industrialized economies, speculator operations in oil markets, expectations of 
other key oil producers about current and future developments of the market, 
international oil companies' decisions on liquidation of their stocks and finally, the 
policy of key oil consumers on strategic petroleum reserves.  
Therefore, oil prices are an exogenous factor for the Iranian economy. I expect that 
significant shocks in oil markets affect contemporaneously the other key 
macroeconomic variables in the system. 
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The second variable in the ordering is government expenditures. Government 
expenditures can be broadly defined as current and capital consumptions. Current 
expenditures cover recurrent expenditures (e.g., payments of governmental employees, 
and subsidies), whereas capital expenditures aim to add, rather than maintain, the 
physical and material assets of an economy. A pattern that has been observed since 
1970 in Iran is the large and growing wage bill, which reflects the trend and magnitude 
of current expenditures of state. The dominant role of the government in the economy, 
especially since the Islamic Revolution in 1979 and the large initial nationalization 
caused a great over-employment in the government sector. Subsidies also play an 
important role in the size and inflexibility of current expenditures in Iran. The 
government, as a main recipient of oil rents, tries to distribute some part of rent through 
different kinds of subsidies. The magnitude of explicit budgetary subsidies is not large 
by international standards, but there are substantial implicit subsidies in the form of free 
or below-cost provision of government services such as utilities, education, health, 
transport and inputs for specific sectors. These implicit subsidies cover consumption of 
petroleum products and long-term loans. Most of these expenditures reflect themselves 
in current payments.  
The average share of current expenditures for the period of 1970–2006 is 71%, whereas 
the average of capital expenditures over the same period is 29% (see Figure 2.5). The 
inflexible structure of government expenditure ranks it largely as an exogenous variable 
in our first ordering.  
Industrial production is also affected instantly by the level of government demand. The 
industry production per capita as a proxy for real income per capita15 feeds into changes 
in inflation. The positive development in oil prices, which results in higher levels of 
government expenditures and income per capita, pushes the effective demand upward. 
Furthermore, the limited capacity of domestic supply and inefficiencies as well as time 
lags in response to increased demand may push the general consumer prices upward, 
fueling inflation. 
                                                     
15 Selecting industrial output per capita designed to analyze the effects of oil price shocks on real 
economic activity. The literature also uses industrial production as suggested by Bernanke and Mihov 
(1998), Kim and Roubini (2000), Wong (2000) and Papapetrou (2001) for analyzing the effects of oil 
shocks. 
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Fig.2.5. Share of current payments in total payments of government (%) 
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Source: CBI (2008) 
Increasing inflation appreciates the real effective exchange rate. The real exchange rate 
measures the relative price of non-tradable goods to tradable ones and is a measure of 
the competitiveness of an economy. The real effective exchange rate is a weighted real 
exchange rate index, with the weights assigned to trading partners of the local economy. 
If domestic prices increase, while prices abroad remain unchanged, this would increase 
the relative prices of non-tradables and the competitiveness of an economy will fall. 
Finally, I have allowed that a shock in real effective exchange rate contemporaneously 
affects real imports in Iran. As explained earlier, any significant developments in 
exchange rate markets affect the competitiveness of Iranian products and foreign trade, 
as well.16  
Another debatable point concerns the use of VAR model in levels or in first differences. 
If all used variables follow a I(0) process, the specification in levels is appropriate. 
However, as most time-series variables have the problem of non-stationarity, the 
question of differencing arises.  
                                                     
16 As robustness tests, we have carried out VAR Granger Causality Block Exogeneity Wald Tests (see 
Granger, 1969) for alternative ordering of variables. The three alternative Cholesky orderings on the base 
of mentioned test are as follow: A.[roilp, reex, inf, rimp, rgdpi, rgex], B.[roilp+, reex inf, rgdpi, rimp, 
reex, rgex] and C.[reex, rimp, roilp-, inf, rgdpi, rgex]. 
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According to Hamilton (1994), one option is to ignore the non-stationarity altogether 
and simply estimate the VAR in levels, relying on standard t- and F-distribution for 
testing any hypotheses. In Hamilton's words, this strategy has three commendable 
features: “(1) The parameters that describe the system's dynamics are estimated 
consistently. (2) Even if the true model is a VAR in differences, certain functions of the 
parameters and hypothesis tests based on a VAR in levels have the same asymptotic 
distribution as would estimates based on differenced data. (3) A Bayesian motivation 
can be given for the usual t- or F-distributions for test statistics even when the classical 
asymptotic theory for these statistics is non-standard.” (Hamilton, 1994, p. 652). The 
other option is to difference any apparently non-stationary variables before estimating 
the VAR. If the true process is a VAR in differences, then differencing should improve 
the small sample performance. The drawback to this approach is that the true process 
may not be a VAR in differences. Some of the series may in fact have been stationary, 
or perhaps some linear combinations of the series are stationary, as in a cointegrated 
VAR. According to Hamilton (1994), in such circumstances, a VAR in differenced form 
is mis-specified. The case of losing useful information by differencing, while there are 
cointegration vectors in the system, is also argued by Sims (1980) and Doan (1992). 
The other area of debate is whether an unrestricted VAR should be used where the 
variables in the VAR are cointegrated. There is a body of literature that supports the use 
of a vector error correction model (VECM), or cointegrating VAR, in this situation.  
It has been argued, however, that in the short term, unrestricted VAR performs better 
than a cointegrated VAR or VECM. Naka and Tufte (1997) demonstrated the 
advantages of unrestricted VAR by examining impulse response functions in 
cointegrated systems. According to their analysis, a system of cointegrated variables is 
estimated either as a VAR in levels or as a VECM model, where the latter is a restricted 
version of the former. If there is cointegration, imposing this restriction will yield more 
efficient estimates. However, in the short run, VEC estimates are less accurate than 
those from a VAR. Their Monte Carlo analysis shows that the loss of efficiency from 
VAR estimation is not critical for the commonly used short horizon. Besides Naka and 
Tufte (1997), other researchers like Engle and Yoo (1987), Clements and Hendry 
(1995), and Hoffman and Rasche (1996) showed that an unrestricted VAR is superior 
(in terms of forecast variance) to a restricted VEC model on short horizons when the 
restriction is true. 
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As a first step I check the properties of the used variables in order to determine the 
appropriate specification for VAR estimation. The order of integration for each variable 
is determined using Augmented Dickey and Fuller (1979) and Phillips and Perron 
(1988) tests. The results of these tests are reported in Table 2.C.1 in the Appendix 2.C. 
The ADF-tests and PP-tests indicate that the variables expressed in logs are non-
stationary. When all variables are first differenced, I find evidence that all variables are 
stationary. Considering that the variables of the model follow a I(1) process, I analyze 
in a second step whether there is a long run relationship among these variables. To test 
this, I employ Johansen cointegration tests (see Johansen, 1991 and Johansen, 1995). In 
formulating the dynamic model for the test, the question of whether an intercept and 
trend should enter the short- and/or long-run model is raised (Harris, 1995, p. 95). I used 
all five deterministic trend models considered by Johansen (1995). The number of 
cointegrating relations from all five models, on the basis of trace statistics and the 
maximal eigenvalue statistics using critical values from (Osterwald-Lenum, 1992) at 
5% level, are summarized in Tables 2.C.2 and 2.C.3 in the Appendix 2.C. 
Considering the existence of long-term equilibrium relationships among non-stationary 
variables in the system and the mentioned debates about advantages and drawbacks of 
different VAR specifications, I decide to employ an unrestricted VAR system in levels.  
The optimal lag length is 4. The selected lag length is based on different criteria.17 The 
results of IRFs and VDC analyses for symmetric and asymmetric formations of real oil 
prices within the Iranian macroeconomy are presented below. 
2.4. Empirical results 
2.4.1. Impulse response functions 
To identify orthogonalised innovations in each of the variables and the dynamic 
responses to such innovations, the variance-covariance matrix of the VAR was 
factorized using the Cholesky decomposition method suggested by Doan (1992). This 
method imposes an ordering of the variables in the VAR and attributes all of the effects 
of any common components to the first variable in the VAR system.  
An impulse response function (IRF) traces the effects of a one-time shock to one of the 
innovations on current and future values of the endogenous variables. If the innovations 
εt are contemporaneously uncorrelated, the interpretation of the impulse response is 
                                                     
17 For details see Table 2.C.4 and Table 2.C.5 in Appendix 2.C. 
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straightforward. The ith innovation εi,t is simply a shock to the ith endogenous variable 
yi,t. 
According to Runkle (1987), reporting impulse response functions without standard 
error bars is equivalent to reporting regression coefficients without t-statistics. As an 
indication of significance, I have estimated 68% confidence intervals for the IRF's (see 
Sims and Zha, 1999). These confidence bands are obtained from 1000 Monte Carlo 
simulations. The middle lines in the figures represent the impulse response function 
while the bars represent confidence intervals. In this regard, when the horizontal line 
falls into the confidence interval, the null hypothesis – that there is no effect of oil price 
shocks on other macroeconomic variables – cannot be rejected. Thus, including the 
horizontal line for the particular time period obtained in this manner is interpreted as 
evidence of statistical insignificance (Berument and Ceylan, 2005). To investigate the 
response of the Iranian macroeconomic variables, symmetric and asymmetric real oil 
prices as shock variables have been utilized. Additionally I include dummy variables to 
capture exogenous shocks and seasonal effects. 
Figure 2.6 shows IRFs for one standard innovation in real oil price growth (in 
symmetric definition) for the period of 1989: I–2006: IV. The shocks in real oil price 
growth significantly increase both real industrial GDP per capita and CPI inflation for 
the first two quarters after the initial shock. Real government expenditures rise rapidly 
and reached their maximum positive response to the initial oil price shock after the 5th 
quarter. This strong increase in government consumption increases aggregate demand in 
the economy and, consequently, the general level of prices. The real import responds 
significantly and reached its peak two quarters after the initial shock. Considering the 
composite of imports in Iran since 1959, which include on average 60% for raw and 
intermediary materials, it would be natural to expect a significant response of industrial 
output to oil price shocks. The impulse response of the real effective exchange rate 
suggests that, in the long-run, this variable reacts to a symmetric shock in real oil price 
by appreciating. However, this appreciation is not statistically significant. 
The significant real effective depreciation in the short run (two quarters) could be 
explained by the fact that rising oil prices lead directly to higher inflation in the major 
trading partners of Iran via higher import prices, while domestic prices of energy 
products are highly subsidized in Iran and are below global market prices. However, in 
the medium- and long-run, the second round effects of higher inflation in Iran because 
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of increasing nominal wages and wealth of citizens appear to surpass the inflation in 
trading partners, leading to a real appreciation of the Iranian rial. 
Fig.2.6. Impulse Response Functions to roilp shocks 
 
Note: roilp is the real oil price growth (linear definition). The graphs shows the impulse 
responses to one standard deviation shocks in a one standard error band. The deviation from the 
baseline scenario of no shocks is on the vertical axis; the periods (12 quarters) after shock are on 
the horizontal axis. The IRFs are estimated for the period 1989:I-2006:IV. The lag length is 4.  
Figure 2.7 shows IRFs based on one standard deviation shock to positive changes in real 
oil price for the period of 1989: I–2006: IV. The response of industrial output per capita 
is clearly positive and lasted till the end of the period. Based on Monte Carlo confidence 
bands, we can judge that its response is significant, especially for the first six quarters 
after the shock. This confirms the stimulus effect of positive oil price shocks on 
domestic industrial output. Using real GDP per capita instead of industrial GDP per 
capita does not change the results. 
The real GDP per capita also reacts positively and significantly, especially three to six 
quarters after the initial shock. However, some of the stimulus effect of positive oil 
price shocks on domestic production is offset by appreciation of domestic currency.  
The response of real effective exchange rate to asymmetric positive shocks on oil price 
is increasing and statistically significant between the 4th and 7th quarters after initial 
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shock. This supports the presence of a Dutch disease syndrome. Inflation reacts 
positively to oil price increases in the short run (two quarters). 
Fig.2.7. Impulse Response Functions to roilp+ shocks 
 
Note: roilp+ is the positive oil price growth (Mork definition, see Eq.2.1). The graphs shows the 
impulse responses to one standard deviation shocks to a positive oil price growth in a one 
standard error band. The deviation from the baseline scenario of no shocks is on the vertical 
axis; the periods (12 quarters) after shock are on the horizontal axis. The IRFs are estimated for 
the period 1989:I-2006:IV. The lag length is 4.  
The inflationary effects of positive oil price shocks on the Iranian economy can be 
explained through the AD–AS model. Increasing oil revenues contribute to higher 
levels of government expenditures (see Figure 2.8).18Considering the dominant role of 
the government in the domestic economy, which is beyond the budgetary expenditures19 
and includes great implicit expenditures (e.g., various energy subsidies, offsetting the 
state companies' annual losses, etc.), current and capital expenditures of the government 
will rise as oil revenues increase. Also, because of increased net foreign reserves of the 
                                                     
18 Correlation between oil revenues and government public consumption is 0.97.  
19 The response of real government expenditures to positive oil price shocks is not statistically significant. 
However, this response does not reflect all expenditures by the government in Iran, but rather reflects 
only the budgetary consumption. Part of this insignificant response may be explained by a new 
institutional design of OSF in 2000. 
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central bank, the money supply will increase. The increased money supply and 
government expenditures will shift demand curve upward. 
Fig.2.8. Co-movement of oil revenues and government public consumption  
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Fig.2.9. Co-movement of oil prices and imports of products  
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At the same time, increasing oil prices and foreign exchange revenues lead to higher 
volumes of imports (see Figure 2.9 for co-movement of oil prices and import level).20 
As the Iranian industrial output is highly dependent on imported raw and capital 
intermediaries, the volume of domestic production will rise, shifting the supply curve to 
the right. However, limited capacity of domestic industries and inefficiency of 
production technology impede the rapid adjustment of supply to increased demand.  
Furthermore, the international trade sanctions during the Iran–Iraq war and the US trade 
sanctions in the most years after the war have increased the burden on limited 
production capacity. This circumstance restricts the shift of the AS curve. Thus, the 
combination of movements of supply and demand curves will increase the level of 
production and prices in the economy. 
The other explanation for inflationary effects of positive oil price changes in Iran is 
through the Dutch disease phenomenon and within the “spending effects” as suggested 
by Corden (1984). The “spending effect” happens because higher oil prices lead to 
higher wages or profits in the oil related sectors, thus increasing aggregate effective 
purchasing power and demand in the economy. While the price of the tradable sector 
(oil and manufacturing) is exogenously determined in international markets, the price of 
the non-tradable sector, which includes services, is determined within the domestic 
market. A component of increased demand is shifted to the non-tradeable sector, 
causing push-demand inflation in these sectors. In this case, we have assumed the 
immobility between tradable and non-tradable sections. Therefore, we will not face a 
transfer of workers toward the booming service sector from the oil and manufacturing 
sector. However, if we assume the mobility of labor forces in the economy, the booming 
non-tradable section absorbs workers from oil industry and manufacturing sectors, 
leading to an increase in wages in the tradable section as well. Since prices in the 
tradable section are determined from outside of the domestic market, their profit margin 
will fall and they will be forced to downsize their operations. This phenomenon is 
described by Corden (1984) as “indirect de-industrialization”. 
Real import response to a shock on positive changes in real oil prices is positive and 
lasts until the end of period. The increasing response of real import for the first quarters 
after initial shock is significantly different from zero. The positive response of real 
imports to positive oil price shocks act as a built-in stabilizer, mitigating the inflationary 
                                                     
20 Correlation between oil prices and imports is 0.66.  
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effects of increased money supply after positive oil price shocks. The long-run 
decreasing trend, albeit not statistically significant, of CPI inflation may be due to 
increased import volumes. 
Finally, the response of real government expenditure to a one standard deviation shock 
to positive oil price changes is not significantly different from zero. At first glance, this 
might seem counter-intuitive. However, the Iranian policy of saving a large part of the 
windfall oil revenues in an oil stabilization fund since 2000, and using them in part to 
finance the capital expenditures and payment of external debts, has been an effective 
mechanism for oil wealth management. 
In Figure 2.10, I demonstrate the responses of variables to negative changes in real oil 
prices. The response of the real effective exchange rate to a decreasing real oil price is 
negative, reaching its minimum in the 4th quarter after the shock. This negative response 
remains significantly different from zero for the first nine quarters. The significant 
reduction of the real effective exchange rate, which results in strong depreciation of the 
rial, can be interpreted as a warning sign of currency crisis. Following significant 
negative oil price shocks, government foreign exchange revenues fall considerably. 
Thus, it will not be able to allocate enough resources to clear the domestic exchange 
market and defend the fixed exchange rate. The depreciation of the domestic currency 
makes foreign products more expensive by increasing import prices. More expensive 
raw, intermediary, and capital imports will reduce real imports and dampen the 
domestic industrial production. 
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Fig.2.10. Impulse Response Functions to roilp− shocks 
 
Note: roilp− is the negative oil price growth (Mork definition, see Eq.2.2). The graphs shows 
the impulse responses to one standard deviation shocks  to a negative oil price growth in a one 
standard error band. The deviation from the baseline scenario of no shocks is on the vertical 
axis; the periods (12 quarters) after shock are on the horizontal axis. The IRFs are estimated for 
the period 1989:I-2006:IV. The lag length is 4.  
As expected, the response of industrial output to a negative shock of real oil price is 
negative and permanent. The response of this variable reached its minimum, on average, 
after three quarters of the initial shock.21 Due to the fall of real effective exchange rate 
and foreign exchange reserves, the response of real imports to a shock in negative oil 
price changes is also negative and lasts until the end of the period. This negative 
response is significant for the first 10 quarters after the shock and reaches to its 
minimum level, on average, in the 6th quarter. The response of inflation to decreasing oil 
prices is also interesting. Inflation responds again positively to a negative oil price 
shock. After a shock in negative oil prices, inflation reaches its maximum in the second 
quarter and gradually decreases over the period of forecasting. However, it remains 
above the base line until the end of the period. This positive response is statistically 
significant for the first four quarters after the shock. When oil revenues fall because of 
                                                     
21 The same negative response to negative oil price shocks is considered by using real GDP per capita. 
Again, on average, after three quarters from initial shock, this variable experienced the largest fall and 
remained negative for the long-run with some adjustment upward. 
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negative oil price shocks, the level of imported raw and capital intermediaries, which is 
mainly financed through oil revenues, will decrease. Thus, domestic production will 
decrease. This means a shift of the supply curve to the left. Because of deficit spending 
through borrowing of the government from the central bank (or recently withdrawals 
from oil stabilization account), which raise the base money and money supply, the 
demand curve shifts to the right. A combination of these two shifts in demand and 
supply curves leads to increased prices. The economy suffers from inflationary 
pressures with both positive and negative oil price shocks. 
Pressures due to a significant reduction in government oil revenues cause a short run 
reduction of its real consumption, reaching its minimum, on average, in the third quarter 
after a shock. This negative fall is statistically significant. However, rigidities in the 
structure of current government expenditures and the high level of involvement of the 
state within the domestic economy will adjust this fall in state consumptions in the mid-
run. Again, the establishment of the OSF has facilitated the financing of budget deficits 
and government expenditures during negative developments of the oil market. 
2.4.2. Variance decomposition analysis (VDC) 
The impulse response functions illustrate the qualitative response of the variables in the 
system to shocks in real oil prices. We can also examine the forecasting error variance 
decomposition to determine the proportion of the movements in the time series that are 
due to shocks in their own series as opposed to shocks in other variables, including oil 
prices. Table 2.5 demonstrates the variance decompositions of the VAR models. Both 
oil price increases and decreases affect the volatility of the other variables in the model 
to varying degrees. For fluctuations of inflation, negative oil price shocks have a 
stronger short and long run role compared to positive oil price shocks. While positive 
oil price shocks account for just 2% and 1% of variances of inflation in the 1st and 12th 
quarters, respectively, negative oil price shocks explain about 5–8% of inflation 
fluctuations for the same period. This confirms again the high inflationary pressures of 
financing budget deficits during negative oil markets. The past innovations in inflation 
in both positive and negative oil price shocks explain more than 90% of the variance of 
inflation in the short-run (one quarter after shock). In both scenarios of positive and 
negative oil price shocks, in the long-run (after 12 quarters from initial shock), the real 
industrial GDP per capita accounts for much of the variance in inflation (about 20–
24%). In both scenarios, real effective exchange rate fluctuations also play a relative 
important role for inflation variances (about 12% in the long-run). 
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Table 2.5. Variance decompositions (VDC) for roilp+ and roilp- 
Quarter inf+ inf- reex+ reex- rgex+ rgex- rimp+ rimp- roilp+ roilp- rgdpi+ rgdpi- 
VDC of inf /1 95.37 91.87 0.00 0.00 2.47 3.03 0.00 0.00 2.10 5.09 0.07 0.01 
4 86.67 73.51 1.19 0.87 6.19 8.32 0.78 0.88 1.13 11.84 4.04 4.56 
8 55.56 49.43 8.03 7.75 11.44 13.51 1.90 4.22 1.12 7.78 21.95 17.51 
12 49.71 44.03 11.61 11.93 10.32 11.70 3.35 4.69 1.01 7.61 23.99 20.04 
VDC of reex/1 1.08 0.17 94.13 81.30 2.93 4.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.04 1.87 4.34 
4 7.46 3.70 79.47 59.13 4.75 3.98 5.51 7.54 1.80 23.49 1.02 2.17 
8 9.07 5.34 73.27 56.12 4.19 3.90 4.60 6.35 5.87 24.53 2.99 3.76 
12 8.66 4.87 72.91 56.10 3.89 3.67 4.90 6.05 5.55 24.18 4.09 5.11 
VDC of rgdpi/1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.11 4.13 0.00 0.00 0.92 2.91 92.97 92.96 
4 1.43 0.83 7.05 5.16 6.05 5.01 5.85 5.43 8.01 7.32 71.61 76.25 
8 1.21 0.66 5.61 3.79 4.45 3.78 3.25 3.21 6.45 7.67 79.24 80.88 
12 1.01 0.63 4.92 3.38 3.37 3.09 2.62 2.74 5.76 7.63 82.31 82.52 
VDC of rimp/1 3.80 4.53 1.47 3.53 1.57 2.15 77.32 70.66 0.23 4.99 15.60 14.14 
4 2.83 4.21 8.47 5.62 2.38 2.35 60.07 58.07 8.04 6.63 18.02 21.14 
8 2.38 3.28 13.79 7.72 2.95 3.34 50.87 45.30 8.86 11.99 21.14 25.90 
12 2.05 2.85 14.57 7.87 2.95 3.20 45.08 39.71 9.45 13.73 25.90 32.63 
VDC of rgex/1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 99.79 99.35 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.65 0.00 0.00 
4 2.69 2.61 5.82 9.09 78.14 73.11 3.39 6.26 2.04 5.47 7.92 3.45 
8 2.38 2.15 10.68 12.31 61.41 58.95 10.55 11.62 2.79 7.66 12.20 7.31 
12 2.74 2.78 10.80 12.54 56.55 52.87 10.60 12.23 3.24 6.96 16.06 12.62 
Note: The column (+) shows the VDC for positive oil price shocks and the column (−) shows the VDC for negative oil price shocks
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The other important aspect of asymmetric oil shocks can be seen in its effects on real 
effective exchange rate fluctuations. While positive oil shocks play almost no role on 
variations in this variable immediately after the initial shock, negative oil shocks have 
large effects in both the short- and long-term. Negative oil price shocks explain for 
about 10% of fluctuations in the real effective exchange rate for the first quarter after 
shock, increasing to about 24% in the third year after the shock. This confirms the 
detrimental role of negative oil price shocks on the real effective exchange rate. When I 
examine the VDC of real effective exchange rate by including a positive oil price shock, 
the direct role of oil price shocks transfers to inflation. In fact, in the positive scenario of 
oil price shocks, the total magnitude of inflation over all periods is doubled compared to 
the total inflation due to negative shocks. 
Again negative oil price shocks are stronger than positive shocks for explaining the 
variances of real industrial GDP per capita in the short- and long-run. However most of 
the fluctuations in industrial output per capita are explained by their own past shocks. 
Negative oil price shocks compared to positive oil shocks have larger explanatory 
effects for real imports fluctuations. This role increased gradually from 5% in the first 
quarter after shock to about 14% at the end of period. 
The explanation for the majority of real import variances however, after its own 
innovations, is fluctuations in the real industrial GDP per capita. This demonstrates the 
close connection between domestic production and foreign trade as a provider of 
necessary inputs. 
In both scenarios of positive and negative oil markets, real government expenditure 
variances in the short run can explained by its own past innovation. This illustrates the 
sticky structure of state expenditures, which is due to the vast role of the state in 
different aspects of economy and automatic consumption stabilization by the 
government. Even in the long run, more than half of the variance in government 
expenditures is explained by itself. However, once again, the role of negative oil price 
shocks on the long-run fluctuations of government expenditures are stronger than 
positive oil price shocks and account for about 7%. 
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2.4.3. Robustness tests 
a)  Alternative orderings 
A debatable point in VAR analyses is the ordering of variables in the system. In order to 
check the stability of our results, I reestimate IRFs with alternative orderings based on 
VAR Granger causality tests for asymmetric definitions of oil prices shocks.22 The 
impulse responses obtained by innovation in positive oil price growth in the alternative 
ordering roilp+, reex, inf, rgdpi, rimp, rgex is comparable to the responses obtained 
using the first ordering. The only difference in this latter case is the significance of real 
government expenditures’ positive response in the five quarters after the initial positive 
oil price shock. The magnitude of this response is slightly larger than the one that was 
obtained in the first ordering. The impulse responses estimated by innovations in 
negative changes of oil prices in alternative ordering reex, rimp, roilp−, inf, rgdpi is 
qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the first ordering. The only exception is the 
response of real industrial output per capita, which is not significant in the latter 
ordering. 
b) Alternative oil price definitions 
A second debatable point is the proper definition of oil price changes. For the 
robustness test I use the oil price definition as suggest by Hamilton (1996) (compare 
Eqs. (2.3) and (2.4)). This less volatile oil price shock definition only slightly changes 
the results. For positive oil price changes, the significance of the responses is similar to 
the responses obtained by using Mork's (1989) definition. The negative definition of oil 
price changes, which are constructed on the basis of Hamilton (1996) formulation of 
positive changes, leads to different results. The response of inflation to negative 
changes of oil prices is still positive for two quarters after the shock. Besides that, I 
have not found significant responses from real effective exchange rate and real import 
in this case. This is contrary to the expected responses that I observed on the basis of 
Mork's definition of negative oil price shocks. The results for the alternative definition 
of oil price shocks are reported in Figures 2.D.2 and 2.D.3 in the Appendix 2.D. 
 
 
                                                     
22 The results for the IRFs with alternative ordering are reported in Figure 2.D.1 and Figure 2.D.2 in 
Appendix 2.D. 
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c) The pre-1989 period 
In order to compare the structural differences of the Iranian economy I take the year 
1988 (the end of first Persian Gulf (Iran–Iraq) war) as a breakpoint. It is important to 
note that estimating the pre-1988 VAR model is challenging due to the lack of quarterly 
data for industrial GDP, imports, and government expenditures. The quarterly data are 
interpolated from annual observations (for details see Emami, 2005). Because of data 
quality issues, the interpretation of the pre-1988 results should be carried out with 
caution. 
I examine the effects of oil price shocks for the period of 1975: II–1988: IV. The 
symmetric oil price shocks do not show a significantly different pattern of affects on 
variables compared with the post-1989 period. 
Regarding the response of other variables to a one standard deviation shock to positive 
oil price innovations, I observe some similarities and differences between the two sub-
periods. The response of real industrial GDP per capita is positive and reached its 
maximum, on average, in the 4th quarter after the shock, while this maximum happened 
in the 3rd quarter during the post-1989 period. The second difference is the magnitude of 
real output response. The size of the response in the pre-1989 period is smaller than in 
the post-1989 period. This may indicate increased dependency of industrial production 
on shocks in global oil markets through fluctuations in imported inputs and 
intermediaries for the post-1988 period. The qualitative and quantitative responses of 
real imports are similar in the post- and pre-1989 period. It is positive and significant 
for the five quarters after shock. The third difference is the response of real government 
expenditures, which is increasing and statistically significant for the first four quarters 
after the initial positive oil shock. I did not identify such a positive response for the 
post-1989 period. Positive oil price shocks demonstrate their inflationary nature for pre-
1989 period. This positive response is only significant in the short run. When I use real 
GDP per capita instead of real industry GDP per capita for the pre-1989 period, the 
response of this variable to positive oil price shocks is effectively zero. 
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d) The full sample 
In this section, I estimate the VAR model for the full sample (1975: II–2006: IV).23 
Innovations in positive oil price growth cause significant and positive responses in real 
effective exchange rates and real imports. The real effective exchange rate reaches its 
maximum in the 6th quarter after the shock. Contrary to the post-1989 period, during 
which positive oil price shocks increased real industrial output, the response is not 
significant for the full sample. The inflation response is only significant in the long run 
(12 quarters) and negative. Increased real imports may act as a built-in stabilizer in the 
long run, reducing inflationary pressures. The response of government expenditures to 
positive oil price shocks is also slightly significant in the long run. 
In considering the negative oil price shocks, I observe that in the long run (12 quarters) 
the trend of decreasing real output reverses and is a significantly positive response by 
the end of the period. The depreciation of real effective exchange rate might benefit the 
real output of the economy in the long run by increasing competitiveness of Iranian 
non-oil products in the global markets. 
Another different result for the full sample can be observed in the response of inflation 
to negative oil price shocks. It is negative and significant in the short- and medium-
term, which is also statistically significant. The reduction of real effective exchange 
rate, while assuming the foreign prices of major trading partners are constant, can 
happen by depreciation of nominal exchange rate or reduction of inflation by 
implementing concretionary monetary policies. The Iranian government tried to support 
the over-valued domestic currency for almost the entire duration of the study. The 
unification of exchange rates that followed a considerable depreciation of the rial 
against the US dollar in 2002 was a breakpoint. Thus, the remaining channel for 
decreasing real effective exchange rate can be through the reduction the domestic 
inflation. 
                                                     
23 The IRFs for the full sample are reported in Figure 2.D.5 and Figure 2.D.6 in the Appendix 2.D. 
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e) Rolling bivariate VARs 
An alternative approach to analyzing possible changes in the macroeconomic effects of 
oil price shocks over time is the use of rolling bivariate VARs. This approach allows for 
a gradual change in the estimated effects of oil price shocks, without imposing a 
discrete break in a single period. The estimation of bivariate IRFs is based on a series of 
dynamic equations and examines a variable of interest by looking at its own past lags as 
well as the current and lagged values of oil price changes. I use this approach by 
applying a moving window of 41 quarters, with the first moving window centered in 
1982. After estimating the first IRF I shift the sample period four quarters forward and 
iterate the VAR estimation. The outcome of this is a series of 22 bivariate IRFs over the 
full sample. 
The formulation of the rolling VARs is as follows (for more details see Blanchard and 
Gali, 2007): 
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where yt is the variable of interest and roilpt describes the oil price variable in different 
definitions. In comparison to our multivariable approach in the previous section, the 
proper identification of oil price shocks is less confident in the bivariate model, given 
the low dimension specification of the economy's dynamics. The advantage of the 
bivariate VAR specification is the possibility of using shorter samples and, hence, being 
able to obtain rolling IRFs (see Blanchard and Gali, 2007). 
In the following, I focus on the dynamic rolling responses of real effective exchange 
rate, inflation, and real industrial GDP per capita to positive and negative oil price 
shocks. The similar dummy variables in pervious analyses of multivariate VARs are 
used here too. 
Figure 2.11 displays the rolling IRFs for the real effective exchange rate. The reex 
appears to be much more sensitive to positive oil price shocks in recent years (especially 
in the late 1990s and early 2000s). Real effective exchange rate appreciated two to four 
quarters after shock by 0.05 percentage point after one positive standard deviation shock 
to oil prices in the early 2000s. This reflects the higher risk of Dutch disease in recent 
years for the Iranian economy. Negative oil price shocks also caused domestic currency 
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to fall over the total period under study. However, this negative decrease of domestic 
currency was much stronger pre-1989 than post-1989. 
Fig.2.11. Bivariate responses of real effective exchange rate 
 
The positive response of real industrial output per capita to positive oil price shocks 
increased gradually over the total period (see Figure 2.12). This rise is more obvious in 
recent years. It reached its maximum in the late 1990s. However, the long-run responses 
of this variable became weaker in recent years. 
Fig.2.12. Bivariate responses of industrial GDP per capita 
 
 
The negative response of real industrial GDP per capita to negative oil price shocks is 
stronger in the late 1980s. It seems that before the 1980s, decreasing oil prices by 
reducing government revenues and increasing the import prices through exchange rates 
was an extra burden on domestic production, especially during the eight years war with 
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Iraq. In recent years, decreasing oil prices by reducing effective exchange rate and 
improving terms of trade (through increased non-oil exports) offset, to some extent, the 
increased import prices of required inputs for industrial production. 
Figure 2.13 shows the rolling responses of the Iranian inflation rate to asymmetric oil 
price shocks. The response of inflation to positive oil price shocks over the period is 
positive, at least for the short- and medium-run. This response, however, seems to be 
stronger in the late 1980s. In particular, in the period centered in 1988, the response of 
inflation to one standard deviation positive shock to oil prices is three percentage points. 
The inflationary effects of positive oil price shocks in recent years have become weaker 
compared to the late 1980s. In recent years, considerable volumes of imports have had a 
role as built-in stabilizers for containing the inflationary pressures of petro dollars in the 
economy. The response of inflation to negative oil price shocks, however, shows us 
another side of coin.  
The inflationary effects of reduced oil revenues, and consequently huge budget deficits 
for which the solution often involves asking the state to cover these deficits, have led to 
much stronger responses in the recent years than in the late 1970s. 
Fig.2.13. Bivariate responses of Inflation 
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2.5. Conclusions 
Much of the research on the oil–gdp relationship has concentrated on developed oil 
importing economies. A formal study on the impact of oil price shocks on 
macroeconomic variables in an oil exporting country such as Iran is still lacking. One of 
the main challenges of such studies is the lack of reliable high frequency data on 
aggregate macroeconomic variables. In this study, I mainly focused on the post Iran–
Iraq war period. I also tried to compare the main results from the post-war period with 
those from the pre-1989 period, which spanned from 1975 to 1988. Moreover, I 
estimated rolling bivariate VARs for inflation, output, and real effective exchange rates. 
The empirical findings of this study suggest that positive oil price shocks increase the 
real effective exchange rate and appreciate domestic currency in mid run, which is one 
of the syndromes of a Dutch disease. This reduces the price of imports and increases the 
price of exports. Real imports and domestic output per capita increase significantly and 
we are only able to observe the initial inflationary effects of positive oil shocks. Real 
government expenditures also only increase in the mid-run and are marginally 
significant. The effects of the oil stabilization fund for mitigating inflationary effects of 
a positive shock and protecting the annual state budgets from external shocks should be 
important. 
The Iranian economy is much more vulnerable to the negative shocks of oil prices. The 
real effective exchange rate falls significantly (domestic currency depreciates) until the 
end of the period (12 quarters). This is a warning sign of a potential currency crisis after 
negative price shocks in oil markets. This depreciation increases the price of imports, 
and despite the traditional approach, which welcomes this event because of improving 
non-oil exports, our analysis for the case of Iran shows the opposite effects. The real 
output, which depends heavily on imported raw and intermediary materials, will be 
forced to downsize. Inflationary effects are much more pronounced during negative 
shocks. This is mainly because of increased import prices and the mechanism of 
financing budget deficits in Iran. Government expenditures initially fall significantly but 
increase beyond the base line after five quarters of initial shock. This demonstrates the 
sticky structure of government expenditures in Iran. The reduction of government 
expenditures following negative oil shocks cannot be permanent. 
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Appendix 2.A. Data sources and description 
I use quarterly data for the period of 1975: II to 2006: IV. The variables considered in 
this paper are as follow: 
• Real industrial production per capita (rgdpi) 
The variable measures industrial value added in GDP per capita. This variable is before 
seasonal adjustment and is at constant prices of 1997. The source of this variable is the 
online portal of time series at the Central Bank of Iran. 
• Real effective exchange rate (reex) 
This variable is the nominal effective exchange rate index of the rial adjusted for 
inflation rate differentials with the countries whose currencies comprise the trade 
basket. Real effective exchange rate is defined such that an increase means a real 
appreciation of the currency considered. An appreciation of the real exchange rate is 
expected to hurt the country's external competitiveness and vice versa for decreasing it. 
The (reex) series has extracted from the IFS online database. 
• Inflation (inf) 
This variable is the yearly changes in the Iranian consumer prices and has been 
extracted from IMF via Datastream. 
• Real public consumption expenditure (rgex) 
This variable is non-seasonally adjusted of public consumptions of Iran on the base of 
constant prices of 1997, extracted from the Central Bank of Iran online database. 
• Real imports (rimp) 
This variable is non-seasonally adjusted data of the Iranian imports on the base of 
constant prices of 1997, extracted from the Central Bank of Iran online database. 
• Real oil price (roilp) 
This variable is the quarterly nominal average of world oil prices deflated by the US 
consumer price index. The price series is extracted from the IFS online database. 
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Appendix 2.B. Coding of the dummy variables D1–D5 
• D1 — Iranian revolution and the Iraq–Iran war, 1979: I–1988: III 
This period cover a military conflict and therefore a strong presence of state in the 
economy. Nearly all the key markets and price mechanism were administered by the 
government. 
• D2 — Iraq–Kuwait war, 1990: I–1990: IV 
This conflict, known as the first Gulf war, started in 1990 and ended in 1991. The 
movement of oil prices in 1990/1991 was erratic, with crude price increasing by 160.1% 
over the war period. 
• D3 — South East Asian financial crisis, 1997: III–1998: IV 
The severe economic collapse after mid-1997 greatly reduced growth in energy 
consumption. Gas demand growth was 2.3%, compared to the pre-crisis rates of more 
than 5%. The impact on oil demand was even more dramatic – rather than growing by 
the pre-crisis expectation of 1.0 MMbpd/yr, demand in 1998 declined by 0.5 MMbpd/yr 
– the first decline since 1985. The powerful negative shock also sharply reduced the 
price of oil, which reached a low of US$8 per barrel towards the end of 1998, causing a 
financial shock in OPEC nations, including Iran and other oil exporters. 
• D4 — September 11, 2001: III–2002: II 
In the month following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, oil prices declined to 
a two year low of US$17.50 per barrel due market concerns regarding a possible 
slowdown in the United States and the global economy. The decision by OPEC to cut 
crude oil exports and signs of a more robust global recovery contributed to oil price 
quickly returning to pre-September 11 levels in early 2002. 
• D5 — Iraq–US war, 2003: I–2003: IV 
Prices spike on Iraq war due to rapid demand increases, constrained OPEC capacity, 
low inventories, and so on. 
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Appendix 2.C. Stationarity, cointegration, and optimal lag length tests 
2.C.1. Stationarity tests 
Table 2.C.1 reports the ADF tests and the Philips–Perron tests for the stationary of each 
variable, over sample period 1989: I to 2006: IV. I applied models with and without 
trend. For the log-level series, the ADF test (Dickey and Fuller, 1979) does not reject 
the null hypothesis of a unit root at 95% confidence level. However, the Phillips–Perron 
tests (Phillips and Perron, 1988) reject the null hypothesis of a unit root (nonstationary) 
at the 99% confidence level for the case of rgex and rimp. After first differencing, each 
series rejects the null hypothesis of nonstationary at the 99 or 95% levels. Relying on 
ADF tests, all variables have unit root in levels and are stationary after first 
differencing. Since all the series are nonstationary at the levels and integrated of the 
same order, this suggests a possibility of the presence of cointegrating relationship 
between oil prices and the Iranian economic variables. 
 
Table 2.C.1. Tests for unit roots (with non seasonal adjusted data) 
 ADF PP 
 Without trend With trend Without trend With trend 
Variables Level 
First 
diff. 
Level 
First 
diff. 
Level 
First 
diff. 
Level 
First 
diff. 
rgdpi -0.66 4.60*** -3.00 5.14*** -0.91 15.4*** -2.07 -16.0*** 
rgdp -2.85** 4.01*** -2.18 5.38*** -3.06** 15.2*** -3.03 16.93***
reex -1.33 10.7*** -2.01 10.6*** -1.36 10.7*** -2.04 -10.6*** 
inf -3.05** 7.30*** -3.05 7.26*** -3.18** 7.52*** -3.17* -7.49*** 
rgex -1.04 17.1*** -0.36 17.5*** 6.91*** 36.8*** 7.13*** -39.5*** 
rgexs -0.58 6.58*** -3.71** 6.59*** 6.16*** 26.6*** 9.39*** -26.4*** 
rimp -2.01 13.0*** -1.60 13.2*** 3.76*** 21.7*** -3.76** -21.8*** 
roilp 8.99*** 9.03*** 8.98*** 8.98*** 8.99*** 27.6*** 9.02*** -27.4*** 
roilp+ 7.94*** 8.73*** 7.95*** 8.69*** 7.86*** 50.9*** 7.86*** -50.3*** 
roilp- 9.81*** 15.2*** 9.76*** 15.2*** 9.82*** 29.3*** 9.78*** -29.4*** 
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2.C.2. Johansen cointegration tests 
The Johansen cointegration test is carried out to test for cointegrating relationships 
among real oil prices and the five Iranian macroeconomic variables. The exogenous 
dummy variables are also included. Prior to performing the Johansen cointegration test, 
variables are entered as levels into a VAR to determine the optimal number of lags 
needed in the cointegration analysis. Three criterions, the Akaike information criterion 
(AIC), Final Prediction Error (FPE) and the likelihood ratio (LR) test are applied to 
determine the optimal lag length. 
 
Table 2.C.2. Cointegrating 1 
Data trend None None Linear Linear Quadratic 
No intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept 
Test type 
No trend No trend No trend Trend Trend 
Trace 3 3 2 2 3 
Maximum 
eigenvalue 
2 2 2 2 3 
Notes: Selected number of cointegrating vectors (roilp+, (Mork) 1989: I–2006: IV, number of 
lags: 4, exogenous variables: Q1, Q2, Q3, D2, D3, D4, D5) 
 
Table 2.C.3. Cointegrating 2 
Data trend None None Linear Linear Quadratic 
No intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept Intercept 
Test type 
No trend No trend No trend Trend Trend 
Trace 3 4 4 5 4 
Maximum 
eigenvalue 
3 3 3 3 3 
Notes: Selected number of cointegrating vectors (roilp−, (Mork) 1989: I–2006: IV, number of 
lags: 4, exogenous variables: Q1, Q2, Q3, D2, D3, D4, D5) 
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2.C.3. Optimal lag length 
Table 2.C.4 and 2.C.5 reports the results for the optimal lag length test. 
Table 2.C.4. VAR Lag order selection criteria, roilp+ 
Lag Log L LR FPE AIC 
0 -132.66 NA 6.12e-06 5.02 
1 127.95 419.88 1.22e-08 -1.22 
2 172.50 64.35 1.03e-08 -1.46 
3 222.21 63.51 7.86e-09 -1.84 
4 276.32 60.12* 5.78e-09* -2.34* 
*Indicates lag order selected by the criterion, LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test 
at 5% level), FPE: Final prediction error, AIC: Akaike information criterion 
 
 
Table 2.C.5. VAR Lag order selection criteria, roilp− 
Lag Log L LR FPE AIC 
0 -132.57 NA 6.11e-06 5.02 
1 129.39 422.05 1.18e-08 -1.26 
2 18077.41 74.21 8.15e-09 -1.69 
3 236.51 71.22 5.28e-09 -2.24 
4 296.99 67.20* 3.25e-09* -2.92* 
*Indicates lag order selected by the criterion, LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test 
at 5% level), FPE: Final prediction error, AIC: Akaike information criterion 
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Appendix 2.D. Robustness tests 
 
2.D.1. Alternative VAR orderings 
Fig.2.D.1. Impulse Response Function to roilp+ shocks, alternative ordering 
 
Note: roilp+ is the positive oil price growth (Mork definition, see Eq.2.1). The graphs shows the 
impulse responses to one standard deviation shocks to a positive oil price growth in a one 
standard error band. The deviation from the baseline scenario of no shocks is on the vertical 
axis; the periods (12 quarters) after shock are on the horizontal axis. The IRFs are estimated for 
the period 1989:I-2006:IV. The lag length is 4. The alternative ordering of variables is: roilp+, 
reex, inf, rgdpi, rimp, rgex. 
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Fig.2.D.2. Impulse Response Function to roilp− shocks, alternative ordering 
 
Note: roilp− is the negative oil price growth (Mork definition, see Eq.2.2). The graphs shows 
the impulse responses to one standard deviation shocks to a negative oil price growth in a one 
standard error band. The deviation from the baseline scenario of no shocks is on the vertical 
axis; the periods (12 quarters) after shock are on the horizontal axis. The IRFs are estimated for 
the period 1989:I-2006:IV. The lag length is 4. The alternative ordering of variables is: reex, 
rimp, roilp-, inf,rgdpi. 
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2.D.2. Hamilton's oil prices 
Fig.2.D.3. Impulse Response Function for roilp+, in Hamiltons definition 
 
Note: roilp+ is the positive oil price growth (Hamilton definition, see Eq.2.3). The graphs 
shows the impulse responses to one standard deviation shocks to a positive oil price growth in a 
one standard error band. The deviation from the baseline scenario of no shocks is on the vertical 
axis; the periods (12 quarters) after shock are on the horizontal axis. The IRFs are estimated for 
the period 1989:I-2006:IV. The lag length is 4.  
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 Fig.2.D.4. Impulse Response Function for roilp−, in Hamiltons definition 
 
Note: roilp- is the negative oil price growth (Hamilton definition, see Eq.2.4). The graphs shows 
the impulse responses to one standard deviation shocks to a negative oil price growth in a one 
standard error band. The deviation from the baseline scenario of no shocks is on the vertical 
axis; the periods (12 quarters) after shock are on the horizontal axis. The IRFs are estimated for 
the period 1989:I-2006:IV. The lag length is 4 
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2.D.3. The full sample 
Fig.2.D.5. Impulse Response Function for roilp+, full sample 
 
Note: roilp+ is the positive oil price growth (Mork definition, see Eq.2.1). The graphs shows the 
impulse responses to one standard deviation shocks to a positive oil price growth in a one 
standard error band. The deviation from the baseline scenario of no shocks is on the vertical 
axis; the periods (12 quarters) after shock are on the horizontal axis. The IRFs are estimated for 
the period 1975:II-2006:IV. The lag length is 4.  
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Fig.2.D.6. Impulse Response Function for roilp−, full sample 
 
Note: roilp- is the negative oil price growth (Mork definition, see Eq.2.2). The graphs shows the 
impulse responses to one standard deviation shocks to a negative oil price growth in a one 
standard error band. The deviation from the baseline scenario of no shocks is on the vertical 
axis; the periods (12 quarters) after shock are on the horizontal axis. The IRFs are estimated for 
the period 1975:II-2006:IV. The lag length is 4. 
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Chapter 3 
 
3 Factionalism, Oil and Economic Growth in Iran: 
Where is the Curse? 
 
Indeed, in Iran it is practically impossible to get  
a clear answer to the simplest of questions: 
 Who is running this country? 
Klein (2002) 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Political power struggles among reformers, conservatives and dozens of other factions 
are a main characteristic of Iran after the Islamic Revolution of 1979. Politicians, just 
like businessmen, want to maximize their profit. Oil rents in Iran are the major factor in 
the calculations of political factions in their competition for executive power. The 
question is to what extent competition among the political factions shapes the role of oil 
revenues in the context of economic growth in Iran. I want to re-visit the natural 
resource curse hypothesis in a highly politically factionalized country such as Iran.  
Iranian political history observed a significant event in 1979 when the autocracy of 
Pahlavi changed to the Islamic Republic. While in the former system the Shah was the 
most powerful and the head of the political and economic system, the latter does not 
carry the same significance in political life. Kenneth Pollack, former director of Persian 
Gulf affairs at the US National Security Council,  illustrates the situation in 
factionalized Islamic Republic as follows: “There are fourteen dozen different positions 
on each issue, and it is very difficult to say with any certainty which of the insiders 
support which position” (see Klein, 2002). Such factionalism of course needs a certain 
degree of democracy which was lacking in the autocracy system of Pahlavi. 
The struggle for power is greater when there is some improvement in democracy 
indicators. A clear example is the period of 1997-2004 which was associated with the 
governance of reformists and the improvement of democracy indices of Iran. Samii 
(2002) explains factionalism as a common characteristic of the contradictory policies of 
the Iranian government. He illustrates the power struggle during the presidency of 
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Khatami as follows: “Indeed, it is not entirely inaccurate to look at domestic Iranian 
politics as a competition between black-hatted hard-liners loyal to a Supreme Leader 
and white-hatted reformists loyal to Khatami. Both sides control specific assets, 
ministries…”. The contemporary political economy history of Iran shows that the 
economic system had performed better during strong autocracies. An example is Iran 
under Reza Shah from 1921-1940 and under Mohammad Reza Shah from 1953-1979. 
Reza Shah carried out significant institutional changes. The examples are the modern 
army, introduction of new Civil Law and Penal Codes, the establishment of an effective 
bureaucracy, and of the first modern university of Tehran and significant improvements 
in the area of national security. Under his governance, Iran succeeded in growing 
relatively fast in the late 1930s compared to other countries. The Polity index24 of Iran 
for the late 1930’s was -8 which is an indicator of nearly full dictatorships.  
The beginning of the Second World War and the presence of foreign troops in Iran from 
1941-1946 forced Reza Shah’s departure from power. The lack of centralized political 
power provided an opportunity for the participation of different political factions and 
groups in the political process (Abrahamian, 1982). The political factionalism continued 
during the prime ministry of Mohammad Mosadegh which forced the Mohammad Reza 
Shah to leave the country for a short while. Political instability and factionalism under 
Mosadegh undermined the economic growth significantly.  
The Polity index shows a reduction in autocracy over the 1940s and early 1950s. 
However, the coup of 1953 put an end to the factionalism and political competition for 
power, restoring a more powerful autocrat system. The Iranian economy observed a 
prosperous period following the coup. More specifically, the GDP per capital growth 
rate increased at an exception rate of 8% per year from 1963-1976. The non-oil GDP 
per capita growth was 8.6% per year (Esfahani and Pesaran, 2008).  
Esfahani and Pesaran discuss that one of the main reasons behind this economic success 
was the concentration of power in the hands of the Shah. This politically monopolized 
system implemented the constructive economic policies such as the Second Seven Year 
Plan (1965-1962), limiting the power of landlords (White Revolution), rapid 
industrialization and investments in human resources. The Polity index of Iran from 
1955-1978 was -10, indicating a maximum degree of autocracy.  
                                                     
24 Polity index varies between -10 and 10. The former figure points out to a full dictatorship and the latter 
to a full democracy (for more details see http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm ).  
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Figure 3.1 shows the trend of per capita GDP and polity index under Autocracy and 
Islamic Republic regimes in Iran. The highest records of real per capita GDP and its 
growth rate observed under the strong autocracy of Shah. Oil rents in all of these 
different polities existed and have had played an important role in the economic system. 
However, the outcomes of system are different. Rent-seeking efforts, especially in post-
revolutionary factionalized system, have eroded the effectiveness of oil revenues in 
economic growth process. 
 
Fig.3.1. Polity index and per capita GDP of Iran (1965-2006) 
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Figure 3.2 also shows the relative superior performance of autocracy in a term of 
industrialization and investment compared to post-revolutionary factionalized system.  
 
Fig.3.2. Polity index, industry value added and fixed investment of Iran (1965-2006) 
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Source: World Bank (2008), Marshall and Jaggers (2007) 
The major share of oil exports in total exports of Iran since mid 1970s has linked the 
Iranian economic growth development to a highly volatile energy market. This is the 
Achilles' heel of the political economy of Iran. What is less observed in empirical case 
studies of oil economies is the interaction of the political power structure with oil rents. 
The political power structure and competition of different political factions in a rentier 
economy25 is a critical issue on the transformation of resource wealth to a curse or 
                                                     
25 Rentier economies are those in which resource wealth provides a high proportion of government 
revenue; e.g. a high resource-to-revenue ratio (see Herb 2005, p. 8). Not any kind of resource wealth 
makes such a rentier state. Usually, oil resource which are geographically concentrates and their 
extraction is highly capital-intensive and  require complex and expensive technology, imposing sever 
barriers for entrance of private companies in this industry provides flow of rents to coffer of state. 
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blessing. This study focuses on the case of Iran to investigate the role of natural 
resource wealth in economic growth, taking into consideration the development of 
factionalism and political competition. 
The Iranian political environments before and after the Islamic revolution and existence 
of significant oil rents in both periods provide a unique opportunity to test Bjorvatn and 
Selvik (2008) theoretical predictions empirically (see section 3.2). Their main prediction 
is increasing political factionalism in an oil rich economy reduce the positive effects of 
oil rents on economic growth.  
This chapter is organized as follows. In section 3.2, I discuss the literature on the 
economic growth of countries under different political systems and natural resource 
dependency cases. The main hypotheses, data, and empirical model are presented in 
section 3.3. Section 3.4 presents the empirical results. Finally, section 3.5 concludes. 
3.2. Review of literature  
This study is related to two branches of research in literature. The first branch contains 
those studies that aim to analyze the economic growth under autocracy (dominance of 
one group) and democracy. The second branch investigates the effects of dependency in 
natural resources on economic growth. The former raises the question whether 
autocracies, rather than democracies, can exercise the more efficient policies to boost 
economic growth. This argument that self-seeking governments which have 
monopolized corruption and rent-seeking are superior to disorganized and factionalized 
polities is discussed by Tullock (1980, p. 27) and Shleifer and Vishny (1993). In a 
factionalized polity, a person must bribe different groups and individuals in different 
organizations to secure a contract or license. The corruption is not predictable in such 
countries. Campos et al. (1999) showed that predictability of corruption which is a 
characteristic of strong autocracies such as Mohammad Reza Shah in the pre-revolution 
period of Iran has a positive effect on the flow of foreign direct investment.  
In a factionalized system which might have just emerged from the fall of an autocratic 
system (e.g. post-revolution of 1997 in Iran), each institution maximizes its revenue 
independently and extorts the investors and entrepreneurs. Such independent and 
excessive extortions in a factionalized system will reduce productive activities and 
investments in the system. In a strong autocracy, there is less, if any, constraint on a 
principal (e.g., Reza Shah from 1921-1940 and Mohammad Reza Shah from 1953-
1979). By contrast, in a republican system the principal is more limited by various 
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institutions such as constitutions, the independent judiciary system, media, private 
sections, political parties, factions and different lobbies. The principal may owe its 
existence to strong lobbies and the support of factions and specific layers of society. 
McChesney (1987, p. 102) explains the situation of the principal in a factionalized 
system: The principal is just a “passive broker among competing private rent-seekers”. 
“Destructive competition”, as mentioned by Bjorvatn and Selvik (2008), among 
political factions and lobbies for having a share in economic rents is costly.  
As Lambsdorff (2007, p. 86) explains, these rent-seekers do not try to maximize the size 
of the cake “but rather to battle for a larger slice of the given cake for themselves”. 
Increasing the dominance of one group in the political system may reduce the 
aforementioned costs in a factionalized system. Strong autocracy would limit the impact 
of political factions and lobbies on the process of decision making. The goal of a strong 
kleptocrat is to maximize the size of cake (e.g., economic growth) to have a larger share 
of its benefits. Therefore, it will oppose the waste of scare resources by lobbyists and 
other rent-seekers. McChesney (1997, pp. 153-155) explains that  “these regimes strive 
for income through extortion, but are able to levy the burden equally on all private 
parties”. A strong ruler will monopolize the corruption, controlling the petty corruption 
at the level of governmental organization. Rock (2008) presents some stylized facts 
about the experience of some countries under strong developmentally oriented rulers 
compared to those with factionalized systems with more symmetrical political power 
structures. He mentions that since 1960, an average of real GDP per capita growth rates 
in Asia’s authoritarian regimes has been significantly higher (4.6% p.a.) than in its 
democratic regimes (3.3% p.a.). Furthermore, South Asia’s longstanding democracies 
(such as India and Sri Lanka) have grown much less (2.8% per capita per year) and had 
lower investment levels (21.3% of GDP) than East Asian strong authoritarian regimes. 
The latter group had a growth rate of 5.9% in per capita GDP and an investment level of 
31.9% of GDP. He further shows that the annual per capita GDP growth of Indonesia 
and Pakistan fell from 4.4% to 2.6% in the former and from 5.9% to 2.6% in the latter 
during the rule of the democratic (or more symmetric political power structure) system.  
The second branch of literature examines the role of natural resource dependency on 
economic growth. The disappointing performance of resource rich economies 
(especially those with a point resource such as oil) draws our attention to the natural 
resource curse hypothesis. The resource curse literature is about the puzzling role of 
natural resources in economic growth. It is a common wisdom that those countries rich 
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in natural resources, especially oil, are suffering from a lower economic growth 
compared to those which do not have such resources (see Sachs and Warner, 2001). The 
question is what really causes such disappointing results from richness in natural 
resources. Do oil revenues and resources in themselves hinder economic growth? After 
all, there is a lack of a globally accepted theory for the natural resource curse (Sachs and 
Warner, 2001). The blessing and the curse of oil wealth needs to be analyzed in both a 
realistic and practical way.  “To an optimist, the possession of oil reserves is an 
unqualified blessing. To a pessimist, the possession of oil is a predictable curse. To a 
realist, oil, as anything else in life, can be blessing or curse, it all depends what is done 
with it” (Askari, 2006, p. 8). What is done with oil should be traced through the political 
economy of oil exporting countries. Indeed, the resource curse puzzle might be a 
misleading concept if we take into consideration the political structure of oil economies. 
Political factionalism in young and fragile democracies and rent-seeking efforts of these 
factions in oil rich economies might be a key for a “resource curse” black box.  
Recently economists have paid more attention to interactions between institutions with 
resource wealth in their analysis of the natural resource curse. Most of these studies are 
cross-country analyses (e.g., Boschini et al., 2007; Mehlum et al., 2006; 
Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008; and Iimi, 2007). However, how these institutions 
influence the relationship between natural resources and growth is country specific 
(Bjorvatn and Selvik, 2008). After all, oil rich economies vary considerably in terms of 
their institutions, political economy structure, demographic and social norms which 
make it difficult to address in cross-country analyses.26  
There is another group of economists who undermine the natural resource curse 
hypothesis (e.g., Davis, 1995; Manzano and Rigobon, 2001). Manzano and Rigobon re-
examined the period analysis of Sachs and Warner (1997), controlling for indebtedness. 
The resource curse (lower growth) disappeared. They discussed that the poor 
performance of resource dependent economies is most likely due to “debt-overhang” 
rather than as a result of the resource curse. Davis (1995) compared the 22 resource rich 
economies with other resource poor countries during 1970-1990. He found that the 
                                                     
26 The approach of this study is in line with a collection of case studies in Rodrik (2007), shedding light 
on the critical role of factionalism for economic growth by studying country specific experiences. “I 
believe in the need for both cross-country regressions and detailed country studies. Any cross-country 
regression giving results that are not validated by case studies needs to be regarded with suspicion...” 
(Rodrik, 2007, p. 4). 
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former group was at a higher average level of development than the latter group over 
this period. He concluded that the resource curse, if anything, is an exception rather than 
a rule. It seems that to be a natural resource rich economy per se does not imply a 
slower economic growth. 
Esfahani (2007) emphasizes the negative indirect effects of democratization and 
factionalism for the countries which are rich in natural resources. He explains how, 
since in these countries the public knows that the government has direct access to 
resource rents, they expect to have a share in these rents. This usually leads to 
inefficient mass subsidies with negative market distortion effects. In a republican state 
with rich oil resources such as Iran, the local interest groups put pressure on the elected 
government to distribute these oil rents through different protectionist policies and 
subsidies.27 More difficulties in macroeconomic coordination, as is mentioned in 
Esfahani (2007), is one of the by-side effects of improved representation under more 
democratic conditions. In contrast to strong autocracies, factionalized systems 
experience more changes in their leaderships, shortens the horizons of policy makers in 
office. In such system, people increase the demand for higher levels of public 
expenditures compared to autocracy system (Esfahani, 2007). In a rich oil republic 
system like Iran, the government finances the public expenditures through oil rents. 
This is mainly due to the weak tax administration system and high tax evasion. Such a 
dependence to oil rents for having the votes of electorates make the macroeconomy 
vulnerable to oil shocks (for more details on the case of Iran see Farzanegan and 
Markwardt, 2009). 
The theoretical model of Bjorvatn and Selvik (2008) which explains the role of political 
power distribution and factionalism on the oil-growth nexus has inspired the empirical 
strategy of this study. Their theoretical model predicts that resources are wasted during 
competition for rents and the structure of a political system significantly affects the 
allocation of oil rents among entrepreneurs. Indeed, in their model, the combination of 
political power structure and oil rents is critical for explaining growth. They conclude 
that given a high level of oil rents, an increasing dominance of one political group 
reduces the welfare loss. This is because of a fall in rent-seeking intensity with 
asymmetry in political power. Thus, in their analysis, higher political competition which 
                                                     
27 The mass subsidies and inefficient protectionism through popular macroeconomic policies in post-
revolutionary Iran are resulted to significant amount of smuggling. For more details see Farzanegan 
(2009).  
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reduces the dominance of one group in the politics of a rentier economy is not an 
optimum. They emphasize on the lack of state autonomy after the Islamic Revolution of 
1979, in contrast to the autocracy of Mohammad Reza Shah which intensified rent-
seeking among different political factions. Such destructive competitions for oil rents 
have transformed the oil wealth to a curse in Iran. They conclude that to improve the 
economic performance of Iran, it is necessary to move toward a more autonomous state. 
Our empirical study provides some evidence for their theoretical predictions.  
3.3. Empirical model and data 
The main hypothesis of this study is that the “oil resources revenues” have a direct 
positive effect on economic growth (in contrast to the resource curse hypothesis).28 
However, higher degree of political factionalism reduces the former positive effect on 
growth. The final impact of oil rents on growth, therefore, varies with changes in 
political factionalism. These hypotheses will be tested by using different variables for 
factionalism, oil dependency and oil abundance.  
3.3.1. Econometric specification 
Following Boschini et al. (2007), the basic specification for our econometric analysis is: 
 
tε)tfactnr.(3βtfac.2βtnr.1βtΧ.2αtG.αtG +×+++′+1- 1 =                              (3.1) 
 
where G is the real per capita GDP growth rate, X is a vector of control variables 
including investment as a ratio of real GDP (Inv_gdp), changes in oil prices (Oil_g; as a 
proxy for changes in terms of trade), inflation rate (Inf; as a measure of macroeconomic 
instability), real government consumption as a ratio of real GDP (Govex_gdp; a proxy 
for size of government distortions in the economy), real per capita GDP growth rate of 
OECD countries (OECD_GDPPCG; a proxy for external demand of Iran major trade 
partners), a dummy variable for Iran-Iraq war (Wardummy; for period of 1980-1988),  
and the lag of the dependent variable (Gt-1; to control for the dynamic path of economic 
growth)29. nr is the natural resource abundance and dependence.30  
                                                     
28 The positive role of natural resources in economic growth is discussed by Habakkuk (1962). In his 
analysis, one of the main reasons behind the surpassing of England by the United States in the 19th 
century was the greater natural resource endowment. 
29 According to Sachs and Warner (2001), it might be difficult to observe the omitted variable affecting 
growth. Thus, they suggest as a solution, one should control for previous growth rates in regressions. 
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The main proxies for oil dependency in this study are share of oil revenues in total 
revenues of government (oilrev_trev), share of oil exports in total exports (oilex_tex), 
and oil value added in total GDP (oilgdp_tgdp). The proxy for oil abundance is per 
capita daily oil production (pcoil_produc). The fac variable refers to factionalism and 
degree of political groups’ competition. nrt×fact is an interaction term of oil dependence 
and/or abundance variable with an index of factionalism and ε is the error term which is 
assumed to be independent from other regressors.  
The model will be estimated with dynamic Ordinary Least Squares (DOLS) and 2SLS 
methods. The marginal impact of a unit increase in the oil rent variable on economic 
growth is β1+β3fac. The natural resource curse hypothesis claims that the sign of β1 is 
negative (assuming factionalism index zero). Based on the theoretical predictions of 
Bjorvatn and Selvik (2008), the sign of β1 should be positive and the sign of  β3 should 
be negative. This means that increasing political competition or factionalism (increasing 
Fac) and oil rents lead to “destructive competition” and intensive rent-seeking. Thus, 
the final effect of oil rents on growth is conditional on the level of factionalism.  
The expected effects of control variables are straightforward. A higher level of real 
investment share in real GDP has a positive effect on growth. An increase in 
government consumption in the economy expected to crowed-out private investment 
and increases the regulatory burden. This argument is more significant considering the 
role of the state in the Iranian economy. Thus, it should have a negative effect on 
growth. Improving terms of trade (export prices/import prices) which is proxied by the 
growth rate of oil prices is expected to have positive effects on growth. Since the major 
export of Iran is oil and refinery products, this variable is a valid indicator in the 
fluctuations of the terms of trade. I also expect that a higher growth in the major trading 
partners of Iran (OECD region) will positively influence the economic growth of Iran. 
                                                                                                                                                           
Based on those, the lagged growth rates would be correlated with the omitted variables and therefore 
being a proxy for them, too.  
30 Besides oil production per capita, we can use oil reserves per capita as a measure of oil abundance.  
There two measures capture exogenous oil wealth. We use oil production because of its availability for a 
longer period. Oil dependency, on the other side, captures materialized rents in the government budget. 
Political factions are more interested in these more tangible rents rather than oil reserves or production.  
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In summary, the main hypotheses are as follows: 
H1: The direct effect of oil revenues on the real growth rate of the Iranian economy is 
positive, ceteris paribus. 
H2: The final (overall) effect of oil revenues on the real growth rate of the Iranian 
economy depends on the degree of political factionalism and competition. A higher 
symmetry of political power (i.e. higher factionalism or lower degree of dominance of 
one group) has a negative effect on real growth rates. Table 3.1 shows the hypothesized 
effects of the independent variables on the real per capita GDP growth rate of the 
Iranian economy.  
Table 3.1. Hypothesized effects of independent variables 
Independent variable Expected sign 
Natural resource (NR) proxies: 
Oil exports / total exports + 
Oil revenues / total revenues + 
Oil GDP / total GDP + 
Per capita oil production per day + 
Factionalism variables  
Van_index +/- 
Van_comp +/- 
Van_part +/- 
Polity +/- 
Fac × NR - 
Investment /GDP (Inv_gdp) + 
Gov_expenditure/GDP 
(Govex_gdp) 
- 
Inflation (inf) - 
Oil price growth (oil_g) + 
OECD_gdppcg + 
Wardummy - 
Lag of dependent var (Gt-1) + 
3.3.2. Measuring factionalism 
Factionalism is not directly observable. Zariski (1960) defined a faction as “any intra-
party combination, clique, or grouping whose members share a sense of common 
identity and common purpose and are organized to act collectively – as a distinct bloc 
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within the party – to achieve their goals”. Beller and Belloni (1978, p. 419) defined 
factions as “any relatively organized group that exists within the context of some other 
group and which (as a political faction) competes with rivals for power advantages 
within the larger group of which it is a part”. Basedau and Köllner (2005) summarized 
the main characteristics of political factions. In their analysis, a faction is any intra-party 
grouping which exists for a certain period of time, has an organization, shares common 
goals and pursues them actively.  
Factionalism is a post-revolutionary characteristic of the political economy of Iran. 
There are some quantified indices which we can use as proxies for factionalism. I 
consider the following variables as indicators of factionalism in Iran: 
• Polity2 (Marshall and Jaggers, 2007): Factionalism requires a certain degree of 
democracy in a society to emerge. In an autocracy with a strong ruler, there 
would be less opportunity, if any, for creation of political factions and parties.31 
Polity2 measures the level of democracy as a pre-requisite for factionalism.  
Polity2 scores are between -10 and +10. A +10 refers to “strongly democratic” 
state and -10 to “strongly autocratic”. I use this measure as a proxy of 
factionalism development. There is another sub-index in polity which measures 
a degree of factionalism (PARCOMP) more directly. However, there is missing 
information on this variable for some years of study. This latter variable, 
however, has a high correlation with polity2.32  
• Van_index: This index combines two basic dimensions of democracy – 
competition and participation – measured as the percentage of votes not cast for 
the largest party (Competition) times the percentage of the population who 
actually voted in the election (Participation).  
This product is divided by 100 to form an index that in principle could vary from 
0 (no democracy) to 100 (full democracy). Higher levels of this index reflect 
more competition of factions within political power and participation of their 
                                                     
31 Currently, there are 240 legal political groups, communities, and factions in Iran (see Iranian Ministry 
of Interior list of political groups, communities or factions at: 
http://www.moi.ir/Portal/File/ShowFile.aspx?ID=10446318-e7d0-436c-8e57-18dc55b5245d ).  
32 PARCOMP is Competitiveness of Participation. It is coded as 1 (repressed), 2 (suppressed), 3 
(factional), 4 (transitional) and 5 (competitive). Iran under Mohammad Reza Shah, except for period of 
Mossadegh government, was coded as 1. In the years after the revolution, it was coded 2, except for 
1997-2003 which was 3 (factional).  
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supporters. This index seems to show better the (a) - symmetric degree of 
political power.  
• Van_comp: This variable portrays the electoral success of smaller parties, that is, 
the percentage of votes gained by the smaller parties in parliamentary and/or 
presidential elections. The variable is calculated by subtracting from 100 the 
percentage of votes won by the largest party (the party which wins most votes) 
in parliamentary elections or by the party of the successful candidate in 
presidential elections. The variable thus theoretically ranges from 0 (only one 
party received 100 % of votes) to 100 (each voter cast a vote for a distinct 
party).  
• Van_part: The percentage of the total population who actually voted in the 
election. The group of Van indicators introduced by Vanhanen (2000).  
More details on variables and sources are presented in Table 3.A. (see Appendix 3.A). 
Table 3.2 shows the correlation among different proxies of factionalism.  
Table 3.2. Correlation matrix  
Correlation van_comp van_index van_part polity2 
van_comp 1.000 .939 .581 .665 
van_index .939 1.000 .756 .812 
van_part .581 .756 1.000 .856 
polity2 .665 .812 .856 1.000 
3.4. Empirical results 
The first step before running regressions is checking the time-series properties of the 
variables in the model. The most common unit-root tests, namely an augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) and Phipps-Perron (PP) tests have been used. The results show that except 
for inflation (inf), growth rate of GDP per capita (pcgdp_g), growth rate of oil prices 
(oil_g), and growth rate of OECD per capita GDP (OECD_gdppcg) which are stationary 
at their level, the other variables are I(1). Thus, they are entered into regression models 
after taking the first difference.33  
                                                     
33 Unit-root tests are available upon request.  
 
 68
In order to examine the effects of different natural resource abundance and dependence 
variables on the Iranian economic growth and role of factionalism, I set up a dynamic 
ordinary least squares (DOLS). In this framework, it is also possible that factionalism 
and natural resource related variables are affected by economic growth. Thus, the 
independent variables may be contemporaneously correlated with the error term. To 
address this problem, I use 1 to 4 years’ lags of independent variables as instruments. 
Usually, there is no significant correlation between lagged variables and disturbance. 
Furthermore, there can be another concern about the effect of “oil-rent” specific 
variables and factionalism which in turn influence economic growth. In this case, I still 
have a correct model but it may not be efficient specification. I can show that this issue 
is a not a source of concern for our case. The correlation between “oil-rent” dependency 
and abundance variables and factionalism variables are not statistically different from 
zero.  
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 show the direct and indirect effects of “oil dependency and 
abundance” on real economic growth.34 I have separated these tables by using different 
natural resource variables in order to provide more insight into specific differences in 
the interaction of factionalism (competition) with resource rents.  
As is evident in Tables 3.3 and 3.4, even after controlling for the most important 
variables in growth literature and interaction effects, I cannot identify a direct negative 
effect from higher oil rents on the economic growth of Iran. The oil rent in itself is not a 
curse for the economy, but a blessing. It provides necessary resources for financing the 
process of economic growth.35 The direct positive effect of natural resource abundance 
and dependence variables on real growth rates of Iranian economy undermines the 
phenomenon of the resource curse which is demonstrated in the cross-country analyses. 
Nevertheless, the final effect of oil dependency and abundance depends on the changes 
of factionalism indicators. The negative and significant sign of interaction terms (β3) in 
most specifications shows that increasing political competition and struggle of political 
                                                     
34 Our main oil dependency variable in this study is Oilrev_trev. The share of oil rents in the annual 
government budgets is the most relevant variable for study of conditional effects of oil revenues on 
growth. However, we have presented the results on the basis of two other indicators of oil dependency 
(e.g., Oil GDP/ GDP and Oil exports / exports). The positive and significant  direct effect of oil rent 
variable on growth remains, however, and the negative interaction effects are hardly statistically 
significant (see Tables 3.B.1 and 3.B.2 in Appendix 3.B). As we mentioned, for political factions, the 
tangible variable is the amount of petrodollars in the state budget. 
35 This positive effect of oil rent is also illustrated by Elhiraika and Hamed (2007) for the case of the 
United Arab Emirates. 
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groups for power besides increasing oil rents reduce economic growth. Rent-seeking 
efforts and directly unproductive activities aiming to capture a part of oil revenues 
increase inefficiency and consequently waste scarce resources within the economy.  
It seems at least in the short term that young democracies, having a fragile and factional 
nature in a rentier economy, experience poor growth. Of course, this observation does 
not undermine the long term benefits of higher democracy. The main puzzle is how a 
government in an oil economy should manage the transit path from a fragile and 
factional democracy to an established one by minimizing the negative side effects on 
the economy.  
The effects of other control variables are consistent with our expectations and economic 
theory. The share of investment in GDP has a positive, significant and stable effect on 
growth over different specifications. An increase in government consumptions in GDP 
has a negative and significant effect on growth in most specifications, especially in 
TSLS estimations. Inflation as an indicator of macroeconomic instability has 
statistically significant and negative effects on growth. The lagged term of growth has a 
positive effect on current growth but it is not statistically significant in most 
specifications. It seems that its effects are reduced by contributions from other main 
control variables. The oil price growth rate has positive and significant effects on 
growth when I use an oil abundance variable. It seems that the growth rate of OECD 
economies has no significant effect on the Iranian economy, when I control for other 
variables. This might be due to a lower degree of integration of the Iranian economy in 
the global markets. In order to control for the effects of eight years’ war with Iraq on 
growth rates, I included a dummy variable. The effect of a war dummy is significantly 
negative in all specifications. The Ramsey test indicates that we do not have a serious 
problem with an omitted variable bias in most specifications. Also based on the LM 
test, I can accept that my main findings are immune to the possible autocorrelation of 
residuals. The R-squared criteria show that a significant portion of changes in the real 
economic growth of Iran can be explained by included explanatory variables.  
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Table 3.3. OLS & 2SLS results for oil revenues / total revenues 
Variable/Specifications  S1(OLS) S1(2SLS) S2(OLS) S2(2SLS) S3(OLS) S3(2SLS) S4(OLS) S4(2SLS) 
D(oilrev_trev) 0.20 (3.10) 0.32 (2.46) 0.23 (3.15) 0.38 (2.28) 0.25 (3.17) 0.55 (3.16) 0.24 (3.32) 0.42 (3.18) 
D(Van_index) 1.13 (1.24) 0.94 (0.90)       
D(Van_comp)   -0.02 (-0.22) 0.05 (0.39)     
D(Van_part)     0.04 (0.20) 0.09 (0.24)   
D(polity)       -0.41 (-1.79) -0.69 (-1.40) 
D(van_index)* D(oilrev_trev) -0.26 (-2.17) -0.22 (-1.78)       
D(van_comp)* D(oilrev_trev)   -0.02 (-2.24) -0.009 (-0.74)     
D(van_part)* D(oilrev_trev)     -0.05 (-1.35) -0.08 (-2.46)   
Dpolity*D(oilrev_trev)       -0.05 (-1.55) -0.10 (-1.86) 
D(inv_gdp) 0.42 (2.11) 0.46 (2.17) 0.43 (2.20) 0.60 (2.51) 0.42 (2.46) 0.55 (2.16) 0.38 (1.85) 0.47 (2.13) 
D(govex_gdp) -1.36 (-2.66) -1.10 (-1.38) -1.45 (-2.57) -1.16 (-1.27) -1.53 (-2.52) -1.13 (-1.10) -1.47 (-2.83) -1.41 (-1.78) 
Inf -0.20 (-2.09) -0.19 (-1.75) -0.18 (-2.04) -0.17 (-1.63) -0.18 (-2.23) -0.17 (-1.56) -0.19 (-2.15) -0.21 (-1.82) 
Gt-1 0.22 (1.93) 0.22 (1.64) 0.20 (1.60) 0.19 (1.34) 0.13 (1.05) 0.09 (0.51) 0.15 (1.29) 0.10 (0.68) 
Oil_g 0.02 (1.49) -0.004 (0.20) 0.01 (1.00) -0.008 (-0.23) 0.02 (1.08) -0.01 (-0.29) 0.02 (1.47) 0.008 (0.38) 
OECD_gdppcg 0.83 (1.20) 1.06 (1.26) 1.09 (1.32) 1.35 (1.34) 0.86 (1.37) 0.91 (1.12) 1.02 (1.31) 1.17 (1.18) 
Wardummy -4.03 (-1.84) -4.09 (-1.58) -5.77 (-2.65) -5.50 (-1.88) -6.54 (-4.30) -5.91 (-2.45) -6.69 (-3.92) -6.81 (-2.50) 
R2 0.71 0.70 0.68 0.65 0.69 0.59 0.69 0.62 
F 7.60 6.34 6.60 5.17 6.74 5.23 6.81 5.48 
LM  0.45 0.10 0.47 0.04 0.06 0.009 0.13 0.005 
RESET 0.74 0.66 0.97 0.45 0.70 0.99 0.93 0.49 
Obs (after adjustments) 41 37 41 37 41 37 41 37 
Dependent variable: real per capita GDP growth rate. Period: 1959-2007 (effective sample: 1968-2004); t value within () brackets; Newey-West HAC standard 
errors & covariance, LM is Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test (F form, p-value for OLS & Obs*R2, p-value for TSLS) which shows the probability of null 
hypothesis (no auto-correlation in residuals) acceptance (p-values larger than 0.05 means acceptance of null hypothesis); RESET is Ramsey test (using powers of the 
independent variables) for omitted variables. The p-value of RESET tests the H0: model has no omitted variables (p-values larger than 0.05 means acceptance of null 
hypothesis (model has no omitted variables).  Instruments consist of 1-4 years lagged values of “oil dependency”, different factionalism proxies, government 
expenditures /GDP, investment/GDP, and interactions terms, as well as 2 year lagged values of inflation and oil price growth rate. Constant term is included but not 
reported.  
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Table 3.4. OLS & 2SLS results for per capita daily oil production 
Variables / Specifications S5(OLS) S5(2SLS) S6(OLS) S6(2SLS) S7(OLS) S7(2SLS) S8(OLS) S8(2SLS) 
D(pcoil_produc) 337.8 (6.77) 381.7 (6.70) 384.04 (5.04) 393.7 (5.71) 319.2 (7.97) 321.7 (5.90) 352.4 (5.99) 447.8 (6.31) 
D(Van_index) -0.02 (-0.06) -0.29 (-0.42)       
D(Van_comp)   -0.06 (-0.80) -0.14 (-0.95)     
D(Van_part)     -0.06 (-0.56) 0.26 (0.56)   
D(polity)       -0.06 (-0.30) -0.47 (-1.10) 
D(van_index)*D(pcoil_produc) -38.77 (-3.28) -49.26 (-3.13)       
D(van_comp)*D(pcoil_produc)   -11.31 (-2.60) -13.22(-2.71)     
D(van_part)*D(pcoil_produc)     -12.56 (-3.71) -7.40 (-0.74)   
Dpolity*D(pcoil_produc)       -26.7 (-3.09) -50.6 (-2.64) 
D(inv_gdp) 0.60 (4.84) 0.69 (4.69) 0.60 (4.20) 0.56 (2.92) 0.57 (5.78) 0.59 (5.06) 0.59 (5.26) 0.66 (3.51) 
D(govex_gdp) -0.36 (-1.03) -0.70 (-1.26) -0.38 (-1.05) -0.71 (-1.24) -0.51 (-1.43) -1.32 (-3.11) -0.28 (-0.81) -0.42 (-0.49) 
Inf -0.08 (-1.37) -0.09 (-1.42) -0.07 (-1.33) -0.10 (-1.69) -0.09 (-1.77) -0.12 (-2.14) -0.07 (-1.33) -0.06 (-0.88) 
Gt-1 0.07 (0.96) 0.02 (0.23) 0.07 (0.96) 0.03 (0.30) 0.05 (0.65) 0.02 (0.24) 0.07 (0.95) 0.06 (0.79) 
Oil_g 0.02 (3.73) 0,.03 (2.65) 0.02 (3.38) 0.03 (2.41) 0.03 (3.94) 0.04 (4.20) 0.02 (3.44) 0.01 (0.99) 
OECD_gdppcg 0.18 (0.36) 0.27 (0.45) 0.30 (0.58) 0.41 (0.65) 0.13 (0.28) 0.30 (0.54) 0.19 (0.40) 0.14 (0.24) 
Wardummy -4.10 (-2.89) -4.56 (-3.13) -4.64 (-3.20) -5.30 (-3.17) -4.31 (-3.39) -4.98 (-3.88) -4.33 (-3.16) -4.02 (-3.08) 
R2 0.82 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.82 0.79 0.82 0.77 
F 14.66 13.24 14.14 12.77 14.59 11.73 14.66 11 
LM  0.11 0.08 0.15 0.23 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.008 
RESET 0.23 0.37 0.04 0.20 0.49 0.47 0.12 0.86 
Obs (after adjustments) 43 40 43 40 43 40 43 40 
Dependent variable: real per capita GDP growth rate. Period: 1959-2007 (effective sample: 1965-2004); t value within () brackets; Newey-West HAC standard 
errors & covariance; LM is Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test (F form, p-value for OLS & Obs*R2, p-value for TSLS) which shows the probability of 
null hypothesis (no auto-correlation in residuals) acceptance (p-values larger than 0.05 means acceptance of null hypothesis); RESET is Ramsey test (using powers 
of the independent variables) for omitted variables. The p-value of RESET tests the H0: model has no omitted variables (p-values larger than 0.05 means acceptance 
of null hypothesis (model has no omitted variables). Instruments consist of 1- 4 years lagged values of “oil abundance”, different factionalism proxies, government 
expenditures /GDP, investment/GDP, and interactions terms, as well as 2 year lagged values of inflation and oil price growth rate. Constant term is included but not 
reported. 
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Since natural resource dependence variables have a different unit of measurement (%) 
than natural resource abundance variables (per capita daily production of oil), 
comparing their direct and indirect effects may not be very precise. To get a better 
picture of the size and interpretation of effects, I calculate the marginal effects of one 
standard deviation increase in a related natural resource variable at different levels of 
related factionalism variables on the real per capita GDP growth. For illustration, I use 
coefficients in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 for Van_index variable (S1 (2SLS), and S5 (2SLS)). 
Using Eq.3.2, I calculate these marginal effects. 
 
( ) )( ..+1 = nrstdDDfac3ββGΔ                                                                                    (3.2) 
where G is the real per capita GDP growth rate, fac is Van_index, std(nr) is a standard 
deviation change in different proxies of natural resource abundance (per capital daily oil 
production; pcoil_produc) and dependence (share of oil revenues in total revenues of 
government; oilrev_trev) and D is differencing operator. Table 3.5 presents the effect of 
a one standard deviation increases in the natural resource variables, taking into 
consideration the maximum, minimum and mean value of van_index  on the real GDP 
per capita growth rate.  
Table 3.5. Marginal effects of oil rents on growth  
Political Factionalism D(Oilrev_Trev) D(pcoil_produc) 
Mean D(van_index) 2.68 3.78 
Maximum D(van_index) -8.98 0.81 
Minimum D(van_index) 8.22 5.19 
 
Table 3.5 shows that an increase of one standard deviation in the share of oil revenues 
in the total revenues of government (oilrev_trev) has a significant dampening effect on 
the real growth when we have the maximum level of political factionalism 
(D(van_index)). In other words, ceteris paribus, with a maximum level of political 
factionalism, Iranian real per capital income growth rate decreases by about -9 36 per 
                                                     
36 For example, this figure is obtained through specification 1(2SLS) of Table 3.3: (0.32-0.22*6.1)*8.79= 
-8.98.  
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cent if the shares of oil revenues in total revenues of state increases by one standard 
deviation. By having the minimum level of political factionalism or higher dominance 
of one political group, Iranian real per capita income growth rate increases by about 8 
per cent, if oilrev_trev increases by one standard deviation. This result supports our 
initial hypothesis, asserting that factionalism and the reduction of dominance of one 
political group intensifies rent-seeking for oil rents in the government budget.  
Per capita daily oil production, more or less, shows the abundance of oil resources. We 
see that with a maximum level of political factionalism, the positive effects of oil 
abundance on growth are significantly lower than the minimum level of factionalism 
situation. However, it is still positive. In other words, by having a maximum political 
factionalism, Iranian real per capita income growth rate increases just by 0.81 percent, if 
daily oil production per capita increases by one standard deviation. Such a low positive 
effect could be changed to a more significant rise of about 5 percent if we were in the 
minimum level of political factionalism.  
3.5. Conclusion  
This paper re-examines the phenomenon of the natural resource curse, using the Iranian 
economy as a case study. The paper discussed that oil rents are not de facto harmful for 
the economy. What is detrimental is “destructive competition” within the political 
power structure for these rents. The pre-revolution monopolized rent-seeking were more 
growth friendly than the post-revolution factionalized rent-seeking. Controlling for 
indirect effects of oil rent on the economic growth through changes of political 
competition, I conclude that higher levels of symmetry in the political system and 
bolder competition among different political factions reduce the positive effects of oil 
wealth on growth.  A balance of power or lack of any dominant political group may 
foster rent-seeking activities. Thus, the more appropriate political system for the case of 
Iran as an oil economy is an autonomous one. Our findings are robust after controlling 
for possible endogeneity. The empirical results of this study are in line with the 
theoretical predictions of Bjorvatn and Selvik (2008).  
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Appendix 3.A 
Table 3.A. Data description and sources 
Variable Description Source 
G Real per capita GDP growth rate % 
CBI (2008) 
 
Oilex_tex 
Share of oil exports in total exports 
(oil dependency) 
CBI (2008) 
 
Oilrev_trev 
Share of oil revenues in total revenues of 
government (oil dependency) 
CBI (2008) 
 
OilGDP_tgdp Share of oil group value added in real GDP 
CBI (2008) 
 
Pcoil_produc Per capita daily oil production (oil abundance) 
EIA 
http://www.eia.doe.gov 
Polity2 
Polity2 index, -10: fully non-democratic, 10: fully 
democratic 
Marshall and Jaggers 
(2007) 
Van_index Index of democracy Vanhanen (2000) 
Van_comp Index of political competition Vanhanen (2000) 
Van_part Index of participation in elections by people Vanhanen (2000) 
Inv_gdp Share of real investment in real GDP CBI (2008) 
Govex_gdp 
Share of real government expenditures in real 
GDP 
CBI (2008) 
Inf CPI inflation CBI (2008) 
Oil_g Growth rate of global average oil prices 
IFS IMF online 
database 
Gt-1 Lag of per capita GDP growth rate  
OECD_gdppcg Real growth rate of OECD per capita GDP World Bank (2008) 
Wardummy Dummy variable for Iraq-Iran war 
1=1980-1988; 
otherwise 0 
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  Appendix 3.B 
   Table 3.B.1. OLS & 2SLS results for oil exports/total exports 
Variables / Specifications SB1(OLS) SB1(2SLS) SB2(OLS) SB2(2SLS) SB3(OLS) SB3(2SLS) SB4(OLS) SB4(2SLS) 
D(oilex_tex) 0.30 (0.89) 0.84 (2.74) 0.22 (0.69) 0.77 (2.59) 0.28 (0.95) 0.80 (2.70) 0.19 (0.61) 0.63 (1.68) 
D(Van_index) 0.43 (0.49) 1.13 (1.26)       
D(Van_comp)   -0.12 (-0.52) -0.34 (-0.77)     
D(Van_part)     -0.07 (-0.28) 0.20 (0.72)   
D(polity)       -0.34 (-1.42) -0.07 (-0.12) 
D(van_index)*D(oilex_tex) -0.35 (-1.12) -0.54 (-1.23)       
D(van_comp)*D(oilex_tex)   0.007 (0.13) 0.09 (0.64)     
D(van_part)*D(oilex_tex)     -0.17 (-0.95) -0.12 (-0.60)   
Dpolity*D(oilex_tex)       0.06 (0.40) 0.26 (1.12) 
D(inv_gdp) 0.56 (2.74) 0.58 (2.64) 0.47 (2.45) 0.48 (1.88) 0.54 (2.62) 0.56 (2.27) 0.46 (2.39) 0.42 (2.12) 
D(govex_gdp) -1.12 (-1.38) -1.14 (-1.04) -1.36 (-1.58) -1.41 (-1.17) -1.18 (-1.62) -1.54 (-1.57) -1.37 (-1.86) -2.36 (-3.04) 
Inf -0.14 (-1.90) -0.17 (-2.40) -0.16 (-2.32) -0.22 (-2.87) -0.16 (-2.08) -0.19 (-2.66) -0.16 (-2.27) -0.22 (-3.07) 
Gt-1 0.19 (1.52) 0.22 (1.69) 0.14 (1.25) 0.05 (0.40) 0.14 (1.26) 0.15 (0.97) 0.15 (1.35) 0.16 (1.04) 
Oil_g 0.01 (0.50) -0.006 (-0.15) 0.03 (1.10) 0.01 (0.41) 0.02 (0.91) 0.006 (0.15) 0.03 (1.27) 0.02 (0.82) 
OECD_gdppcg 0.87 (1.13) 0.87 (1.12) 0.93 (1.15) 1.01 (1.22) 0.74 (1.09) 0.88 (1.25) 0.93 (1.17) 1.15 (1.48) 
Wardummy -5.89 (-3.43) -5.27 (-3.06) -7.15 (-3.46) -8.46 (-2.93) -6.43 (-5.20) -6.46 (-4.00) -7.10 (-4.75) -7.81 (-3.81) 
R2 0.60 0.57 0.59 0.54 0.61 0.56 0.60 0.53 
F 4.87 4.71 4.74 4.28 5.03 4.65 4.88 4.29 
LM 0.77 0.26 0.81 0.38 0.80 0.19 0.93 0.73 
RESET 0.33 0.22 0.98 0.62 0.20 0.68 0.95 0.97 
Obs (after adjustments) 43 41 43 41 43 41 43 41 
Dependent variable: real per capita GDP growth rate. Period: 1959-2007 (effective sample: 1968-2004); t value within () brackets; Newey-West HAC standard 
errors & covariance, LM is Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test (F form, p-value for OLS & Obs*R2, p-value for TSLS) which shows the probability of null 
hypothesis (no auto-correlation in residuals) acceptance (p-values larger than 0.05 means acceptance of null hypothesis); RESET is Ramsey test (using powers of the 
independent variables) for omitted variables. The p-value of RESET tests the H0: model has no omitted variables (p-values larger than 0.05 means acceptance of null 
hypothesis (model has no omitted variables). Instruments consist of 1-4 years lagged values of “oil dependency”, different factionalism proxies, government 
expenditures /GDP, investment/GDP, and interactions terms, as well as 2 year lagged values of inflation and oil price growth rate. Constant term is included but not 
reported. 
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  Table 3.B.2. OLS & 2SLS results for oil-GDP/total GDP (constant prices) 
Variables / Specifications SB5(OLS) SB5(2SLS) SB6(OLS) SB6(2SLS) SB7(OLS) SB7(2SLS) SB8(OLS) SB8(2SLS) 
D(oilGDP_gdp) 1.39 (9.9) 1.53 (5.8) 1.38 (10.7) 1.48 (4.7) 1.33 (10.8) 1.44 (4.9) 1.38 (9.5) 1.55 (4.5) 
D(Van_index) -0.01 (-0.02) -0.13 (-0.13)       
D(Van_comp)   -0.001 (-0.00) -0.006 (-0.02)     
D(Van_part)     -0.17 (-1.0) -0.02 (-0.05)   
D(polity)       -0.04 (-0.18) 0.79 (1.1) 
D(van_index)* D(oilGDP_gdp) -0.006 (-0.05) -0.01 (-0.08)       
D(van_comp)*D(oilGDP_gdp)   0.009 (0.24) 0.06 (0.74)     
D(van_part)* D(oilGDP_gdp)     -0.02 (-1.0) -0.01 (-0.22)   
Dpolity*D(oilGDP_gdp)       0.002 (0.03) 0.18 (1.7) 
D(inv_gdp) 0.72 (5.3) 0.70 (4.6) 0.70 (4.7) 0.66 (4.4) 0.71 (5.8) 0.64 (4.5) 0.71 (5.6) 0.71 (4.7) 
D(govex_gdp) -0.20 (-0.4) -0.44 (-0.6) -0.25 (-0.5) -0.75 (-1.5) -0.28 (-0.6) -0.81 (-1.0) -0.23 (-0.5) -0.71 (-1.0) 
Inf -0.13 (-1.7) -0.15 (-1.9) -0.13 (-1.7) -0.17 (-2.1) -0.14 (-1.7) -0.17 (-1.9) -0.13 (-1.7) -0.17 (-2.5) 
Gt-1 0.16 (1.57) 0.14 (1.32) 0.15 (1.57) 0.07 (0.61) 0.15 (1.63) 0.16 (1.74) 0.15 (1.53) 0.11 (1.22) 
Oil_g 0.04 (4.1) 0.04 (4.2) 0.04 (4.6) 0.06 (5.9) 0.04 (4.7) 0.05 (3.1) 0.04 (4.0) 0.05 (4.3) 
OECD_gdppcg -0.01 (-0.02) 0.04 (0.07) -0.01 (-0.02) 0.05 (0.08) -0.03 (- 0.06 (0.10) -0.003  (- 0.20 (0.31) 
Wardummy -5.47 (-2.4) -5.98 (-2.5) -5.64 (-2.7) -6.96 (-3.5) -5.49 (-2.7) -5.86 (-3.2) -5.57 (-2.7) -5.91 (-2.7) 
R2 0.80 0.81 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.77 
F 13.1 12.6 13.2 12.24 13.50 12.1 13.2 10.38 
LM 0.34 0.20 0.40 0.18 0.38 0.06 0.45 0.43 
RESET 0.64 0.78 0.67 0.67 0.65 0.74 0.62 0.55 
Obs (after adjustments) 43 41 43 41 43 41 43 41 
Dependent variable: real per capita GDP growth rate. Period: 1959-2007 (effective sample: 1968-2004); t value within () brackets; Newey-West HAC standard 
errors & covariance, LM is Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test (F form, p-value for OLS & Obs*R2, p-value for TSLS) which shows the probability of null 
hypothesis (no auto-correlation in residuals) acceptance (p-values larger than 0.05 means acceptance of null hypothesis); RESET is Ramsey test (using powers of the 
independent variables) for omitted variables. The p-value of RESET tests the H0: model has no omitted variables (p-values larger than 0.05 means acceptance of null 
hypothesis (model has no omitted variables). Instruments consist of 1-4 years lagged values of “oil dependency”, different factionalism proxies, government 
expenditures /GDP, investment/GDP, and interactions terms, as well as 2 year lagged values of inflation and oil price growth rate. Constant term is included but not 
reported. 
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Chapter 4 
 
4 Illegal Trade in the Iranian Economy: Evidence from 
a Structural Model 37 
“Rather than engaging in abstract theorizing and 
speculation, we need to figure out how to measure the scale 
of illicit activity and then see how it responds to economic 
carrots and sticks out in the real world of smugglers and 
gangsters“ 
Fisman and Miguel (2008, p. 55) 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Smuggling is the clandestine import of goods (Deflem and Henry-Turner, 2001) or the 
evasion of excise taxes by circumvention of border controls (Merriman, 2003). 
Regardless of various different definitions, the effects of smuggling are numerous and 
economically significant. In the past, economists have drawn attention to the welfare 
aspects of smuggling. Bhagwati and Hansen (1973) studied welfare levels under tariffs 
with and without smuggling. They assumed that smuggling involves a cost difference as 
compared to legal trade. They model the extra cost of smuggling as a real resource cost. 
In their approach, a constant fraction of smuggled goods is lost. We cannot, however, 
simultaneously observe both legal and illegal trade in their model. If the real unit cost of 
smuggling is too high, then we will only observe official trade, and illegal trade will be 
substituted for official trade in the opposite situation. Bhagwati and Hansen conclude 
that achieving a given degree of protection for domestic importable production in the 
presence of smuggling leads to lower welfare levels than if smuggling were absent. This 
is due to the real resource cost of smuggling, which absorbs productive agents from the 
official trade sector. In practice, however, we observe both legal and illegal trade 
simultaneously. 
Pitt (1981) proposed a model of smuggling consistent with the coexistence of 
smuggling, legal trade, and price disparities. He assumes that legal trade provides a 
cover for smuggling. The greater the legal trade, the easier it is to hide smuggling from 
                                                     
37 Different versions of this chapter published as CESifo working paper (Munich, No. 2397) and 
Economic Research Forum working paper (Cairo, No. 409). The current version is based on Farzanegan 
(2009).  
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enforcement agencies, and smuggling will therefore be less costly. In fact, the declared 
amounts of imported goods are sold at a loss on the local market, which is compensated 
for by the profits of undeclared imported goods. In fact, more trade openness by itself 
does not guarantee reduction of illegal trade.  
The other important debate in the theoretical literature on smuggling is the role of law 
enforcement in influencing the cost of smuggling. Martin and Panagariya (1984) 
modelled the economy’s response to increased enforcement of anti-smuggling laws. 
They showed that higher law enforcement raises real per unit smuggling costs and the 
domestic price of imports, but lowers the absolute quantity and the share of illegal 
imports amongst total imports. Thursby et al. (1991) proposed a model where 
smuggling is camouflaged by legal sales. This is in line with Pitt’s (1981) argument. 
They sought to evaluate the effects of market structure and law enforcement on 
smuggling and welfare. According to their model, cover effects, in which official trade 
provides a cover for smugglers, reduce the market price of imported goods. If these 
price effects outweigh the extra real costs of smuggling, then smuggling will enhance 
welfare. In this latter scenario, increasing law enforcement reduces welfare levels. 
Increasing tax burdens is the other key factor behind engaging in illegal trade. Norton 
(1988) shows that an increase in the tax rate will increase the optimal choice for 
smuggled goods and the number of firms involved in this type of trade.  
While a large body of literature is devoted to theoretical aspects of smuggling’s effects 
on social welfare, this paper provides an empirical contribution by applying structural 
equation modeling techniques and examination of foreign trade statistics to the case of 
Iran. Estimating smuggling is challenging because it is an illegal hidden activity. The 
principal technique of detecting illegal trade – the partner country data comparison 
technique – has its origins in the work of Morgenstern (1963) on the accuracy of foreign 
trade statistics. The technique was further refined by Bhagwati (1964) and Naya and 
Morgan (1969). Fisman and Wei (2004) used this technique to study “missing imports” 
in China. In Fisman and Wei (2007) they revealed illegal trade in cultural goods. Hsieh 
and Moretti (2006) used foreign trade data to reveal corruption: they show that the 
government of Iraq, under the “oil for food” program, systematically underinvoiced its 
oil exports in return for bribes from oil buyers. Berger and Nitsch (2008) examined the 
foreign trade data discrepancies for the world’s five largest importers from 2002-2006 
and found a positive relationship between estimated discrepancies and level of 
corruption in both partner countries.  
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Yavari (2000) adopted the methodology of Bhagwati (1964) and estimated 
overvaluation of imports in Iran from 1977-1997. His calculation of import 
misinvoicing shows a different pattern before and after the final year of Iran’s war with 
Iraq (1988). While we can observe both under- and overinvoicing of imports before this 
year, in most years after 1988 there has been overinvoicing. Madah and Pajoyan (2005) 
examined smuggling in Iran using a structural equation approach. They calculated an 
ordinal trend of import smuggling using three causal variables, namely the rate of fines, 
the ratio of the official to the black market exchange rates, and import tariffs, and found 
a negative effect of fine rates and a positive effect of the exchange rate and tariffs on 
smuggling. They did not, however, estimate the relative size and value of smuggling. To 
accomplish this, information is required on the value of smuggling in one of the years of 
the sample through another technique such as foreign trade data discrepancy. This 
complementary estimation enables the calculated MIMIC ordinal index of smuggling to 
be transformed to a relative index and thereby meaningful value.  The latter authors also 
did not control for the effects of other key variables such as GDP per capita, trade 
openness, human capital, institutional quality, and a range of important interaction 
terms. Their study focuses only on import smuggling, and so neglects the important 
phenomenon of export smuggling. Export smuggling of fuel products in Iran results in a 
large divergence of government revenue.  
To my knowledge, this paper is the first study that applies both structural equation 
modeling and an examination of foreign trade statistics discrepancies to trace the causes 
and consequences of smuggling and to quantify its relative size. This study expands on 
current applications of MIMIC modeling in the shadow economy literature and applies 
them to smuggling.38 In addition to the main direct effects of hypothesized causes on 
smuggling, I also examine indirect effects of causal variables through interaction terms. 
In contrast to classic regression analysis, using interaction terms and examining the 
effects of main causal variables through relevant institutional quality factors is a novel 
approach to MIMIC models in economics. Furthermore, this provides a novel 
application of MIMIC to the illegal trade that also takes into account political and 
economic institutional quality. Finally, estimations of this study can be compared to 
                                                     
38 For a detailed study applying MIMIC techniques for estimation of shadow economy, see Schneider 
(2005). Buehn and Farzanegan (2008) used the MIMIC modeling to study smuggling in the 1990s for 55 
countries.  
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rather objective records of the Iranian police organization on detected value of 
smuggling in Iran. These objective information are summarized in Table 4.1. These 
exogenous information are useful to assess the variance and reliability of my 
estimations based on MIMIC modeling.  
I have selected Iran as a case study for illegal trade estimation. The Iranian economy, in 
particular after the Islamic revolution, provides an excellent case for such an analysis. 
Global records for black market premia during the 1980s and 1990s, government 
intervention in the economy through various subsidies and protection policies, the role 
of para-governmental bodies in trade and the economy, along with other bottlenecks in 
the structure of the economy and the political system, provide a unique opportunity for 
such an experiment.  
Table 4.1. Media information on the amount of smuggling in Iran 
Source Estimated amount of smuggling 
Mehdi Karbasian, the former head of 
Iran’s Customs. Akhbar-e Eqtesadi, 7 
Bahman 1378 (January 27, 2000) 
$1.5 to $2 billion worth of goods was 
smuggled into the country 
Hosayn Nasiri, the former Secretary of the 
Supreme Council of Free Trade Zones. 
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty 3 
(September 18, 2000) 
$3 billion 
Bonyan, 25 Bahman 1380 (February 14, 
2002) 
$3.5 billion 
Iran Daily citing government sources. Iran 
Daily, 28 Febuary 2001
$3 to $5 billion 
Eqtesad-e Iran (Iran’s version of The 
Economist). Eqtesad-e Iran 360 (Bahman 
1380 [January–February 2002]) 
$4 billion worth of goods are smuggled or 
‘‘legally smuggled’’ into Iran 
Wall Street Journal, 7 December 1998 Two-thirds of sold goods in Tehran Bazaar 
are smuggled 
Source: Based on information in Keshavarzian (2007) 
The results link basic education and trade openness to illegal trade through the quality 
of governance and institutions. The lack of well-designed institutions and absence of the 
rule of law channels skills and education into rent-seeking activities. Liberalization of 
foreign trade without efficient institutions only provides new opportunities for illegal 
traders. I show the negative effects of increasing penalty rates for smuggling. The 
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important role of institutional quality is conclusive. The effects of smuggling in 
reducing import prices are more substantive than those for the reduction of government 
revenues.  
This chapter is organised as follows. In section 4.2, I present stylized facts about the 
Iranian economy that indicate why it is an interesting case for studying smuggling. The 
empirical methodology is presented in section 4.3. The empirical model and key 
variables are presented in section 4.4. The results and main conclusions are set out in 
sections 4.5 and 4.6, respectively.  
4.2. Stylized facts on Iran 
4.2.1. Rules and regulations for smuggling in Iran 
An illegal transaction happens in order to avoid legal taxation and duties on goods that 
can be imported legally. There is also, however, an incentive to smuggle goods that are 
prohibited on legal or religious grounds, such as alcoholic beverages and drugs in the 
case of Iran. The main Iranian rules and regulations on smuggling are “Penal codes on 
smuggling” (1933), “Custom rule” (1971), and “Governmental discretionary 
punishments rule” (1994). The 1933 punishment rule for smuggling identified various 
types of smuggling. This classification covers the following groups: (1) the smuggling 
of legal products; (2) the import smuggling of illegal products; (3) the export smuggling 
of illegal products; (4) the smuggling of monopoly products; and (5) special activities.  
The smuggling of legal products is the import or export of products for which the 
government assesses custom duties and taxes when preparing annual budgets. In fact, 
these products can be traded legally by paying these official duties and taxes. Smugglers 
evade legal import taxes and custom duties in this type of smuggling. The second and 
third groups are the import and export of illegal products. Custom rule has determined 
these products.39 The fourth category is the smuggling of monopoly products. 
Monopoly products are those goods which based on monopoly regulations (such as the 
monopoly of tobacco rule, 1931), can be traded only by the governmental institutions. 
Thus, trading such products without the legal representation of the government is 
considered as trading in smuggled goods. The last category involves special activities 
                                                     
39 Some examples of imported illegal goods are military weapons, drugs, and printed materials that are 
anti-religious or are opposed to social norms. 
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that are not in effect smuggling but are considered as such based on the perspective of 
authorities and are treated as smuggling in practice.40  
The main regulatory development to combat the smuggling of goods and foreign 
exchange occurred through the governmental discretionary punishments of 1994 and its 
executives’ guidelines in 2000. Based on this regulation, the penalty for smuggled 
goods depends on the value of goods, which falls into two groups: (1) products with a 
value equal to or less than 10 million rials41 (less than 1,010 current US dollars), and (2) 
products with a value beyond 10 million rials (more than 1,010 current US dollars). 
Although petty smuggling constitutes the major share of total detected cases, its relative 
value has been much lower. Table 4.2 shows the value and scale of investigated 
smuggling cases by the Iranian Judiciary system from 2000-2005.  
Table 4.2 shows that smuggling in Iran is not risky. Let us calculate the rate of success 
in smuggling based on the presented information in this table. I assume (on the basis of 
my estimations in this chapter) that the total amount of smuggling in Iran, on average, is 
$3 billion and $1 =10000 rials. For the year 2002 I can calculate the ratio of value of 
total investigated smuggling cases to value of assumed smuggling: ($174,400,000 / 
$3,000,000,000) × 100 = 5.8%. This means that only about 6% of all smuggled goods 
are investigated (or detected). In other words, the rate of success in the smuggling 
business is about 95%.  
 
                                                     
40 For example, Article 48 of the Jungles Protection and Maintenance rule of 1985 declares, “transport of 
woods and gained coals from trees out of cities without license from the Forestry Organization will be 
punished like a smuggling act”. Another example is Article 1 of “Penal codes of sellers of anti-religious 
or anti-public decency textiles”. The economic agents who import, produce, or sell such textiles are 
offenders and these textiles are treated as smuggled goods. 
41 In early 2009 the US dollar was equal to 9,899 rials. (See http://www.cbi.ir/exrates/rates_en.aspx) 
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Table 4.2. Smuggling cases in the Judiciary system of Iran (2000-2005) 
Description 
 2000 2001 2002 
2003 
(first 7 
months) 
2004 (first 
6 months) 
2005 (first 
6 months) 
Number of total 
investigated cases at 
judiciary system 
 
46,675 37,547 57,716 45,416 38,973 34,170 
Value of all 
investigated cases 
(billion rials) 
 
624.5 1687 1,743.8 952.5 641.3 761.6 
Number of 
investigated  
cases under 1000$ 
value 
39,999 29,077 47,583 39,714 34,588 29,865 
Share of petty 
smuggling in 
investigated 
smuggling 
 
86% 77% 82% 87% 88% 87% 
Value of investigated 
cases under 1000$ 
value (Billion rials) 
 
249.8 49 237.2 154.5 123 120.2 
Share of petty 
smuggling value in 
total value of 
investigated 
smuggling 
 
40% 2.90% 13.6% 16.22% 19% 15% 
Realized fines (billion 
rials) 
 
    12.3 59 
Predicted fines (billion 
rials)     1,038.5 1,027.2 
Share of realized to 
predicted fines     1.2 % 5.7 % 
Source: Seif (2008, p. 183) 
4.2.2. The main contributing factors to smuggling in Iran 
Tariff and non-tariff barriers, strict control of foreign exchange transactions, pervasive 
corruption, and high price disparities between Iran and her neighbours (because of 
considerable subsidies on fuel products) are main causes of Iranian smuggling. A study 
by Doing Business (2009) found that among 181 economies, Iran ranked 142nd in terms 
of ease of trading across borders, while UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan all perform 
much better with rankings of 14, 16, and 74, respectively. For import costs ($ per 20-
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foot container) in the MENA (Middle East and North Africa), only Iraq performed 
worse than Iran. The best practice economy was Singapore, with a cost of $439 per 
importing container; Iran’s cost was $1,656 for the same container. These costs cover 
documents and administrative fees for customs clearance and technical control, terminal 
handling charges, and inland transport (excluding tariffs or trade taxes). The time 
required for importing products into Iran is 42 days, while in Singapore it is only three 
days. The export process in Iran has the same characteristics. Table 4.3 shows the 
comparative international trade costs of Iran.  
Beyond the tariff and non-tariff barriers on legal product imports, the foreign exchange 
market also affects incentives for illegal trade. The foreign exchange premium in Iran 
set new records during the 1980s and 1990s.42 Figure 4.1 (Appendix 4.A) shows the 
trend for black market premia on the US dollar from 1970-2006 in Iran. 
Since the unification of the exchange rate in 2002, the black market premium has 
declined substantially. In recent times the main motivation for import and export 
smuggling in Iran is the high tariff protecting domestic industries and producers, a 
continuation of subsidies on fuel products in Iran, and export bonuses for non-oil 
exporters.43 Table 4.4 shows the main import and export smuggled goods in Iran for 
2005. Another important factor behind expanding smuggling out of Iran is the large 
price disparity between Iran and her neighbours due to subsidies on fuel products. 
Approximately 90% of export smuggling in Iran belongs to oil related products. 
Subsidies on fuel products in 2003 were 10.6% of GDP, while the share of subsidies on 
essential goods in this year was 13.7% (Komijani, 2004). The subsidies on fuel products 
in 2003 were twice the amount of tax revenues, and almost equalled oil revenues 
(Komijani, 2004). This price disparity, following these huge subsidies, provides an 
attractive incentive for smuggling. 
 
                                                     
42 For example, the difference between the price of the US dollar in rials in the black and official markets 
reached 2,170 percent in 1992. See Biswas and Marjit (2007) for more detailed theoretical 
interconnections between black market premiums and smuggling. 
43 For example, the detected export misinvoicing in Khoramshahr Custom (South-west of Iran in 
Khouzestan province) over 2006 and 2007 is $1.2 billion. Another example in the mentioned custom is an 
exporter who reported $10 million exports and benefited from export bonuses; however, it was found 
after investigation that he had not exported any amount of materials, but rather had misinvoiced the $10 
million through a corrupt deal with custom officers. See http://sardaar.pib.ir/75678/ (in Persian, Access: 
09.02.09). 
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Table 4.3. Comparative international trade costs 
 
Documents 
for exports 
(numbers) 
Time 
for 
exports 
(days) 
Costs to 
export ($ 
per 
container) 
Documents 
for imports 
(numbers) 
Time 
for 
imports 
(days) 
Costs to 
imports ($ 
per 
container) 
Best practice economies 
France 2  2  
Malaysia   450  
Denmark  5  
Singapore     3 439 
Iran 8 26 1011 10 42 1656 
Comparative economies
Jordan 7 19 730 7 22 1290 
Oman 10 22 821 10 26 1037 
UAE 5 10 618 7 10 587 
Source: Doing Business in Iran, 2009 
Table 4.4. The five largest detected illegally imported-exported goods (2005) 
No. Import smuggling 
Share of total 
detected import 
smuggled goods 
(%) 
Export smuggling 
Share of total 
detected export 
smuggled goods 
(%) 
1 Machinery 24 Gas oil 60.6 
2 Car 12 Kerosene 17.6 
3 Alcoholic 
beverages
9 Other petroleum 
products
11 
4 Piece (cloths) 8.5 Gasoline 2.5 
5 Chemical materials 8 Gold bar and clutch 1.5 
Source: Online portal of “Combating Goods and Exchange Smuggling Central Staff”. Available 
at: http://eqtesadepenhan.com/comments.asp?category=12&id=36 (in Farsi, access: 06.02.09) 
Para-state organizations and military bodies undermine Iran’s ability to reduce 
smuggling. The most controversial debates are about the revolutionary guard’s 
economic and trading activities since the end of the war with Iraq in 1988. Dealing with 
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such bodies’ extensive discretion and a lack of accountability presents difficulties for 
any reformist government in Iran. For example, there was a high level of smuggling 
through the Payam international airport in the northwest of Tehran, which is state-
owned and operated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). In 2005, an 
Iranian newspaper disclosed that “two thousand tons of goods, mainly cosmetics, 
performance enhancing medication, and computer electronics” entered Iran through the 
cargo carrier Payam Air, a company owned by the transportation ministry. It was 
reported that four smuggling flights per day, and as many as twice that number on 
holidays, were in operation through this airport (Samii, 2005).44  
4.3. Empirical methodology  
In this study, I employ a specific form of structural equation modeling (e.g., Multiple 
Indicators Multiple Causes). MIMIC estimates the relationship between observable 
variables and the latent variable by minimizing the distance between the sample 
covariance matrix S  and the covariance matrix )(θΣ  predicted by the model. I use 
MIMIC models to confirm the influence of a set of causal variables in a confirmatory 
(rather than exploratory) analysis.45 In fact, this is a theory-based approach for 
investigating the effects of causal variables on the latent variable smuggling, as well as 
smuggling’s effects on macroeconomic variables. Formally, the MIMIC model consists 
of two parts: the structural equation model and the measurement model. The structural 
part of model shows the effects of exogenous causal variables on the latent variable. 
The measurement part of model illustrates the effects of the latent variable on the 
selected indicators. The structural equation model is given by: 
ςqxqγ...2x2γ1x1γ η ++++=                                                                                 (4.1) 
                                                     
44 Invisible jetties are also another well-known means of involvement by the IRGC in smuggling. An ex-
parliamentarian estimated that IRGC smuggling might amount to $12 billion per year. He remarked that 
“this smuggling business is of such magnitude that it cannot be done through donkeys or passengers”, and 
added that “this volume is entering the country through containers and via illegal and unofficial channels 
such as invisible jetties supervised by strong men and men of wealth.” It seems that there is organized 
smuggling with the assistance of governmental bodies. According to the former chief of Iran's national 
police force, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, about 75% of total import smuggling is through official 
customs and free trade zones. For more details about role of IRGC in smuggling, see Alfoneh (2007). 
 
45 Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) has been used to explore the possible underlying factor structure of a 
set of observed variables without imposing a preconceived structure on the outcome (Child, 1990). 
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), however, allows the researcher to test the theoretical hypothesis 
regarding the relationship between observable variables and latent constructs. In this latter case, we use 
the theory to design a path diagram and then test the hypothetical relationships.  
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where ix  is a vector of causal variables, iγ  are scalars, η is the smuggling and ς  is a 
structural disturbance term. Thus, the latent variable η  is linearly determined by a set of 
exogenous causes. Since they only partially explain the latent variable η , the error term 
ς  represents the unexplained component. The measurement model represents the link 
between the latent variable (smuggling) and its indicators, i.e., smuggling is expressed 
in terms of observable variables. It is specified by: 
111 + = εηλy , 222 + = εηλy  , …, pp εηλy + = p                                                           (4.2) 
where yi are indicator variables, and λi are the loading factors that represent the 
magnitude of expected change for a unit change in the latent variable. The εi are the 
measurement variables’ errors.  
Equations 4.1 and 4.2 can be summarized as follows: 
ςxγη +′ =                                                                                                                     (4.3) 
εληy  + =                                                                                                                     (4.4) 
Considering equations 4.3 and 4.4, I assume that 0=)′( εςE  and define 2=)( σςE  and 
2Θ=)′( εεE . The Θ (p×p) is a diagonal matrix with the standard deviation of the ε’s on 
its diagonal.  
I can solve the model by entering Eq.4.3 into Eq.4.4: 
υεςγλy  +XΠ′ =+)+x′( =                                                                                          (4.5) 
where the reduced-form coefficient matrix λγ ′=Π , and the reduced-form disturbance 
vector is ελςυ +=  with covariance matrix: 
[ ] 22 Θ+′=)′+)(+(E=)′E( =∑̂ σλλελςελςυυ                                                             (4.6) 
where 2σ  is the variance of disturbance of ε. Considering that the rank of Π in Eq.4.5 is 
1 and the covariance matrix of errors is also restricted, I cannot obtain values for all 
parameters. This situation calls for normalizing one of the elements of vector λ to a pre-
specified value before estimating the reduced-form. Finally, assuming normality, model 
parameters are estimated based on minimizing the following function: 
ρδStrδF -Sln-)}(∑{+)(∑ln = -1                                                                             (4.7) 
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where S is the sample covariance matrix of observable variables, and 1-∑ is the 
estimated population covariance matrix. ρ is the number of measured variables. 
The first step in the MIMIC model estimation is to confirm the hypothesized 
relationships between the latent variable and its causes and indicators. Once I have 
identified and estimated these relationships and the parameters, the MIMIC model 
results can be used to calculate the latent variable scores. Next, with the help of the 
exogenous calculation of the relative size of smuggling in trade through the trade 
discrepancy approach, the ordinal scores of smuggling transform to cardinal scores and 
I am able to finally estimate the value of smuggling.  
4.4. Model variables 
In this section, I present the causal and indicator variables used for the estimation of 
smuggling. I am mainly interested here in the causes (predictors) of smuggling, which 
comprise the structural part of model.  
4.4.1  Causes (predictors) 
a. Penalty on smuggling [ln(arf)] 
In the literature, the most popular determinants of smuggling are the rate of fines, 
punishments, and law enforcement (Martin and Panagariya, 1984 and Norton, 1988). 
More recently, Fisman and Miguel (2007) examined the effect of law enforcement on 
the culture of corruption for a sample of UN diplomats.46 They show the effectiveness 
of penalties and the rule of law on changing cultural aspects of corruption. In this paper, 
the penalty rate on smuggling equals the Iranian rial amount for every US dollar of 
smuggled goods adjusted for inflation. The real rate of penalty before the revision of 
smuggling punishment codes by the Expediency Council of Iran in 1994 was very low 
and negligible. The real rate of penalty in 1994 increased by 46 times its rate in the 
previous year. The common hypothesis is that an increase in the fine rate increases the 
transaction costs of smuggling and reduces expected profits. Therefore, I expect a 
negative sign for the parameter. The average growth rate of penalties for the pre-
revolution period (1970-79), the Iraq-Iran war period (1980-1988), and the post-war 
period (1989-2002) was -15.3, -3.06, and 331 percent, respectively.  
                                                     
46 They show that lack of effective law enforcement against the parking violations of UN diplomats 
before 2002 was highly correlated with the perception of corruption in the homeland courtiers of 
diplomats. However, after 2002, and by imposing penalties on violators, the rate of parking violation per 
diplomat declined significantly. 
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b. Black market premium [ln(bmp)] 
In the case of organized smuggling, well-connected traders use the official banking 
system and subsidized foreign exchange to finance their imports. In this case, the 
existence of high premia on the black market encourages traders to overinvoice their 
imports, selling the extra and illegal subsidized exchange in the black market. In this 
situation, I expect a positive effect of BMP on import smuggling.  
Barnett (2003) proposed a model in which agents decide to become smugglers or 
entrepreneurs based on premia in the black market for foreign exchange. The idea 
behind his model is that for low premia, it is cheap for agents to acquire foreign 
exchange in the parallel market. De Macedo (1987) also found such an effect of BMP 
on illegal trade. In this scenario, I expect to observe negative effects of BMP on the 
smuggling. The latter models, however, implicitly assume that illegal traders do not 
access the subsidized official exchange rate through the banking system. While illegal 
importers are some of the main buyers in the black market for foreign exchange, the 
supply flow into this market is generated partly by illegal exporters underinvoicing their 
exports. Thus, the amount of export smuggling will increase as the export tax rate and 
BMP increase. Therefore, I expect a positive effect of BMP on export smuggling. 
In summary, two types of evidence suggest a strong link between illegal trade and black 
market premiums. First, trade data comparisons find that increases in the premium give 
rise to greater underinvoicing of exports and overinvoicing of imports (McDonald, 
1985). Second, studies based on export supply functions find that a rise in the black 
market premium tends to reduce exports as domestic companies resort to misinvoicing 
or smuggling (Kiguel and O`Connel, 1995). 
The high value of premia was one of the critical economic challenges in the post-
revolution period in Iran. Between 1979 and 1989, the premium rose at an average 
annual rate of 42.1% (Pesaran, 1992). In 1992, the black market rate for the dollar 
reached its peak, 22 times the official rate (CBI, 2008). This unusually large premium 
was achieved under strict foreign exchange control during most years after the 
revolution. An importer with access to a subsidized official exchange rate 22 times 
below the black market rate has a great incentive to overinvoice imports or underinvoice 
exports for easy and immediate profit. 
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c. Tariff burden [ln(tariff)] 
Faced with high trade taxes or restrictions, traders often resort to illegal means of 
conducting trade, such as smuggling and misinvoicing exports and imports. The 
literature shows that taxes and trade restrictions lead to underinvoicing and smuggling.47 
Phylaktis (1991) demonstrated the positive effects of this variable on individuals’ 
incentives for smuggling in Chile. Trade restrictions cause price disparities between 
domestic and international markets, and the mark-ups on imported goods provide an 
incentive for illegal imports and tariff evasion (Pitt, 1981). I define the tariff burden as 
the ratio of real import taxes to real imports. The average tariff burden for the pre-
revolution period (1970-79), the Iraq-Iran war period (1980-1988), and the post-war 
period (1989-2006) was 14, 11, and 8 percent, respectively. The average share of import 
taxes as a portion of total tax revenues over similar time intervals were 39, 31, and 27 
percent, respectively (CBI, 2008). The declining trend in the tariff burden is expected to 
channel some portion of illegal trade into legal trade.  
d. GDP per capita [ln(rgdppc)] and Unemployment rate [ln(unem)] 
Increasing income per capita increases demand for both legal and illegal imports. Braun 
and Di Tella (2004) and Fréchette (2006) find support for the positive effects of 
increasing income on corruption-related activities. Braun and Di Tella explain that this 
is due to the pro-cyclical nature of corruption-related activities, where “moral standards 
are lowered during booms, as greed becomes the dominant force for economic 
decision.” The relationship between the unemployment rate and smuggling depends on 
whether an “income effect” or “substitution effect” is dominant. Increasing (decreasing) 
unemployment may cause decreasing (increasing) demand for both legal and illegal 
imported products. This is the “income effect” of unemployment changes. On the other 
hand, it is possible that with increasing unemployment, the unemployed will try to meet 
their living needs through the unofficial and illegal sector of the economy. In this latter 
case, the “substitution effect” underlies a positive effect of unemployment on illegal 
activities. The sign of this variable thus depends on the relative weight of the income 
and substitution effects.  
Aside from controlling for level of GDP per capita, I also take into account the growth 
rate of real GDP per capita. Because of increasing economic incomes, those who were 
                                                     
47 See, for example, Anam (1982), Bhagwati (1964), Bhagwati and Hansen (1973), Bhagwati and 
Srinivasan (1973), Johnson (1972), Sheikh (1974), Krueger (1974), and Pitt (1981). 
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already active in illegal trade may shift to official legal trade. In line with Frey and 
Weck-Hannemann (1984), Loayza (1997), Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996), Eilat and 
Zinnes (2002), and Schneider and Enste (2000), I expect to find a negative relationship 
between the growth rate of GDP per capita and smuggling. To control for direct effects 
of the level and growth rate of GDP per capita, I also include an interaction of these 
variables with other relevant variables such as the black market premium, trade 
openness, and the tariff burden. The final effect of income per capita on engaging in 
illegal activities depends on bottlenecks in the economic system, as well as rent-seeking 
opportunities. The average real GDP per capita growth for the pre-revolution period 
(1970-79), the Iraq-Iran war period (1980-1988), and the post-war period (1989-2005) 
was 5, -5.01, and 3.42 percent, respectively.  
e. Openness [ln(open)] 
Ades and Di Tella (1999), and Sung and Chu (2003) empirically show a negative effect 
of more trade openness on corruption; however, a number of studies contradict this 
finding. Studies show that rapid trade liberalization may not reduce corruption 
immediately. Indeed, trade liberalization may create more opportunities for corruption 
and smuggling. Treisman (2000) claims that trade liberalization must be extensive to 
reduce the level of corruption. Tavares (2007) shows that political and trade 
liberalization, realized in rapid succession, reduce corruption. She includes an 
interaction effect between trade and political liberalization. Trade liberalization requires 
transparency and efficient law enforcement to impede increasing illegal trade under the 
cover of legal trade.  
As Pitt (1981) predicted, the greater the legal trade, the easier it is to hide smuggling 
from enforcement agencies, and smuggling will therefore be less costly. This issue is 
more serious when foreign trade and customs lack transparency and law enforcement is 
weak. The Iranian experience of increased illegal imports through Free Trade Zones 
suggests links between institutions and trade openness (Arabmazar, 2007). It is 
estimated that for every $100,000 in legal imports, smugglers import $300,000 through 
official customs. Investigations also show that at least 90% of import smuggling is 
realized through Free Trade Zones.48 I control for both the direct effects of openness 
and its interaction with GDP per capita, education, and institutional quality variables on 
the smuggling. For calculating trade openness, I exclude the export of oil in order to 
                                                     
48 http://www.lajvar.se/eghtesad/ghachage-kala.htm (access: 13.11.08, Persian Sina News Agency) 
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have a more realistic index of openness. The average of the openness index for the pre-
revolution period (1970-79), the Iraq-Iran war period (1980-1988), and the post-war 
period (1989-2004) was 40, 41, and 31 percent, respectively.  
f.  Education [ln(edu)] 
Education increases the ability of society to control government behaviour and judge its 
performance. An educated society also plays an important role as an external control on 
corruption in government administration (Brunetti and Weder, 2003; Ades and Di Tella, 
1999). The negative relationship between education and corruption is well documented 
in the literature (e.g., see Treisman, 2000; and Rauch and Evans, 2000). The 
constructive effect of education on illegal activities depends on the quality of 
institutions, rent-seeking opportunities, and the rule of law. In a Cobb-Douglas 
aggregate production function, Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) do not find a significant 
effect of human capital on per capita growth rates. In another study, Pritchett (2001) 
shows a significant and negative effect of educational capital on total factor productivity 
(TFP). Apart from education quality, he refers to the important role of institutional 
quality and governance for this rather surprising effect of education. In fact, insofar as 
economic and regulatory rents provide for extraordinary profits in a weak institutional 
framework, we should not expect that increasing basic education (as in this paper) 
decreases the likelihood of engaging in illegal activities. To control for the conditional 
effects of education on smuggling, I also include interactions between education and 
black market premiums, trade openness, the tariff burden, GDP per capita, and the 
institutional quality variables.  
The average level of education, measured by the literacy rate, for the pre-revolution 
period (1970-79), the Iraq-Iran war period (1980-1988), and the post-war period (1989-
2006) was 44, 59.9, and 80.3 percent, respectively. 
g. Institutional quality [IQ] 
The quality of governance and institutions not only directly influences smuggling-
related activities, but also determine the conditional effects of other major causal 
variables on illegal activities. Examining the effect of this variable within the Iranian 
context is especially important given the tremendous political economy changes in the 
country since 1970. The Islamic revolution in 1979 changed the political system from a 
monarchy to an Islamic republic. The long period of war with Iraq from 1980-1988 
limited domestic political freedom and was accompanied by high government 
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intervention in all aspects of economy. Ending the war opened a new area of economic 
reconstruction and foreign trade liberalization under the government of Hashemi 
Rafsanjani (1989-1997). During his governance, however, less attention was paid to 
political liberalization. Reformists’ taking executive power, led by Khatami in 1997, 
was a breakpoint in Iran’s political environment. More attention to political freedom, 
expansion of NGOs, and freedom of the press were all parts of this group’s agenda. The 
Iranian economy also experienced major economic institutional reforms, such as the 
unification of different exchange rates in 2002. These rather promising improvements in 
the quality of institutions, however, were negatively affected when neo-conservatives 
took control of executive and parliamentary powers in 2005. It is therefore a high 
interest to examine the dynamic effects of these institutional changes on the tendency of 
economic agents to engage in smuggling-related activities. I use five different 
institutional quality measures and build an index of institutional quality comprised of 
these measures. I construct this index using a factor analytic approach (for more details 
on factor analysis, see Field (2005), chapter 15). The basic rationale behind factor 
analysis is that different measures of institutional qualities all measure the same 
concept, e.g., good governance and democracy. Therefore, there should be a relatively 
high correlation between these different measures (see Table 4.A. in Appendix 4.A). 
The final calculated index of institutional quality (IQ) reflects the underlying concept 
being measured through the various observed institutional quality measures (see Figure 
4.2 in Appendix 4.A).  
4.4.2 Indicators 
An increase in the size of smuggling may be reflected in the following indicators: 
h. Real governmental revenue [ln(rg)] 
Smuggling has a significant impact on government revenues. We can assume that total 
governmental revenue is a function of national income Y. Increasing national income 
can be a sign of business prosperity and higher levels of obtainable taxes. In addition, 
increasing legal imports lead to higher tax levels on imports revenues. Consequently, I 
expect that the government’s revenues GR will increase as national income and legal 
imports rise [GR= F (national income, legal imports)]. I assume that total domestic 
demand Q is met by legal and illegal imports, leading to [Q = legal imports + illegal 
imports] and [GR= F (national income, legal imports)]. This assumption implies that 
total government revenue will be reduced by an increased flow of illegal trade mainly 
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due to tariff evasion by smugglers. Export smuggling and misinvoicing similarly reduce 
government revenue. Smugglers usually export highly subsidized goods such as 
gasoline or misinvoice real exports to benefit from attractive bonuses or black market 
premia. The subsidies are financed through the government’s oil and tax revenues. The 
average growth rate of government revenue (oil, tax, and other revenues) for the pre-
revolution period (1970-79), the Iraq-Iran war period (1980-1988), and the post-war 
period (1989-2006) was 38.44, 5.23, and 36.87 percent, respectively. 
i. Import price index [ln(imx)] 
The Import Price Index (IMX) measures price changes for goods purchased from other 
countries. A theoretical discussion of the IMX-smuggling relationship can be found in 
Thursby et al. (1991) and Martin and Panagariya (1984). By evading legal duties and 
tariffs, smugglers have a cost advantage as compared to legal importers in the domestic 
market. Therefore, they are able to earn their expected profit margin with prices lower 
than the market equilibrium price. Depending on the share of smuggled products in the 
domestic market, the market equilibrium price for that product will decline.  
Fisman and Miguel (2008, p. 66) illustrate the effect of a 1998 Chinese anti-corruption 
and smuggling project on import prices: “…official imports into Guangdong province 
jumped by 10 percent as smuggling declined. But exports plummeted 12 percent as the 
province’s factories struggled to deal with higher- priced imported inputs, like oil and 
raw materials, which could no longer be smuggled in tariff- free…”.49 The average 
growth rate of the import price index for the pre-revolution period (1971-79), the Iraq-
Iran war period (1980-1988), and the post-war period (1989-2005) was 10, 16, and 22 
percent, respectively.  
j. Consumption of petroleum products [Gpconsum] 
The idea of using this variable as one of the indicators for smuggling is rooted in the 
heavy subsidies for fuel products in Iran. These subsidies cause a considerable price 
disparity between Iran and neighbouring countries like Turkey, Pakistan, and 
                                                     
49 One example of this is the mobile set market in Iran and the decision of the Ahmadinejad government 
to increase tariffs on this import. In 2006, while domestic demand for mobile sets in Iran was for 10 
million sets, and domestic production only 1 million sets, the government decided to increase the tariff on 
mobile set imports from 4% to 60%. The main revealed justification for such a high tariff hike was to 
support domestic investments in mobile production. The share of smuggled mobile sets in recent years 
was approximately 80% of the local market. The tremendous increase in tariffs on legal imports of this 
product, in addition to the implementing of new technical controls on the registration of illegally imported 
mobile sets in national network, significantly increased the import prices for this product.The import tariff 
for this product, after 2 years of initial increases from 4 to 60%, declined once again to 4% in 2008. 
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Afghanistan. For example, according to the director general of Iran’s Customs 
Administration, crude oil and oil products accounted for over 90% of goods smuggled 
from Iran over the years 2000-2005. According to records from the population of 
provinces in Iran, the per capita consumption of gasoline in border provinces was 10-
60% higher than in central provinces. In addition, General Ali Soltani, director of the 
campaign against economic crimes, highlighted the massive smuggling of petroleum 
products: “Every year, 1.8-billion litres of refined oil products worth 10.8 billion rials 
[$1.18 billion] are smuggled abroad”.50 I include the growth rate of petroleum products 
consumption and expect to observe a positive effect of smuggling for this variable. 
Figure 4.3 (Appendix 4.A) illustrates the hypothesized path diagram for the general 
MIMIC model.51 Table 4.B (see Appendix 4.B) presents details of the variables, 
definitions, and sources.  
4.5. Estimation and Results 
Estimating the structural component of the model provides ordinal estimates of 
smuggling, which are then calibrated with the exogenous information obtained from the 
trade discrepancy method. This enables me to examine the relative and then absolute 
amount of smuggling in trade. Table 4.5 presents estimates for eleven specifications.  
The penalty rate on smuggling was entered into models in its inverse form. This was 
done to make the variable’s distribution normal.52 The effect of the inverse of this 
variable on smuggling is always positive and significant. Thus, the relation between the 
penalty rate itself and smuggling is clearly negative, meaningful, and stable throughout 
the various specifications.  
                                                     
50 http://www.mg.co.za/printformat/single/2006-06-19-oil-smuggling-costs-iran-billions-of-dollars 
(access 13.11.08). 
51 According to ADF unit root tests (Dickey and Fuller, 1979), most variables follow I (1). A Johansen 
(1991) cointegration test, however, shows the existence of long run relationships between indicators and 
causes. With integrated or trending data in MIMIC models, the levels of variables are strongly 
informative. If there is cointegration, the strategy of estimating the differences dismisses such 
information. The stationary tests are available upon request. 
52 Maximum Likelihood (ML) methodology for SEM modeling assumes multivariate normal distribution. 
Lack of normality can inflate the Chi-square statistics and create upward bias for determining the 
significance of coefficients. Also, the use of Chi-square is not valid in most applications (Joreskog and 
Sorbom (1989)). For multivariate normality assumption, it is important that each variable of the model 
follows univariate normality (Diamantopoulos and Siguaw, 2000, p.152). When one or more variables are 
not normally distributed, we can use transformations of variables such as log transformations, square 
roots, or inverse transformations (for more details see Osborne, 2002). Penalty rates on smuggling had an 
excessive kurtosis of 5.37 with a probability of acceptance normality of zero. This makes it a candidate 
for inverse transformation. Table 4.D (Appendix 4.D) shows the normality test for transformed variables. 
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The other important driver of illegal trade in Iran is the black market premium. 
Increasing this premium provides more attractive rents to export smugglers, leading 
them to underinvoice their real exports and sell unreported export earnings at the black 
market’s exchange rate. The flows of illegal exchange supply on the black market meets 
the demands of import smugglers. Organized smugglers who access the official banking 
system for financing their imports have an incentive to overinvoice their real imports, 
selling the illegally earned subsidized exchange on the black market.  
It is interesting to note that in some years after revolution, the government benefited 
from selling petrodollars on the black market instead of at the official exchange market 
(Valadkhani, 2004). In fact, one of the main suppliers of foreign exchange to black 
market aside from export smugglers was the central bank of Iran.  
The amounts of these sales were predicted in annual national budgets under the title 
“other revenues” (Valadkhani, 2004). The tariff burden had significant positive effects 
on smuggling in all specifications. Its statistically significant coefficient is also stable 
across specifications. Its economic magnitude compared to other main bottlenecks like 
black market premium, however, was weaker.  
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Table 4.5. Estimations of MIMIC-model 
Specification S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 S11 
Causes  Standardized solutions with (t statistics)        
Ln (inverse of penalty rate) 0.12 (4.0) 0.13 (5.1) 0.13 (4.1) 0.09 (3.4) 0.09 (3.0) 0.12 (4.0) 0.12 (4.4) 0.13 (4.6) 0.13 (4.8) 0.09 (3.3) 0.08 (3.0) 
Ln (black market premium) 0.10 (2.4) -0.09 (-1.5) 0.13 (2.9) 0.13 (3.5) 0.16 (3.8) 0.12 (3.3) 0.03 (0.7) -0.03 (-0.5) -0.04 (-0.9) 0.12 (1.8) 0.16 (6.0) 
Ln (tariff burden) 0.04 (1.7) -0.00 (-0.1) -0.01(-0.2) 0.04 (1.8) 0.04 (1.7) 0.03 (1.3) -0.0 (-0.5) -0.01 (-0.5) -0.01 (-0.5) 0.06 (2.7) 0.02 (1.4) 
Ln (unemployment) -0.03(-2.1) -0.00 (-0.0) -0.04 (-2.5) -0.09 (-4.9) -0.08 (-4.4) -0.03 (-2.1) -0.02 (-1.2) -0.00 (-0.1) 0.00 (0.0) -0.05 (-2.1) -0.07 (-4.6) 
Ln (education) 0.32 (0.5) 2.66 (3.5) 0.14 (0.2) 0.83 (1.6) 1.13 (2.0) 0.50 (0.9) 2.34 (3.2) 2.98 (3.6) 3.21 (4.4) -0.73 (-8.0) -0.74 (-19.2) 
Ln (real GDP per capita) 0.88 (4.1) 0.32 (1.8) 0.69 (3.1) 0.84 (4.7) 0.73 (4.0) 0.76 (4.3) 0.39 (2.8) 0.03 (1.4)  0.69 (3.8) 0.81 (5.8) 
Ln (trade openness) 0.13 (3.4) 0.08 (2.4) 0.13 (3.7) 0.11 (3.3) 0.12 (3.6) 0.11 (3.9) 0.07 (2.4) 0.06 (2.4) 0.04 (1.1) 0.11 (3.4) 0.10 (4.3) 
GDP per capita growth rate -0.87(-4.2) -0.30 (-1.8) -0.70 (-3.2) -0.84(-4.8) -0.71(-4.0) -0.75 (-4.4) -0.36 (-2.6)  0.03 (0.8) -0.69 (-3.8) -0.82 (-6.1) 
Polity index -0.09 (3.1)     -0.09 (-3.0)      
CIM  -0.21 (-4.6)     -0.14 (-3.5) -0.22 (-4.2) -0.22 (-6.3)   
Van_part   -0.08 (-2.1)         
Van_index    -0.09 (-4.4)        
Van_comp     -0.07 (-3.8)       
IQ          -0.13 (-2.0) -0.12 (-4.7) 
Ln (bmp)*ln(rgdppc) 0.11 (0.8) 0.03 (0.2) 0.10 (0.6) 0.04 (0.3) -0.06 (-0.4)     0.18 (0.9)  
Ln (open)*ln(rgdppc) -0.8 (-4.7) -0.4 (-3.3) -0.6 (-3.78) -0.7 (-4.9) -0.6 (-4.2) -0.7 (-4.6) -0.4 (-3.1) -0.02 (-0.9)  -0.6 (-3.4) -0.7 (-5.7) 
Ln (tariff)*ln(rgdppc) 0.09 (0.7) 0.2 (2.2) 0.3 (1.9) 0.09 (0.7) 0.06 (0.4) 0.09 (0.6)    0.14 (1.0)  
Ln (bmp)*gdppcg -0.1 (-0.8) -0.03 (-0.2) -0.11 (-0.7) -0.03 (-0.2) 0.06 (0.4)    0.03 (1.2) -0.18 (-0.9)  
Ln (tariff)*gdppcg -0.08(-0.6) -0.2 (-2.2) -0.3 (-1.9) -0.07 (-0.6) -0.04 (-0.2) -0.07 (-0.5)   -0.01 (-0.3) -0.11 (-0.8)  
Ln(open)*gdppcg 0.7 (4.6) 0.4 (3.3) 0.6 (3.6) 0.6 (4.8) 0.5 (4.0) 0.6 (4.5) 0.3 (3.0)  -0.0 (-0.09) 0.5 (3.3) 0.6 (5.8) 
Ln(edu)*ln(bmp) 0.05 (0.8) 0.1 (1.9) 0.02 (0.3) 0.00 (0.08) -0.03 (-0.5) 0.0 (0.07)  0.02 (0.5)  0.03 (0.3)  
Ln (edu)*CIM -1.0 (-1.5) -3.3 (-4.6) -0.9 (-1.3) -1.6 (-3.0) -1.9 (-3.4) -1.3 (-2.2) -3.13 (-4.5) -3.7 (-4.9) -4.2 (-5.7)   
Ln (edu)*ln(open) 0.09 (2.0) 0.09 (2.2) 0.12 (2.5) 0.08 (2.0) 0.05 (1.2) 0.07 (1.8) 0.02 (0.7)   0.10 (1.8) 0.10 (3.9) 
Ln (edu)*ln(tariff) 0.14 (3.5) 0.10 (3.0) 0.14 (3.1) 0.15 (4.3) 0.11 (3.0) 0.12 (3.2) 0.04 (1.2)   0.12 (2.8) 0.15 (5.3) 
Ln(edu)*IQ          -0.1 (-1.3)  
Ln (open)*IQ          -0.07 (-1.3)  
Ln (rgdppc)*IQ          -0.1 (-0.9)  
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Table 4.5 (Continued) S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 S11 
GDPPCG*IQ          0.05 (0.5)  
Indicators            
Petroleum consumption  0.5 (3.9) 0.4 (2.8) 0.4 (3.3) 0.5 (4.1) 0.5 (4.2) 0.5 (3.7) 0.3 (2.7) 0.3 (2.5) 0.3 (2.5) 0.5 (3.9) 0.5 (3.7) 
Ln (import price index)* -0.96 -0.97 -0.96 -0.96 -0.96 -0.95 -0.96 -0.97 -0.97 -0.97 -0.97 
Ln (government revenues) -0.6 (-4.3) -0.6 (-4.7) -0.6 (-4.8) -0.5 (-4.1) -0.5 (-4.0) -0.6 (-4.6) -0.6 (-4.9) -0.6 (-4.8) -0.6 (-4.8) -0.5 (-4.0) -0.6 (-4.2) 
Goodness of Fit Indices 
RMSEA (a) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
GFI (b) 0.87 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.84 0.83 0.84 0.88 0.85 
AGFI (c) 0.85 0.84 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.82 0.80 0.81 0.87 0.83 
NFI (d) 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.92 0.90 0.89 0.95 0.90 
Note.*: ln(imx) is scale variable. 
(a): The RMSEA shows how well the model, with unknown but optimally chosen parameter values, would fit the population covariance matrix if it were available. 
Values less than 0.05 are indicators of a good fit. 
(b): This index ranges between 0 and 1. The GFI>0.90 is usually taken as reflecting acceptable fits. 
(c): GFI adjusted for a degree of freedom. 
(d): Normed Fit Index (NFI), which has the range of 0-1. The larger amount is better. 
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Increasing the unemployment rate in Iran has a dampening effect on smuggling. This 
shows that the “income effect” outweighs the “substitution effect” over the period of 
study. A similar effect can be seen in the coefficient for real GDP per capita. 
Increasing GDP per capita has a positive effect on smuggling. In fact, increasing the 
demand of consumers by increasing GDP per capita and reducing unemployment 
creates a market for cheaper smuggled products on the market. The effects of GDP per 
capita on smuggling are statistically and economically significant in all specifications 
except for specification 8. At the same time, I observe an important dampening effect of 
the real GDP per capita growth rate on smuggling. This shows that continuous 
economic growth, rather than the static level of income per capita, has important 
implications for illegal activities. Economic prosperity and continuous growth provide 
more interesting opportunities in the formal sectors of the economy. In such an 
environment, agents prefer to shift their labour and capital into the economy’s formal 
sector, benefiting from legal protection and access to banking credits, among other 
benefits (for more details on this negative relationship in shadow economy literature, 
see Loayza, 1997; Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton, 1999; and Schneider and 
Enste, 2000). 
I have also included interaction terms for the level and growth rate of real GDP per 
capita in a different specification. Although there is a direct negative effect of the 
growth of GDP per capita on smuggling, I observe a positive effect when I account for 
its interaction with openness. Trade openness itself provides more opportunities for 
illegal traders if the country lacks transparency and efficiency in its system of 
governance and its judiciary system. This issue, in addition to increasing domestic 
demand (through increasing GDP growth) may send new attractive signals to illegal 
traders. The net effect depends on whether the direct negative effects of GDP growth 
outweigh these positive indirect effects. In all specifications, except for specification 2, 
the negative direct effect was stronger than positive indirect effects. Neither interactions 
of level and growth of per capita GDP with black market premiums were statistically 
significant. In order to reduce the risk of collinearity between the level and growth of 
GDP per capita in specification 8, however, I estimated models with only the level and 
its interactions. I do the same in specification 9 with the growth rate and its interactions. 
By implementing this approach, both the level and growth of per capita GDP were now 
insignificant.  
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Trade openness has a positive effect on smuggling activities in Iran. This supports the 
theoretical propositions of Pitt (1981) and Thursby et al. (1991) that legal trade 
camouflages smuggling. Increasing legal trade through more openness reduces the costs 
of smuggling or misinvoicing price or quantity. The coefficient for this variable was 
statistically significant and stable for all specifications except model 9.  
The role of education in affecting smuggling and illegal trade was not conclusive. 
Education by itself does not prevent illegal activities. In weak institutional 
environments, education may behave counterproductively, without any positive and 
significant effects on aggregate activity. In specifications 2, 5, 7, 8, and 9, I observe a 
significant and positive effect of the literacy rate on smuggling. 
The direct effect of higher education, however, is dependent on other institutional 
variables and rent-seeking opportunities. The interaction of education and BMP, which 
is positive and significant in specification 2, indicates that increasing the literacy rate 
while preserving excellent rent-seeking opportunities in the black market for exchange 
increases profiting from smuggling. Education is used to benefit from transactions in 
illegal markets. An interaction between education and contract-intensive money (CIM) 
(an objective index for the quality of economic institutions introduced by Clague et al., 
1999) has an important and significant negative effect on smuggling. That is, improving 
quality of economic institutions allows better-educated people to direct their energies 
toward productive activities instead of engaging in illegal activities. The interaction 
between education and trade openness was positive and significant, except for 
specifications 5 and 7. Trade liberalization provides more opportunities for those who 
have basic education. The interaction between education and tariff burden is also 
positive and significant in all specifications, except for specification 7. When other 
bottlenecks such as high tariffs are present, increasing basic education provides more 
incentives for bypassing these impediments and engaging in illegal activities. Illiterate 
traders usually have more difficulties figuring out how they can evade tariffs and other 
official impediments to foreign trade. In specifications 10 and 11, which use a self-built 
institutional quality index (IQ), the direct effect of education on smuggling turns out to 
be negative and significant. This negative direct effect outweighs the positive indirect 
effects of the interaction of education with openness and tariff levels.  
The quality of political and economic institutions and governance is suggested to have a 
substantive negative effect on engaging in illegal trade. In assessing this common 
wisdom, I use five different institutional quality indices in addition to the more 
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aggregate index (IQ). All the different indices of political and economic institutional 
quality have the expected negative and significant effects on smuggling across various 
specifications.  
Turning to the measurement part of model, it is necessary to first scale the latent 
smuggling variable to one of the indicators with a correct sign in order to properly 
identify the model. The real import price index was selected as the scale variable and 
fixed to -1 in all specifications.  
The standardized effect of smuggling on three selected indicators, namely the growth 
rate of petroleum products consumption, the import price index, and real government 
revenues were as expected (and statistically significant) in all specification. According 
to the coefficients of the measurement model, the most important variable affected by 
smuggling is real import prices, followed by government revenues and petroleum 
product consumption. The negative effect of smuggling on the import price index 
outweighs the effect on government revenues.  
All specifications show acceptable fit indices. Specification 10, however, performs 
better in terms of GFI, AGFI, and NFI compared to the others. For robustness, I 
estimate the ordinal index of the latent variable (smuggling) for all specifications, and 
then transform the ordinal index of each specification to a cardinal index by calculating 
smuggling though the foreign trade statistics examination method.  
In the following, I estimate total misinvoicing in Iran’s export and import activities with 
her major trading partners.53 I estimate misinvoicing of Iranian trade through the 
following equations: 
Factor CIFcXiX  ing MisinvoicExport ×-=                                                             (4.8) 
Factor CIF i M-c M ing MisinvoicImport ×=                                                           (4.9) 
where 
Xi are imports from Iran as reported by her major trading partners; 
Xc are exports as reported by Iran (FOB prices) to her trading partners; 
Mc are imports as recorded by Iran with her trading partners; 
Mi are exports to Iran as recorded by her trading partners. 
                                                     
53 The IMF authorities provided the author with information on the major trading partners of Iran, 
estimating Iran’s real effective exchange rate based on these trade weights. 
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CIF is the costs (insurance and freight costs), while FOB refers to free on board without 
transport costs. Imports and exports are in CIF and FOB prices. In order to make 
imports and exports comparable, I add 10% to the exports figures, as suggested by the 
IMF (1993). The calculation of trade discrepancies was carried out for the period of 
1988-2006. When the result of equation 4.8 is negative, we have overinvoicing of 
exports by Iranians, while positive outcomes indicate underinvoicing of exports. 
When the result of equation 4.9 is positive, it indicates overinvoicing of imports by 
Iranians, while in the case of a negative result, this indicates underinvoicing of imports. 
Gulati (1987) and McDonald (1985) have argued that reported exports and imports may 
both be biased because of deliberate misinvoicing to bypass controls, evade tariffs, 
and/or facilitate capital flight. Although the reasons behind these discrepancies are not 
exclusively due to mis-invoicing, one can estimate illegal practices in foreign trade 
through such systematic discrepancies. Tables 4.C.1-4.C.3 (Appendix 4.C) show 
import, export, and total misinvoicing in Iran. Yavari (2000) also calculated import 
misinvoicing in Iran for the period of 1988-1997. His calculation is illustrated in Table 
4.C.4 (Appendix 4.C). The figures in his calculation are relatively close to my 
calculations of import misinvoicing for the same period, in particular for 1993. 
Differences may be due to the different trade weights and trade partners used in his 
analysis.  
I use the figure from 1993 as the share of total misinvoicing in Iran’s total trade. This 
leads to a relative size of misinvoicing in Iran’s foreign trade of 12.74%. This figure 
will be used for calibrating the ordinal smuggling index derived from structural 
equations. The relative size of smuggling in total trade for all specifications is illustrated 
in Table 4.6 and Figure 4.4 (Appendix 4.A). Table 4.6 also shows the absolute amount 
of smuggling for each specification. The average size of smuggling in trade and the 
average amount of smuggling across all specifications is about 13%, or $2.65 billion. 
We observe a declining trend in the relative size of smuggling across all specifications.  
Generally, higher proportions of smuggling are found from 1970 to 1988. The main 
reasons behind this relatively higher smuggling level are likely due to higher real tariff 
burdens, negligible real penalties for smuggling, higher premiums in the black market, 
and lower education levels.  
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Table 4.6. Size (% of trade) and amount of smuggling (million US dollars) 
Year/ Specifications S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 S11 
1970 9.1 13.7 13.2 15.4 13.6 15.9 15.1 13.4 14.4 16.0 15.6 
1971 11.5 14.2 13.3 15.4 13.9 16.0 15.5 13.5 14.4 16.1 15.7 
1972 10.7 14.0 13.2 15.1 13.7 15.7 15.2 13.5 14.3 15.7 15.3 
1973 12.2 14.1 13.4 15.0 13.8 15.6 15.3 13.7 14.2 15.6 15.3 
1974 13.0 13.9 13.4 14.9 13.8 15.5 15.2 14.3 14.3 15.4 15.2 
1975 13.2 14.2 13.1 14.8 14.2 15.3 15.3 14.6 14.3 15.2 15.1 
1976 12.0 13.9 13.0 14.6 14.1 14.9 14.7 14.1 14.2 14.9 14.8 
1977 14.3 14.0 13.2 14.6 14.2 15.0 15.1 14.3 14.1 15.1 14.9 
1978 14.1 12.9 13.2 14.4 14.0 14.7 13.5 12.3 13.0 15.0 14.8 
1979 15.8 13.4 12.4 14.2 13.0 14.8 14.0 12.8 13.4 14.7 14.7 
1980 17.0 13.7 13.1 14.1 13.0 14.7 14.6 13.5 13.5 14.7 14.6 
1981 16.1 13.7 13.2 14.0 13.0 14.5 14.2 13.7 13.6 14.5 14.4 
1982 14.8 13.6 13.1 13.9 12.9 14.2 13.9 13.5 13.6 14.3 14.2 
1983 15.9 13.7 13.1 13.9 12.9 14.3 14.1 13.9 13.6 14.4 14.3 
1984 15.7 13.6 12.8 14.0 13.5 14.2 13.9 13.5 13.6 14.5 14.3 
1985 14.8 13.5 12.8 13.8 13.4 14.1 13.7 13.2 13.5 14.1 14.2 
1986 12.5 13.3 12.7 13.6 13.2 13.8 13.2 13.2 13.5 13.8 13.8 
1987 14.6 13.6 12.8 13.6 13.4 14.0 13.7 13.4 13.5 13.9 14.0 
1988 12.7 13.5 12.9 13.4 13.2 13.7 13.5 13.6 13.7 13.5 13.7 
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Table 4.6 (Continued) S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 S11 
1989 13.0 13.6 12.8 13.3 13.2 13.6 13.4 13.4 13.5 13.4 13.5 
1990 13.0 13.7 12.9 13.1 13.2 13.3 13.4 13.3 13.3 13.2 13.3 
1991 13.0 13.7 12.9 13.0 13.2 13.1 12.7 12.9 13.1 13.1 13.2 
1992 10.3 13.0 12.7 12.7 12.9 12.6 11.9 12.3 12.9 12.6 12.7 
1993 12.7 12.7 12.7 12.7 12.7 12.7 12.7 12.7 12.7 12.7 12.7 
1994 7.6 11.8 12.4 12.4 12.5 12.2 11.2 10.7 11.9 12.0 12.2 
1995 5.5 11.4 12.3 12.2 12.4 11.9 10.8 10.5 11.8 11.7 11.9 
1996 5.7 11.3 12.0 12.1 11.7 11.8 10.2 10.2 11.7 11.6 11.7 
1997 4.4 11.0 11.9 11.9 11.6 11.6 9.9 10.1 11.7 11.3 11.4 
1998 4.8 11.2 12.0 11.8 11.6 11.6 10.1 9.8 11.5 11.1 11.3 
1999 3.8 11.0 11.9 11.7 11.6 11.4 9.7 9.7 11.5 11.0 11.2 
2000 2.9 10.7 11.5 11.8 12.3 11.2 9.5 9.2 11.2 10.9 11.1 
2001 3.6 10.7 11.6 11.8 12.3 11.3 9.4 9.2 11.2 11.0 11.2 
2002 5.1 10.6 11.6 11.8 12.2 11.3 9.7 9.1 11.0 11.1 11.2 
Max 17.0 14.2 13.4 15.4 14.2 16.0 15.5 14.6 14.4 16.1 15.7 
Min 2.9 10.6 11.5 11.7 11.6 11.2 9.4 9.1 11.0 10.9 11.1 
Ave. 11.07 12.94 12.69 13.49 13.04 13.66 12.98 12.45 13.08 13.59 13.57 
Ave. amount of 
smuggling (Million 
US$)-(1988-2002) 
1824 2744 2798 2825 2841 2784 2555 2535 2777 2742 2772 
Source: author calculations from structural equation part of MIMIC models 
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Since 1988, the initiation of economic construction development plans, the gradual 
elimination of non-tariff barriers, the revision of penalty rates in 1994, the relative 
reduction in black market premiums, and more stable and improved economic and 
political institutions (especially during 1997-2002) have all contributed to a lower 
smuggling in Iran. Indeed, improvements in political institution quality during the 
reformist government of Khtami (1997-2005) (see Figure 4.2, Appendix 4.A), along 
with some key economic institutional reforms (such as the unification of different 
exchange rates and the removal the black market premiums in 2002) are important for 
explaining the decreasing trend smuggling’s relative trade positing. In fact, one of the 
main promises of ex-president Khatami after being elected for his second term was “the 
fight against smuggling of goods into Iran”54. 
The estimated relative size of smuggling (Table 4.6) enables me to calculate the 
absolute amount of illegal trade in Iran. Table 4.7 presents the estimated amount of 
smuggling over 1988-2002 for all specifications. We see that, for nearly all 
specifications, the average annual value of smuggling was between $2.5 and $3 billion. 
Interestingly, the highest degree of smuggling was realized in 1991 and 1992. In these 
two years, the Iranian economy experienced the extraordinary premium on the US 
dollar in the black market. The ratio of the black market rate of the US dollar to its 
official market rate reached 22.70. In other words, the percentage gap between the 
official and black market rates for the US dollar exceeded 2000% (see Figure 4.1, 
Appendix 4.A). Such a huge gap, caused by faulty foreign exchange policies, was a 
golden opportunity for rent-seekers in the trade sector. In comparison, the estimated 
annual value of smuggling based on detected smuggled goods in the Iranian public 
media was quoted as between $2 and $6 billion.55  
 
 
                                                     
54 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1419806.stm (Access: 13.11.08) 
55 http://www.parstimes.com/news/archive/2005/rfe/goods_smuggling.html  and 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1419806.stm (Access: 13.11.08) 
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Table 4.7. Value of smuggling (million US dollars) 
Year/ Specifications S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 S11 
1988 1547 1642 1560 1628 1603 1661 1639 1651 1666 1635 1667 
1989 2293 2409 2269 2352 2335 2395 2370 2362 2386 2372 2391 
1990 3554 3763 3527 3596 3614 3649 3663 3642 3657 3609 3654 
1991 4146 4353 4098 4147 4189 4162 4049 4105 4166 4175 4200 
1992 3402 4281 4174 4197 4243 4170 3932 4048 4244 4153 4194 
1993 3093 3093 3093 3093 3093 3093 3093 3093 3093 3093 3093 
1994 1438 2225 2347 2347 2363 2297 2114 2024 2243 2271 2304 
1995 1010 2094 2259 2248 2281 2184 1983 1923 2172 2143 2184 
1996 1285 2530 2697 2708 2633 2656 2296 2293 2632 2595 2625 
1997 919 2323 2505 2512 2451 2438 2087 2119 2466 2374 2393 
1998 863 1991 2131 2108 2069 2058 1800 1754 2057 1985 2021 
1999 821 2391 2580 2547 2505 2474 2103 2096 2483 2388 2429 
2000 656 2388 2566 2621 2730 2505 2121 2059 2502 2435 2472 
2001 881 2632 2832 2891 3002 2766 2291 2242 2734 2707 2738 
2002 1454 3049 3339 3386 3503 3250 2789 2614 3163 3188 3209 
Average 1824 2744 2798 2825 2841 2784 2555 2535 2777 2742 2772 
Max (year) 4146 
(1991) 
4353 
(1991) 
4174 
(1992) 
4197 
(1992) 
4243 
(1992) 
4170 
(1992) 
4049 
(1991) 
4105 
(1991) 
4244 
(1992) 
4175 
(1991) 
4200 
(1992) 
Min (year) 656 (2000) 1642 
(1988) 
1560 
(1988) 
1628 
(1988) 
1603 
(1988) 
1661 
(1988) 
1639 
(1988) 
1651 
(1988) 
1666 
(1988) 
1635 
(1988) 
1667 
(1988) 
Source: Based on product of relative size of smuggling and total trade for each year of 1988-2002 period. 
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4.6. Conclusions 
This study investigated illegal trade and smuggling in Iran. MIMIC modeling was 
coupled with the trade discrepancy method for the period 1970-2002. Based on various 
specifications, the estimated annual average value of smuggling for the period 1988-
2002 was between $2.5 and $3 billion. The highest estimated smuggling value was 
approximately $4 billion, in the years 1991 and 1992. These years accompanied record 
black market premia. Smuggling was about 13% on average of trade across 
specifications and study years. By combining structural equation modeling with the 
objective investigation of foreign trade statistics, we can trace the fingerprints of 
smugglers and identify their main incentives.  
The summary of MIMIC analyses results is as follows:  
a) Penalty rates have the most stable and significant effects on smuggling. One of 
the main factors reducing smuggling since the mid-1990s was the revision of 
penalty rates and their significant increase after 1994.  
b) Higher black market premia encourage exporters and importers to misinvoice.  
c) Basic education (literacy rates) affects smuggling activities through direct and 
indirect channels. With the exception of specifications 10 and 11, the direct 
effect on engaging in illegal trade was positive, but interactions with 
institutional quality significantly reduced this effect (for example, see 
specifications 8 and 9).  
d) Unemployment and real per capita GDP control for the effects of business 
cycles, income effects, and substitution effects. The income effect of increasing 
per capita GDP and decreasing the unemployment rate outweighs the 
substitution effect. Increasing growth of per capita GDP controls for prosperity 
and better opportunities in the legal and formal economy.  
e) Trade openness by itself does not ensure a reduction in smuggling. My results 
show that increasing openness increases the inflow of smuggled goods. This 
evidence is in line with the theoretical predictions as well as stylized facts about 
smuggling in Iran in the Economic Free Zones.  
f) All of the economic and political institutional quality variables affect smuggling 
negatively and significantly. The self-built IQ index also has a significant and 
negative effect on smuggling in specifications 10 and 11.  
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g) Smuggling has a significant negative effect on the import price index in Iran. 
The negative effect on real government revenue is less important in magnitude 
than is the reduction in the import price index. This means that strict border 
control and higher penalty rates may impede smuggling, but one should also 
expect increased import prices. The effect of smuggling is also positive and 
significant for domestic consumption of petroleum products for which there are 
large subsidies.  
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Appendix 4.A 
Fig.4.1. Black Market Premium in Iran (%) 
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Source: CBI (2008) 
Fig. 4.2. Institutional Quality Index for Iran. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: lower value means lower quality of political and economic institutions 
Source: Author calculation based on factory analysis 
 
 
Note: lower value means lower quality of political and economic institutions 
Source: Author calculation based on factory analysis 
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Fig. 4.3. Hypothesized Path Diagram (without interactions) 
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Fig.4.4. Size of smuggling (percentage of trade) in different specifications 
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Appendix 4.B 
Table 4.B. Data sources and description 
Variables Definition Transformation/ Calculation Source 
Penalty rate 
Penalty amount in rial 
for each US$ value of 
smuggled goods, 
adjusted for inflation 
The inverse form of fine rate is 
used, logarithmic form, 
standardized 
Madah and Pajoyan 
(2005) 
BMP 
The difference between 
official and black market 
exchange rate for 
US$/rial 
logarithmic form, standardized CBI (2008) 
Tariff 
burden 
The ratio of real tax on 
imports/ real imports 
logarithmic form, standardized CBI (2008) 
RGDPPC Real GDP per capita logarithmic form, standardized CBI (2008) 
Openness 
Non-oil 
exports+imports/non-oil 
GDP 
logarithmic form, standardized CBI (2008) 
Education Literacy  rate logarithmic form, standardized CBI (2008) 
Polity2  
Polity IV: from -10 ( the 
lowest  democracy) to 
+10 (the highest 
democracy) 
polity index /10 
Marshall and Jaggers 
(2007) 
http://www.systemicpeace.
org/polity/polity4.htm 
CIM 
Contract Intensive 
Money: ratio of non-
currency money to total 
money supply. 
(M2-C)/M2, M2: Money 
supply, C: currency held 
outside banks, Not 
standardized 
Based on data from CBI 
(2008) 
Van_comp 
The competition 
variable portrays the 
electoral success of 
smaller parties, that is, 
the percentage of votes 
gained by the smaller 
parties in parliamentary 
and/or presidential 
elections. 
-The variable is calculated by 
subtracting from 100 the 
percentage of votes won by the 
largest party (the party which 
wins most votes) in 
parliamentary elections or by 
the party of the successful 
candidate in presidential 
elections, Not standardized 
Vanhanen (2000) 
http://www.qog.pol.gu.se 
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Table 4.B. 
(Continued) 
   
Van_index 
This index combines 
two basic dimensions of 
democracy (Competition 
and participation). 
Measured as the percentage of 
votes not cast for the largest 
party (Competition) times the 
percentage of the population 
who actually voted in the 
election (Participation). This 
product is divided by 100 to 
form an index that in principle 
could vary from 0 (no 
democracy) to 100 (full 
democracy) 
Vanhanen (2000) 
http://www.qog.pol.gu.se 
Van_part Participation in elections 
The percentage of the total 
population who actually voted 
in the election., Not 
standardized 
Vanhanen (2000) 
http://www.qog.pol.gu.se 
IQ Institutional Quality 
This score is calculated 
through factor analysis 
technique on the basis of 
observable variables such as 
van_index, van_com, CIM, and 
polity, standardized 
Author calculations 
GDPPCG Growth rate of GDP per 
capita 
standardized World Bank (2008) 
Import price 
index (IMX) 
Real Import price index logarithmic form, standardized CBI (2008) 
RG Real government 
revenues 
logarithmic form, standardized CBI (2008) 
Gpconsum 
Petroleum products 
consumption 
Growth rate of total final 
consumption of petroleum 
products, standardized 
Energy  Balances of 
Islamic Republic  of  
Iran 
http://www.iranenergy.org.
ir/ 
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Appendix 4.C: Estimating smuggling by trade discrepancy methodology  
Misinvoicing of import and export between Iran and her major 19 trading partners (e.g. 
Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, China, P.R.: Mainland, France, Germany, Hungary, 
India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Switzerland ,Turkey, 
UAE, and UK). The amount of trade with these countries is used by the IMF to 
calculate the real effective Exchange Rate of Iran for recent years. The main differences 
between import and export figures usually arise because most exports are recorded on 
an F.O.B. basis and most imports on C.I.F. The difference represents the cost of 
transport and insurance. Therefore we have to adjust the export figures by adding 10% 
to the original value of exports. The 10% factor is an approximate value of the costs of 
the insurance and freight (IMF, 1993). Misinvoicing and fraud usually play a significant 
role in the remaining discrepancies in figures.  
Table 4.C.1. Import Misinvoicing (million US dollars) 
Year Underinvoicing of imports Overinvoicing of imports 
1988 849.223  
1989  1353.0626 
1990  1302.2909 
1991  4526.6547 
1992  4184.4239 
1993  2922.7846 
1994 183.4126  
1995  73.1655 
1996  647.7069 
1997 380.2756  
1998  474.3407 
1999  377.1785 
2000  53.1018 
2001  168.1432 
2002  2148.758 
2003  2.88 
2004 48.2196  
2005 0.0212  
2006 0.0059  
Source: Raw trade figures of Iran with major trading partners from DOT (IMF) and calculation 
of misinvoicing from author 
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Table 4.C.2. Export Misinvoicing (million US dollars) 
Year Underinvoicing of exports Overinvoicing of exports 
1988  1563.162 
1989  2256.979 
1990  3421.792 
1991  196.216 
1992  753.651 
1993 169.788  
1994  2482.787 
1995  1043.547 
1996  2577.244 
1997  1507.081 
1998  1531.743 
1999  3343.953 
2000  0.0118 
2001  0.0029 
2002  0.002 
2003  7.9798 
2004 134.9124  
2005  0.0264 
2006  0.0369 
Source: Raw trade figures of Iran with major trading partners from DOT (IMF) and calculation 
of misinvoicing from author 
Table 4.C.3. Total Misinvoicing (million US dollars) 
Year Total mis-invoicing 
1988 -2412.39 
1989 -903.916 
1990 -2119.5 
1991 4330.439 
1992 3430.773 
1993 3092.573 
1994 -2666.2 
1995 -970.382 
1996 -1929.54 
1997 -1887.36 
1998 -1057.4 
1999 -2966.77 
2000 53.09 
2001 168.1403 
2002 2148.756 
2003 -5.0998 
2004 86.6928 
2005 -0.0476 
2006 -0.0428 
Source: Raw trade figures of Iran with major trading partners from DOT (IMF) and calculation 
of misinvoicing from author 
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Table 4.C.4. Misinvoicing of Imports (1988-1997) 
Year Underinvoicing of imports Overinvoicing of imports 
1988 1306.8  
1989  329.6 
1990  453.8 
1991  3212.8 
1992  231.5 
1993  2460.9 
1994  181 
1995  454.8 
1996  809.3 
1997 876.3  
Source: Yavari (2000) 
Appendix 4.D: Analysis of normality 
The following table presents the tests of normality (univariate) of the variables used in 
MIMIC models. This test presents the p-value of the Jarque-Bera test. The p-values 
larger than 5% confirm the acceptance of null hypothesis, indicating normal distribution 
of respected variables. 
Table 4.D. J-Bera Test (P-value) of Univariate Normality 
Causes J-Bera test (p-value) 
Ln (ARF) 0.17 
Ln (BMP) 0.28 
Ln (Edu) 0.30 
Ln (Open) 0.30 
Ln (Rgdppc) 0.57 
Ln (Unemp) 0.31 
Ln (Tariff) 0.71 
CIM 0.35 
IQ 0.44 
Van_comp 0.41 
Van_part 0.71 
Van_index 0.24 
Polity 0.15 
Indicators 
Ln (Im) 0.19 
Ln(Rg) 0.51 
Gpconsum 0.90 
Note: all the other used interaction terms also have normal distribution (not reported here). 
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Chapter 5 
 
5 Macroeconomic Populism in Iran 
Extremism does not have a place in the popular government. It 
will be dealt with. All powers and abilities, all opportunities and all 
competencies, will be used in the popular government. The focus will 
be on national interests, national honour, and progress for all. 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, 26 June 2005 
 
5.1. Introduction 
Throughout history Governors of developing countries have relied on different tools to 
consolidate their power. While at times, ruling classes have used only military 
repression to deter any threat of revolution, in other cases they have relied on income 
transfers to the poor in order to control them, halting potential efforts on regime change. 
Despite the global trend towards democracy, neoliberal policies and the fall of dictators 
in different parts of the world, there is no guarantee that no new populist leaders will 
emerge. On the contrary, most of the countries in the Middle East experience economic 
cycles where concurring episodes tend to repeat themselves. The potential threat and 
concern is the repeated use of populist macroeconomic policies to cure the problems of 
income inequality, despite the existence of historical examples and evidence of their 
harmful results. Populism in the Middle East is financed by abundant natural resources 
such as oil and gas. The governments of these countries rely heavily on the revenues 
that come from these resources in order to implement their populist programs. 
In the Iran of today, we once again observe the emergence of a populist regime. The 
Islamic Republic of Iran initially claimed to serve the needy in society. However, this 
plan to reduce the economic gaps between rich and poor was not successful and 
gradually ceased after the destructive war with Iraq.  
The economic development plans after the war required a huge amount of capital. Less 
attention was paid to the needy classes of society and the importance of an effective 
distribution policy. Subsequently, by turning a blind eye to the side-effects of economic 
liberalization on the masses, populism saw a fresh recovery, some 27 years after the 
victory of the Islamic Revolution. 
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Iranians have learned that incomes generated through natural resources like oil and gas 
go hand in hand with corruption in their country. The corrupted state is something that 
is documented in Iranian history and people have tried to find a willing individual 
within the government who really wants to combat this systematic corruption and 
nepotism. This situation creates the context for a special kind of leader to emerge, a 
person who shows interest in the needs of the middle and lower social classes of society 
and promises to address corruption and nepotism issues directly and aims to redistribute 
the wealth which its people considers their right, especially those from oil funds.  
My thesis endeavours to place the government of Ahmadinejad in a populist context and 
forecasts its fall mainly due to macroeconomic instabilities. I apply the Dornbusch and 
Edwards (1990)  framework in order to analyze the current situation and the future 
probable position of Ahmadinejad’s government in Iran. In sum, the purpose of this 
study is to illustrate how closely Ahmadinejad's government follows the model of 
Dornbusch and Edwards (1990).  
The rest of this chapter is as follows. Section 5.2 introduces the concept of ''populism'' 
and explains the model of Dornbusch and Edwards (hereinafter D&E framework). I will 
discuss the various phases of a populist regime in the D&E model. Section 5.3 deals 
with the case of Iran. It describes how the country's social and economic situation led to 
the emergence of a populist. I will then explain how the Ahmadinejad government fits 
within the framework of the populist model. Section 5.3 also describes Ahmadinejad’s 
policies and details their probable effects on the economy. Section 5.4 concludes the 
chapter. 
5.2. Defining macroeconomic populism  
Defining populism has proved to be a difficult task. According to Knight (1998), 
populism in Latin America has been intimately related to means for obtaining (and 
maintaining) political power. Roberts (2000) notes that ''In essence, populism is an 
informal alternative to institutionalized forms of political representation,... provided by 
political parties''. 
According to Di Tella (1965), paternalism is an essential component of populism which 
is characterized by ''a political movement which enjoys the support of the mass of the 
working class an/or the peasant, but which does not result from the autonomous 
organizational power of either of these two sectors”. The populism is a set of economic 
policy measures (or promises) directed towards obtaining support from ''the masses''. 
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In terms of a political approach, perhaps the definition of Weyland (2001) is better than 
the others because it shows the nature of populists: to win and exercise power, while 
using economic and social policy as an instrument for this purpose. According to this 
definition, populism is much more like a tool used by dictators who aim to remain in 
power for personal benefits rather than serving their poor subjects, as they would have 
them believe. The populist leader is charismatic and wins broad and intense support 
from a largely unorganized mass by representing people who feel excluded or 
marginalized from national political life and by promising to rescue them from crisis, 
threats and enemies (Weyland 2001). 
From various kinds of definitions of populism, ''macroeconomic populism'' is a newer 
concept. D&E (1990) used this term and showed that policy experiences in different 
countries and periods share common features: initial conditions, motivations for 
policies, different domestic conditions, and ultimate collapse. Their model is not a 
righteous assertion of conservative economics, but rather a warning that populist 
policies will ultimately fail; and when they fail it is always at a frightening cost to the 
very groups who were supposed to be favoured. D&E (1990) provide a set of properties 
to explain populism and define a common process. Their model also establishes a link 
between the behaviour of populist regimes and its effects on the macroeconomy. The 
extreme vulnerability and instability of the populist regimes are, by and large, the result 
of unsustainable policies. The D&E model does not explain why the populist leaders 
behave the way they do. With their model, however, we can examine the decisions 
populists make and how these decisions affect the macroeconomy. 
5.2.1. Properties of populist leaders and populist policies 
Many populists have an attachment to a specific part of a country or to a specific social 
class such as the working, middle or the agricultural classes.  Populists are usually 
skilled at rhetoric and claim to be representatives of all the people, trying to find a 
foreign enemy in order to cover their own weaknesses and mismanagement in domestic 
affairs. A populist leader tends to design a set of plans in order to realize some special 
political interests, including: 
a) Organizing support from lower middle class groups and organized labour. 
These groups represent the regime's primary support because of the high 
level of discontent with income inequalities. 
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b) Isolation of elites, rural oligarchy and foreign enterprises. In a populist 
regime, these groups are seen as enemies and rent-seekers who have no 
regard for the lower classes in society. They are also assumed to operate 
against the populist regime within the domestic economy, trying to hamper 
the trend of serving needy people through the regime. In fact, the interests of 
such groups tend to conflict with the redistributive aims of the populist state 
(Coupal, 2003). 
In order to meet populist leaders’ goals, they usually follow some specific economic 
policies in the country (Coupal, 2003) such as: 
a) Fiscal deficit to stimulate domestic demand. 
b) Increase in the nominal wage accompanied by price controls and huge 
subsidies. 
c) Control or appreciation of exchange rate to reduce inflation by increasing the 
volume of imports and to increase the income and profits of sectors that are 
not involved in international markets. 
 
5.2.2. Phasing the Populist Macroeconomy 
D&E (1990) identified the initial conditions for the appearance of a populist regime and 
four phases of its life. In the following sections, I analyze the initial conditions and the 
four phases of Iran under Ahmadinejad. 
a) Initial conditions 
In order to establish a populist regime, three initial conditions are required. The first is 
that the country has experienced slow growth, stagnation, or depression. The second 
issue is the readiness of people for fundamental changes in economic programs because 
of high income inequalities and corruption in the country. The third initial condition is 
having enough room for highly expansionary programs which require sufficient external 
balance and reserves. Without the required reserves for fiscal manoeuvre, the populist 
regime cannot initiate its economic plans. Providing the abovementioned initial 
condition is present, populist regimes may be set in motion and implement their populist 
economic programs. 
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b) Phase 1 
In this phase, the economy experiences lower levels of unemployment, higher output 
and real wages. High levels of imports make it easier for the populist regime to control 
inflation in spite of the expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. Usually, the major 
source for financing imports is rooted in high revenues from natural resources. 
c) Phase 2 
In this phase, the economy faces a first challenge. Due to the strong expansion in public 
demand, the country runs into growing shortages of foreign exchange reserves which 
have been used for considerable imports in the former phase. It is now the time of 
introducing industry protection, devaluing the currency, and adjusting the prices. In this 
phase, we observe the increase of inflation and wages. Furthermore, a large number of 
subsidies and gross inability on the part of the government to control its increasing 
expenditures put a great burden on government budgets and worsen the budget deficits. 
d) Phase 3  
The main features of this phase are pervasive shortages, an extreme increase in inflation 
and a considerable foreign exchange gap, leading to capital flight and demonetization of 
the economy. The populist regime tries to control the budget crisis by re-examining the 
amount of subsidies and by real depreciation. Economic policies become unstable and 
real wages fall considerably. 
e)  Phase 4 
In this phase, we observe the collapse of the populist government. In the end, real wages 
decrease to a level significantly lower than that prior to the populist government (see 
Table 5.1). 
Table 5.1. The main properties of phases of populist regime economic life 
Stages/main 
indicators 
Unemployment Inflation Imports Subsidies 
Phase 1 Decreasing (-) Constant or Increasing (+) Increasing (+) 
Phase 2 Increasing (+) Increasing(+) ? Increasing (+) 
Phase 3 Increasing (+) Increasing (+) ? Constant or 
Phase 4  Increasing (+) Constant or Decreasing (-) Decreasing (-) 
Source: Extracted from D&E (1990) 
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5.3. From Khatami to Ahmadinejad 
5.3.1. Initial Conditions (1997-2004) 
A set of initial conditions is necessary to bring a regime to populism. In this section, I 
explain the conditions that allowed Ahmadinejad to be successful with his populist 
agenda. Through eight years of reformist government, the people of Iran and especially 
the lower classes of society were unhappy with the inability of the state to meet their 
basic needs.  
a) A high degree of inequality was not acceptable for the people in a country rich in oil 
reserves. The official data confirm people’s feelings about their economic situation 
during the reformist government. The Gini index56 in urban areas increased from 
0.396 in 1998 to 0.415 in 2003/04 (Figure 5.1). In fact, Iranians have hardly 
experienced a Gini index lower than 0.39 since the revolution, indicating the 
inability of governments since that period to use the huge oil revenues at their 
disposal to establish a welfare state for the people.57 The income distribution 
inequality index in urban areas illustrates a considerable increase between the 
richest 10% of households and the poorest 10% in the country during the reformist 
state. While the ratio of richest  to poorest 10% of the population was at 13.9 times 
in 1998, this ratio increased to about 17 times in 2002 and 16 times in 2003, 
confirming the failure of reformists to decrease income distribution inequalities 
(Figure 5.1). 
b) The Misery index makes clearer the situation of the social-economic environment of 
Iran before the populist regime of Ahmadinejad. This index is the sum of 
unemployment and inflation rates. It is assumed that both a higher rate of inflation 
and unemployment create economic and social costs for a country. A combination 
of rising inflation and more people out of work implies deterioration in economic 
performance and a rise in Misery index.  
 
                                                     
56 This Index measures inequality of distribution of income. It is a number between 0 and 1, where 0 
indicates perfect equality and 1 refers to perfect inequality. 
57 Based on available data the Gini index of Iran in 1998 was 44.1 compared to 24.7, 36.42, 28.65 in 
Denmark, Jordan, and Pakistan in the same year and to 29.1, 32.9, 32.5, 34.42, 28.31, 40.03, and 25 in 
Austria, Belgium, Canda, Egypt, Germany, Turkey, and Sweden in the year 2000 (World Bank, 2008).  
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Fig. 5.1. Initial condition for populist state: growth of inequality 
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Fig. 5.2. Initial condition for populist state: growth of Misery index 
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The Misery index was over 30% in the last two years of Khatami presidency.In the 
first year of Ahmadinejad government, as predicted by D&E (1990), this index 
reduced significantly to just above 20%. (Figure 5.2).58 
c) Another evidence of weak performance of the reformist government can be 
observed in the GRICS59 index which was produced by the World Bank. The “Voice 
and Accountability Index” which shows the extent to which a country’s citizens are 
able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, 
freedom of association and a free media fell from -1.08 in 1996 to -1.36 in 2004, 
referring to a decline in the freedom of speech in this period in spite of the reformist 
agenda on political development. Political stability also showed a diminishing trend. 
The index fell from -0.37 in 1996 to -0.91 in 2004. “Government Effectiveness” 
which measures the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the 
degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation 
and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such 
policies fell from -0.30 in 1996 to -0.66 in 2004. The index of “Rule of Law” which 
measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society was also disappointing during this period, falling from -0.77 in 1996 to -0.83 
at the end of the reformist government. Just two indicators showed a slight 
improvement: “Regulatory Quality” and “Control of Corruption”. In general, most 
indicators of governance over this period point to a negative performance on the part 
of the reformist governance in Iran.  
The initial necessary conditions were present for the emergence of populism. The 
increasing inflation during the second term of Khatami reduced the purchase power of 
the public. CPI inflation increased from 11.27% in 2001 to 14.76% in 2004, while 
inflation based on GDP deflators reached from 11.63% to 21% in the same period. 
Furthermore, the GDP growth rate had fallen from 7.5% in 2002 to 4% in 2005 (World 
Bank, 2008).  
                                                     
58 Unemployment data from http://www.indexmundi.com/iran/unemployment_rate.html and inflation 
from http://www.indexmundi.com/iran/inflation_rate_(consumer_prices).html (Access: 13.03.2009)  
59 The Governance Research Indicator Country Snapshot is accessible through the Governance & Anti 
Corruption section of the World Bank website. The range of these indicators is from +2.5 to -2.5. The 
former figure indicates the best and the latter the worst situation section under study. 
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Ehteshami and Zweiri (2007, p. xvi) illustrate the disappoint of those who elected 
Khatami: 
“However, it was more surprising to see those who had so wholly bought into 
Khatami’s reforms so downhearted and disappointed by the end of his first term in 
office. Though they voted him in again, they nonetheless started blaming him more 
openly for not achieving his stated objectives, which he had repeatedly promised he 
would do”. 
Khatami’s first priority was political development. Thus less attention paid by his 
government to economic issues. This negligence was his Achilles' heel. 
Neoconservatives focused on this weakpoint of Khatami government among needy 
classes of the Iranian society. Political development slogans in a society where people 
struggle for meeting their economic needs were not enough. Ehteshami and Zweiri 
(2007, p. 46) highlighted the outcome of Khatami policies: 
“Ironically, it was the reformists that gave the masses the voice and the tools to 
articulate their concerns, and it was the movement’s failure to deliver on the tangible 
needs of the people that left the door open for neoconservative forces to present 
themselves as a new alternative.” 
The main financial source of populism, oil revenues, was also in a favourable position. 
In fact, Ahmadinejad could instantly begin his populist programs because oil prices 
exceeded $70 per barrel in 2006. The Iranian oil and gas exports increased from 15.74 
billion dollars in 1997 to more than 36 billion dollars in 2004 (about 140 % growth).The 
oil revenues reached a record high in 2005. The actual oil revenues at that time were 
about 50 billion dollars, 35 % more than the previous year. In 2005, the state received 
more than 10 billion dollars from the export of non-oil goods, accounting for more than 
60 billion dollars of the total foreign exchange revenues of the country. By comparison, 
in 1998, the total foreign exchange revenues of oil and non-oil exports amounted to 10 
billion dollars. 
The two other key issues, namely the balance of payment and international reserves 
were also affected positively by high oil prices in the year before the election of 
Ahmadinejad. The considerable increase in foreign exchange revenues (oil and non-oil 
exports) led to higher levels of imports reaching $36.6 billion. In addition, the inflow of 
foreign capital exceeded the outflow of it in 2004 and the capital account showed a 
surplus of 5.6 billion dollars. Consequently, the balance of payment in 2004 recorded 
the highest level over its past three years of 9.6 billion dollars. 
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In spite of all the challenges outlined above through the Khatami government, the 
Iranian economy was in a good state in terms of foreign reserves when Ahmadinejad 
was elected as president in June 2005.  
5.3.2. Phase 1: Reactivation and Redistribution Policies 
In 2005/06, the Iranian economy grew by 5.4%, which was 0.6% higher than in 2004/05 
and reversed the declining trend of economic growth during the reformist government. 
The rate of inflation fell to about 10%, 5 per cent lower than the previous year. The 
Misery index in 2005 compared to its previous year fell by 10% (see Figure 5.2). 
Improvement in the balance of payments accelerated, mainly because of rising oil 
prices, which approached and surpassed $70 per barrel (averaging about $51.37 a barrel 
for Iran in 2005/06). Meanwhile, increasing imports helped to absorb extra domestic 
demand created by expansionary fiscal and monetary programs of the Ahmadinejad 
state. In order to implement the first step of the populist agenda, Ahmadinejad began 
expansionary policies. The rate of growth of all the main monetary indicators increased 
sharply in 2005/06. The rate of growth of the monetary base which had increased by 
17.5% in 2004 shot up to 46.1% in 2005. The growth rate of the money supply (M1) 
jumped from 16.3% to 25.8%. The increase was more moderate for liquidity, rising 
from 30.2% to 34.3%, for total deposits, going from 31.4% to 35.8%, and for private 
sector credit, rising from 37.6% to 38.3%. The financial position of the government was 
very much affected during the final month of the year as the oil revenues rose 12 times 
and subsidies quadrupled in that month. In general, current expenditures registered a 
huge leap of 57.3%, while the increase in total expenditure was 52.5%. Despite the 
increase in oil prices, the budget deficit was 3% higher than last year.  
Despite increasing money supply, inflation was kept under control in the first phase by 
fixing the prices of governmental goods and services (petroleum products, gas, 
electricity, water, telephone and postal services) at the level of prices in 2004 as well as 
by increasing the level of imports. In 2005 and 2006, the first two years of Ahmadinejad 
presidency, inflation rate reached to 10.4% and 11.9% from 15.3% in the last year of 
Khatami presidency (2004).60  
Over the first year of the populist government of Ahmadinejad, the Oil Stabilization 
Fund (OSF) was transformed into a safe box for financing populist policies. The 
Ahmadinejad government sent two budget supplements to parliament. These 
                                                     
60 http://www.indexmundi.com/iran/inflation_rate_(consumer_prices).html  (Access: 12.03.2009).  
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supplements permitted the government to draw $11.3b from the oil revenues, instead of 
borrowing from the OSF. The amount of $3.5b of this figure was used for the import of 
subsidized gasoline. The rest was directly converted into domestic expenditures, e.g. 
food subsidy, and government employees' salaries, thus further feeding the populist 
programs of the state. 
Ahmadinejad submitted his 2006-07 budget proposal to parliament on January 15, 2005. 
The draft of his first budget showed an increase of 27% in total spending compared to 
the 2005-06 budget, amounting to $217.4b. The clear point is that his budget heavily 
relied on oil revenues, projecting the oil prices in his budget plan at about $40 per 
barrel, which was the highest price projection throughout the entire Iranian history of 
budgeting. Real GDP growth was expected at 8%, much higher than what had been 
achieved in the pervious years, showing the aim to boost the economy. The projection 
of the higher base price of oil per barrel enabled the government to use a larger portion 
of the country's total oil export revenues and therefore transferring a lower amount of 
petrodollars into OSF.61 The direct access to oil revenues enabled Ahmadinejad to 
expedite his populist programs which mainly focus on current expenditures and short-
term projects. The ratio of capital expenditures to current expenditures in his budget 
plan was 48.7%, while the projection of the Fourth Five Year Economic Plan is about 
55%.62 
The support of special interest groups in his budget plan of 2006 was obvious. For 
instance, some of the budget increases compared to the budget of 2005 showed his 
commitment to ''bringing oil revenues to the dinner tables of special Iranians'':63 
a) The Services of Islamic Seminaries Organization 64 (Markaze Khadamate Hozeh 
Elmieh Qom), which its directors nominated by the Supreme Leader. The 
organization provides different kinds of services to clerical students throughout 
the country: increase of 147.1%. 
                                                     
61 The idea of establishing OSF was to save probable extra oil revenues on the basis of oil price projection 
in budget, using it for productive investment and financing non-oil budget deficits. 
62 Fourth Five-Year Economic, Social and Cultural Development Plan Bill took effect from March 2005. 
63 Gooya News Agency Website: http://news.gooya.com/economy/archives/2006/02/043393print.php (in 
Persian, Access: 03.03.2009). 
64 http://osis.ir  
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b) The Guardian Council 65(Shoraye Negahban), which has a veto power on 
parliament decisions and is almost under the control of the Supreme Leadership 
of Iran: increase of 142.2%. 
c) The Representative Office of the Supreme Leader in Universities66 (Nahade 
Namayandegi Rahbari dar Daneshgahha), which is a conservative body and plays 
the role of watch dog of the government in universities: increase of 140.8%. 
d) The Islamic Development Office of Islamic Seminaries 67 (Daftare Tablighate 
Islami Hozeh Elmieh Qom), which is active in expanding the Islamic culture and 
teachings in the country: increase of 110.7%. 
e) The Coordinator Council of Islamic Propaganda68 (Shoraye Hamahangie 
Tablighate Islami), which is mainly active in organizing the pro-government 
demonstrations and gatherings: increase of 96.5%. 
f) The Islamic Development Organization69 (Sazmane Tablighate Islami), which 
official mission is “developing culture of real Islam and manifesting the spiritual 
life and disseminating the belief and faith values”: increase of 95.4%. 
g) IRIB (Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting)70, the president of which is 
appointed every five years by the Supreme Leader: increase of 46%. 
h) The Cleric Elites Secretary Office71 (Khobregane Rahbari), which is a 
conservative body and evaluates the performance of the Supreme Leader: 
increase of 44%. 
i) The Supreme Cultural Revolution Council72 (Shoraye Enghelabe Farhangi), which 
its president is Ahamdinejad: increase of 41.9%. 
                                                     
65 http://www.shora-gc.ir  
66 http://www.nahad.ir/  
67 http://www.ipoh.ir/  
68 http://www.fajr.ir/  
69 http://www.ido.ir/en/en-default.aspx  
70 http://www.irib.ir/English  
71 www.khobreganrahbari.com  
72 http://www.iranculture.org  
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j) The Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute73, the president of which 
–Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi- is the most famous supporter of Ahmadinejad: the 
budget of this institute increased 10 times from 3500 million rials ($360,824) at 
the end of Kahtami presidency to 35000 million rials ($3,608,247) in the first 
year of Ahmadinejad’s governance. This huge increase has continued during the 
first three years of Ahmadinehad’s governance and reached the 70 billion rials 
($7,216,494) mark in early 2009.74 
According to Amirreza Khadem, a member of the 7th parliament, the average rate of 
increase in the budget of religious bodies was 100% in the budget of 2006-07. This 
considerable rise in the budget of interest groups can be compared to the increase in the 
budget of the Health Organisation (9.4%), the Sport Organization of (4.1%) and the 
Education Organization (0%). It is interesting to note that the budget under the control 
of the Islamic Development Organization, which amounted to 190 billion rials is 19 
times more than the budget of the Ministry of Health.75 In sum, the budget of the 
populist state pays very little regard to financial discipline and relies heavily on oil 
revenues to reactivate the economy. The expenditure patterns show the aim to distribute 
the money in exchange for the votes. The two important populist plans of Ahmadinejad 
upon taking office were “Imam Reza Charity Fund” and “Justice Shares”.  
5.3.2.1 Establishing the ''Imam Reza Care (or Charity) Fund'' 
The first legislation to emerge from his newly formed government was a 12 billion rial 
($1.3b) fund called ''Imam Reza Care Fund''. The initial capital of the fund was 
financed by a reduction in the National Oil Company (NIOC)’s share of oil revenues.76 
Ahmadinejad's government claimed that this fund would be used to help young people 
to get jobs and to afford marriage, as well as assist them in purchasing their own 
homes.77 According to the initial proposals put forward by the Ahmadinejad 
government, the fund was introduced through a non-governmental body and it was 
                                                     
73 http://www.qabas.org/index_en.asp  
74 Rooz Online Website, 10.02.2009: http://www.roozonline.com/archives/2009/02/post_11508.php (in 
Persian, Access: 03.03.2009). 
75 Gooya Agency Website: http://news.gooya.com/economy/archives/2006/02/043393print.php (Access: 
03.03.2009) 
76 Baztab News Agency Website: www.baztab.com/news/28471.php (in Persian, Access: 02.03.2009). 
77 Baztab, Ibid. 
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proposed that 30% could be raised by the Oil Stabilization Fund and the rest by credits 
in annual budgets, interest-free funds of banks78, public assistance, profits of 
governmental companies, Fund membership payments and repayments of funds.79  
The major problem of the Fund was the inability of its advocates to find a proper 
funding for the missions of the Fund. Parliament deputies and economic experts 
immediately objected to the provision to take 30% of the OSF funds in order to kick-
start the project. 
After several months of discussions between government and parliament, three different 
Funds were created: the Employment Assistance Fund, the Rural Development Fund 
and the Banking Account for Youth Marriage, which came under the collective heading 
of ''Imam Reza Cooperative, Employment and Marriage Fund”.  
5.3.2.2 Distribution of governmental companies' shares to needy people (Justice 
Shares) 
The second populist program which was intensely publicized by the Ahmadinejad 
government and broadly advertised on national TV channels was the ''Justice Shares''.80 
Under this scheme, the government planed to give the shares of privatized firms at 
subsidized prices to low-income households. Following this plan, in July 2006, 
Khamenei - the Supreme Leader - ordered the three branches of government to hand 
over 80% of the shares of major state-owned firms, including key large industries  
The main idea behind this plan was taken from ''voucher privatization'' in the former 
Soviet bloc.81 The distribution of vouchers that could be exchanged for shares was the 
dominant privatization method in the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Latvia, Kazakhstan 
and initially also in Slovakia.  
However, Ahmadinejad’s plan to distribute wealth among low-income Iranians in 
exchange for their loyalty has some serious shortcomings: 
                                                     
78 Intrest-free lending or Gharz-al-hasaneh is a common practice in Islamic Banking.  
79 Mehr News Agency Website: www.mehrnews.com/fa/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=312770  (in Persian, 
Access: 02.03.2009). 
80 Law and regulation of Justice Shares distribution is available here: 
http://www.en.ipo.ir/index.aspx?siteid=83&pageid=305 (in English, Access: 03.03.2009). Distribution 
procedure can be seen here: http://www.en.ipo.ir/index.aspx?siteid=83&pageid=299 (Access: 
03.03.2009).  
81 This is a privatization method where citizens are given or can inexpensively buy a book of vouchers 
that represent potential shares in any state-owned company. This method was mainly used in the early-to-
mid 1990s in the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe. 
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a) Because of their inefficient structure and operation as well as poor management, 
the government compensates for some of the annual losses of governmental 
companies by giving subsidies. The number of loss making companies increased 
from 75 in 1997 to 87 in 2006. The amount of loss increased from 1492.2 billion 
rials (150,327,455 US$) to 43266.4 billion rials (4,359,294,710 US$) for the 
same period. To offset this loss, the subsidy increased from 531.8 billion rials 
(53,501,259 US$) to 4150.6 billion rials (418,136,020 US$) for this period.82 
There are some exceptions, especially in oil and gas industry. Of course, the 
companies in this sector remain under control of state. The maximum reported 
annual profit for governmental companies has been about 3-4%.83 Such a profit 
is negligible in an inflationary economy. Each qualified person receives the total 
amount of 5 million rials shares (around $500). Assuming the optimistic 
situation, the share holders receive 150000 rials or about $16 per year (taking a 
fixed profit rate of 3% for each year).  
b) The second criticism refers to the identification of the target groups. According 
to the plan, the justice shares should be distributed among some 7 million people 
in its initial phase, including those covered by charity services of the Imam 
Khomeini Relief Committee and State Welfare Organizations, as well as 
members of Basij (militia of government) and Sepah (Revolutionary Guards). 
The number of recipients will increase to 21 million, during the course of the 
implementation of project. Usually, membership of some of these organizations 
is not subject to real financial problems of householders but depends on their 
loyalty to the government. Ultimately, well-connected groups benefit from much 
more attractive shares over this program. 
5.3.3. Phases 2 and 3: Has the Ahmadinejad state surpassed the Second Phase? 
In the second phase, the economy runs into shortages. This is partly due to the 
increasing shortage of foreign exchange and the price controls. The government 
introduces protection and reviews the price control system. Inflation increases 
considerably and wages too. Finally, budget deficits will worsen as a result of the high 
amount of subsidies 
                                                     
82 http://www.spac.ir/barnameh/Barnameh%20228/p-2.htm (in Persian, Access: 12.03.2009).  
83 Deutsche Welle Website: Interview with Mohsen Safaie Farahani, 19 Aug. 2006: http://www.dw-
world.de/dw/article/0,,2408509,00.html (in Persian, Access: 03.03.2009).  
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The necessary condition for entering into the second phase is the imbalance between 
foreign exchange reserves and the populist spending. The distinguishing characteristic 
of the second phase and the third phase is the subsidy policy (see Table 5.1). While in 
the second phase subsidies tend to rise, the government reduces the level of subsidies in 
the third phase. There is some alarming evidence that the Ahmadinejad government has 
surpassed the second phase and is in the third phase: 
a) Figure 5.3 shows the development of the Iranian heavy oil prices during the 
presidency of Khatami (1997-2005) and Ahmadinajd (since 2005). We observe a 
significant increase of oil prices from the level of $20 to $60 per barrel at the 
end of the Khatami presidency. Ahmadinejad began his presidency in an 
attractive oil market situation. Such an increase financed the first phase of his 
government’s populists spending. Ahmadinejad was highly confident of the 
increasing oil prices84, neglecting the warning messages of the Iranian 
economists about the inflationary effects of his aggressive spending.85 The first 
phase ended when the oil market collapsed in September 2008. The oil price 
reached $39 a barrel in February 2009. In the face of such a negative oil market 
in the second half of 2008, the $307 billion budget has to be financed by a 
deficit. The estimated borrowing amount is between 7-50 billion dollars.86  
According to the D&E framework, the Ahmaedinejad’s government entered into his 
second phase. In the second phase, the populist government resists a reduction or any 
reform of subsidies. The massive subsidies on fuel products continued during most of 
2008. The government spent 13.6 million rials ($1380) per person in 2008 as subsidies, 
mainly for energy.87 An increasing inflation rate as a common aspect of the second and 
third phases is evident. The Ahmadinejad government initially managed to lower 
                                                     
84 In July 2008, Ahmadinejad claimed that the price of oil would never fall below $100 a barrel. See: 
http://www.economist.com/world/mideast-africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12650281 (Access: 
05.03.2009). 
85 In November 2008, a group of 60 Iranian economists sent a letter to Ahmaedinajd, challenging his 
populist approach toward economy. In this 30 page letter, economists criticized his policies: “ Meager 
economic growth, increasing unemployment rate, increasing inflation rate, crisis in capital markets, 
government expansionary budget…, inequality and poverty combined with global crisis have a big impact 
on exports and imports of the country”. Ahmadinejad paid no attention to this letter. See: 
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/nov/10/world/fg-iran10 (Access: 05.03.2009).  
86 http://www.wsws.org/articles/2008/oct2008/iran-o29.shtml (Access: 05.03.09) 
87 Based on another source, in 2008, the government paid $100 billion direct and indirect subsidies for 
goods.  
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inflation in its first phase of state. However, the inflation rate increased significantly in 
2007, reaching 18.4%.88  
Fig.5.3. Weekly Iran heavy spot price FOB (dollars per barrel) 
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Source: EIA (http://www.eia.doe.gov)  
b) In the third phase, the financial pressures due to shortage of foreign exchange 
reserves (e.g. mainly due to a fall in oil prices) force the populist government to 
undertake fundamental revisions in its aggressive spending. In January 2009, 
Ahmadinajd presented the budget to the parliament. This budget totalled 
2827000 billion rials ($287 billion). In a rare example of Iranian budget history, 
the 2009 budget fell by 2.5% compared to its pervious year’s actual budget. 
Ahmadinejad who used to ignore the warnings from economist during his first 
and second phases of state, admitted the crisis symptoms in December 2008. He 
said that the government would have to abandon “a major part” of its public 
projects.89 Apart from suspending these projects, the populist government had to 
revise its hardly manageable subsidy plans. In December 2008, Ahmadinejad 
                                                     
88 http://www.spac.ir/barnameh/306/p7.htm (in Persian, Access:12.03.2009)  
89http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122973669825423389.html?mod=googlenews_wsj (Access: 
04.03.2009).  
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presented a plan to parliament proposing an end to fuel, water, and electricity 
subsidies. “Falling oil prices encourages us to promptly implement the bill; it is 
time we made a decision”, Ahmadinejad told the parliament as he defended the 
removal of subsidies.90  
The evidence implies that Ahmadinejad populist governance is in its third phase of life. 
The fourth phase would mean his removal from office. Whether this will happen will be 
cleared in the next presidential election in June 12, 2009. 
5.4. Conclusion 
I have examined the political life process of the Ahmadinejad’s government on the basis 
of the D&E analytical framework which is designed for populist regimes. This 
framework has four phases. The D&E model points out that most populist regimes have 
a promising start: the inflation and unemployment rate are reduced, while subsidies 
increase. This is what Iranians experienced during the first two years of the 
Ahmadinejad’s government. By entering into the second phase, there are not enough 
foreign exchange reserves because of the reduction of oil revenues. Consequently, the 
inflation rate which was controlled by regulated prices and by increasing imports can no 
longer be maintained. In this phase, there are increasing pressures on the populist state 
to reform the subsidy system. However, this reform is costly and the populist 
government is afraid of losing support. The third phase of a populist regime has much in 
common with the second phase except for position of populist state against heavy 
subsidies. The high imbalance between the financial sources of populist regime and its 
spending in the third phase will make a reduction or halting of subsidies unavoidable. 
The Iranian economy in 2008 and 2009 reflects the third phase of the populist state. The 
fourth phase may be realized in the coming presidency election in June 2009.  
                                                     
90 http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/12/30/news/ML-Iran-Subsidies.php  (Access: 04.03.2009). In May 
2007, the government had started to implement a rationing system for gasoline consumption. However, 
there was never a direct statement about ending the energy subsidies as mentioned by Ahmadinejad one 
year later in 2008.  
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Chapter 6 
 
6 Final Remarks 
 
“The world is round  
and the place which may seem like the end  
may also be the beginning.” 
Ivy Baker Priest (1905-1975) 
 
6.1 Summary and conclusions  
In this dissertation, I investigate the role of oil resources and economic and political 
institutional quality on the economic performance of Iran. To this end, I examine four 
related themes. First and foremost, I provide a detailed picture of the economic structure 
of Iran and compare its performance with other oil and non-oil economies of the Middle 
East and the Middle Easterb region. As we get a clear picture of the relative economic 
position of Iran in the MENA region, I go further into macroeconomic analyses of oil 
wealth effects on the Iranian economy. It is crucial to examine how external shocks in 
the global oil markets affect the domestic economy of Iran. After all, more than 90% of 
foreign exchange revenues of Iran and more than 60% of government budget revenues 
are dependent on oil prices. The major part of government social security programs such 
as subsidies on fuel products, electricity, water, communications, and foods among 
others is financed through the oil revenues. Thus, fluctuations of oil markets not only 
affect the political structure of Iranian government but also have a direct effect on the 
living standards of Iranians.  
Such investigation is of value for international political decision makers who want to 
understand the responsiveness of the Iranian economy against global oil shocks. Sitting 
on a pool of valuable and strategic natural resource (oil) has its own advantages and 
disadvantages. Many poor non oil economies could progress more rapidly on a path of 
development if they had such natural resources. Indeed, oil resources can act as an 
initial capital for investments and production. Such a capital has a supplementary role 
besides domestic savings and foreign investment for future growth and development.  
The previous statement, of course, is dependent on responsible management of natural 
resources. Management of petrodollars in Iran is a challenging issue for every 
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government. Why might oil revenues be harmful for economic growth in Iran? I 
investigated three channels which offer an answer to this. These channels are the supply 
side, the demand side and the terms of trade. Furthermore, we can see that effects of oil 
price shocks on the economy may be non-linear, therefore, it is important to use the 
asymmetric definitions of oil prices besides the symmetric form. To analyze the 
symmetric and asymmetric effects of oil shock on the Iranian economy, I used the 
impulse response functions and variance decomposition analyses for a quarterly period 
from 1988 - 2006.  
The events of the past decade, as shown by recent literature on the oil-GDP relationship, 
seem to call into question the relevance of oil price changes as a significant source of 
economic fluctuations. The reason being that since the late 1990s, the global economy 
has experienced two oil shocks of sign and magnitude comparable to those of the 1970s 
but, in contrast with the latter episodes, GDP growth and inflation have remained 
relatively stable in much of the industrialized world. However, the literature on net oil 
exporting economies is silent on this point.  
The question which may arise is: Could this have been the case in a net oil exporting 
developing country such as Iran? Are the macroeconomic effects of oil price shocks in 
Iran in the 1990s and 2000s different from the 1970s? In this due, first I extended the 
sample period to 1975 - 2006. Considering the special political situation of Iran during 
the Iranian revolution and the Iran-Iraq war, I determined a break point in 1988:IV. 
Accordingly I reestimate the VAR models for two sub-periods and the full sample. The 
general results for the full sample with some minor exceptions are comparable with the 
results of the post-1989 period.  
Regarding the pre-1989 period I find some similarities and differences compared to the 
post-1989 period. A debatable point about the first approach is the relative low number 
of observations for the pre-1989 period. An alternative approach to analyze possible 
changes in the macroeconomic effects of oil price shocks over time is the use of “rolling 
bivariate VARs”. The advantage of this approach is the possibility of using shorter 
samples. According to the latter approach, the qualitative response of the economy to oil 
price shocks over the sample period is almost unchanged. However, I find quantitative 
differences in the response of the economy to oil shocks. 
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The results on the supply side of economy reveal that positive oil price shocks stimulate 
the Iranian industrial production and real imports. By increasing oil prices and 
increasing foreign exchange revenues the import volume of raw, intermediary and 
consumption goods will increase (as it is also evident from the positive and persistent 
impulse response of real imports). Following increased foreign net reserves and imports, 
domestic industrial production which is highly dependent on imported materials will 
rise sharply. 
On the demand side, both positive and negative oil price shocks have inflationary 
effects and drive up the general level of prices, which translate into lower real 
disposable incomes and a reduction in the real effective demand of Iranian consumers. 
The inflationary effects of positive oil price shocks on the Iranian economy can be 
explained through the AD-AS model. Increasing oil revenues contributes to higher 
levels of government expenditures. Considering the dominant role of the government in 
the domestic economy, which is beyond the budgetary expenditures and includes great 
implicit expenditures (e.g., various energy subsidies, offsetting the state companies’ 
annual losses, etc.), current and capital expenditures of the government will rise as oil 
revenues increase. Also, because of increased net foreign reserves of the central bank, 
the money supply will increase. The increased money supply and government 
expenditures will shift the demand curve upward. 
At the same time, increasing oil prices and foreign exchange revenues lead to higher 
volumes of imports. As the Iranian industrial output is highly dependent on imported 
raw and capital intermediaries, the volume of domestic production will rise, shifting the 
supply curve to the right. However, the limited capacity of domestic industries and 
inefficiency of production technology impede the rapid adjustment of supply section to 
increased demand. Furthermore, the international trade sanctions during the Iran-Iraq 
war and the US trade sanctions in the most years after the war have increased the extra 
burden on limited production capacity. This circumstance restricts the shift of the AS 
curve. Thus, the combination of movements of supply and demand curves will increase 
the level of production and prices in the economy. The other explanation for inflationary 
effects of positive oil price shocks can be discussed through the “Dutch disease” 
phenomenon. 
The response of inflation to decreasing oil prices is also interesting. Inflation responds 
positively to a negative oil price shock. When oil revenues fall because of negative oil 
price shocks, the level of imported raw and capital intermediaries, which is mainly 
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financed through oil revenues, will decrease. Thus, domestic production will decrease. 
This means a shift of the supply curve to the left. Because of deficit spending through 
borrowing of the government from the central bank (or recently withdrawals from oil 
stabilization account), which raise the base money and money supply, the demand curve 
shifts to the right. A combination of these two shifts in demand and supply curves leads 
to increased prices and to a reduction of the production level in the economy. The 
economy suffers from inflationary pressures with both positive and negative oil price 
shocks. 
The second theme investigated in this dissertation is the interaction of political power 
structure with oil rents and their effects on Iranian economic growth. The natural 
resource curse hypothesis discusses that the economies which are rich in point resources 
(e.g. oil and gas) have a weaker economic performance. This is called the natural 
resource curse hypothesis. In most recent cross-country studies, the sign of resource 
dependence or abundance variable in the growth equation was negative. However, if we 
accept the curse hypothesis of oil resources, we might ask the question why it should be 
that some resource rich economies such as Norway are performing well. It seems that 
oil in itself is not the curse. The oil revenues can be a source of start-up capital for 
developing countries like Iran. It becomes a curse when factions and political parties 
struggle to gain a higher share in these rents. This study is the first examination which 
takes into consideration political factionalism interaction with oil rents in the case of 
Iran. The results show that oil resources have a direct positive effect on economic 
growth in Iran. However, the interaction effect of factionalism (as a proxy for political 
asymmetry degree) with oil rents is negative and significant. That means that increased 
competition of different political factions for power (and in the absence of  any single 
dominant group) and higher oil rents have negative effects on growth.  
The third theme which is examined in this study is illegal trade in Iran. This topic is also 
related to natural resource management in Iran. A large number of fuel products 
smuggled from Iran are due to heavy subsidies within the country. These subsidies are 
financed by oil revenues. This is of course not only related to fuel products. In this 
study, I measure the amount of illegal trade in Iran, identifying the major causes and 
indicators of smuggling. For the first time, I control for political and economic 
institutional quality besides the other major causes of smuggling in Iran. The other 
novelty of this study is controlling for indirect effects of major causal variables on 
smuggling. Thus, I have used the interaction terms in model specifications. The average 
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of illegal trade in Iran’s total trade is 13%. The value of annual illegal trade, on average, 
is within the range of $ 2.5 - 3 billion.  
The fourth topic which is examined in this dissertation is macroeconomic populism in 
Iran. The main source of financing populism spending in Iran is the oil revenues. 
Therefore, it is connected to the management of natural resources. This analysis is based 
on the Dornbusch and Edwards (1990) framework. They modelled the political life of 
populist governments in four phases. I have used this framework to examine the 
conditions which on the one hand led to the presidency of Ahmadinejad and to its 
predicted fall on the other. It seems that the political behaviour of Ahmadinejad is in 
line with the predictions of the Dornbusch and Edwards (1990) model.  
6.2 Future research 
For future research, it would be rewarding to examine the role of natural resources in 
the economic growth of other oil rich countries, taking into consideration the political 
power structure. This might shed more light on the puzzle of the resource curse. This 
dissertation has also clarified how to measure illegal trade through economic analysis, 
which would be a useful basis for other empirical studies about illegal trade in other 
countries. There are few studies on the oil-GDP nexus in major oil exporting countries 
in the Middle Eastern region. This study provides necessary guidelines for further 
empirical analysis of this relationship for these countries too. After all, it is crucial to 
know how these countries’ economies respond to high volatile oil markets in order to 
reduce the negative and costly effects.  
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